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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Human societies are regulated by a set of institutions. According to the Handbook of
New Institutional Economics, institutions are “the written and unwritten rules, norms
and constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environ-
ment. These include (i) written rules and agreements that govern contractual rela-
tions and corporate governance, (ii) constitutions, laws and rules that govern politics,
government, finance, and society more broadly, and (iii) unwritten codes of conduct,
norms of behavior, and beliefs.” (p.1) A fundamental feature distinguishing societies
lies in the system of rules established to achieve social goals such as efficiency and
equity in the distribution of goods and services.
My dissertation uses the laboratory as a testing ground for the performances of
various institutional designs and the influences of heterogeneity on their established
properties. It consists of three parts. The first part (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) studies
and compares economic institutions in public economics. The second part (Chapter
4 and Chapter 5) examines the impact of two types of heterogeneity on performances
of economic institutions. The third part (Chapter 6) provides an example of how
heterogeneity affects the choices of institutions.
1.1 Testing institutions via controlled laboratory experiments
One important purpose of controlled laboratory experiments is to test and compare
economic institutions such as trading rules, matching mechanisms, or auction de-
signs. In these laboratory experiments, subjects are placed in an artificial, controlled
environment, specifying their preferences, goals, initial endowments, as well as the
cost and benefit of their choices. Institutions are communicated to the subjects in the
form of systems of rules regulating behavior.
1
2 INTRODUCTION
The main reason why the laboratory is well suited for testing institutions is that we
can define the rules and the reward structure exactly according to the assumptions of
the theory. If we fail to do this in the laboratory, then we cannot hope to control for
these factors in a “naturally occurring environment”. Moreover, the randomization
of subjects to treatment eliminates bias from the endogeneity issue. Given such a con-
trolled environment and a specific group of subjects, if a mechanism fails to perform,
we have reasons to doubt its external validity in a less-controlled environment (Fio-
rina and Plott (1978)). For detailed discussions on experimental methodology and
comprehensive surveys on experimental results see Smith (1976), Smith (1982), Smith
(1994), Plott (1982), Davis and Holt (1993), Roth (1995), Guala (2005) and Alm (2011).
Take an early study on auctions by Coppinger et al. (1980) as an example. In this
study, the authors experimentally compare various kinds of auctions (Dutch, English,
first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions). According to the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem by Vickrey (1961), all auctions satisfying a set of conditions should yield the
same revenue to the seller.1 Coppinger et al. invited university students as subjects
of the experiment to bid for a fictitious good. Individual values of the bid are induced
by promising a resale value by cash minus the cost if the bid if a subject wins the
bid. Information is presented to the subject in the same way as assumed in theory.
The main finding of the experiment is that bidding prices in the first-price sealed-bid
auction are significantly higher than other forms and subjects learn quite differently
in these auctions. This example illustrates how an experimental laboratory serve as
a test bed, or “wind tunnel”, to check the robustness of institutions even before they
are implemented in the real world.
The first part of my dissertation focuses on this theme. In particular, Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 study the effect of economic institutions in the two main research areas in
the field of public economics: tax auditing and peer punishment mechanism in public
goods contributions.
Chapter 2 experimentally examines a new auditing rule, the bounded rule, which
is a better representation of an actual audit selection procedure. The basic setting
follows a classic tax-compliance game in which each taxpayer receives either high or
low income with certain probabilities. The traditional rule audits every low-income
report with a constant probability. The bounded rule audits a randomly selected sam-
ple of low-income reports whenever the number of these reports exceeds the maxi-
mum number of audits allowed by the budget, or otherwise all of the low-income
reports. The experimental evidence suggests that the bounded rule deters potential
tax cheaters more cost-effectively.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of peer punishment on promoting cooperation in
the presence of a third-party judge. In a naturally occurring environment, the right
1These conditions include: (i) the bidder with the highest type/signal/value always wins, (ii) the
bidder with the lowest possible type/value/signal expects zero surplus, (iii) all bidders are risk neutral
and (iv) all bidders are drawn from a strictly increasing distribution.
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to propose sanctions is often separated from the right to implement sanctions. For
instance, when a car driver hurts a cyclist, the latter may sue the former and claim
compensation for the damage. It is a judge who ultimately decides whether the pun-
ishment request is to be implemented. We design an experiment based on a pris-
oner’s dilemma game to study the effectiveness of punishment in this situation. Play-
ers’ punishment decisions will be implemented only if an independent third player
approves the proposal. We find that both cooperation rate and earnings are signifi-
cantly lower when a third party decides whether the players’ punishment decision,
if any, should be implemented. The reason is that both proposed and implemented
punishment on defectors is lower when the third party has the final decision on the
punishment implementation. Although the intervention of the third party also de-
creases anti-social punishment, overall it reduces the effectiveness of punishment in
promotion cooperation.
1.2 Heterogeneous behavior in the lab
One typical pattern in almost all experiments is that individual decisions exhibit a
considerable degree of heterogeneity. For instance, in Chapter 2, around 60 percent of
the subjects do not behave in accordance with theory prediction. That is, they switch
between honestly reporting and underreporting their income with various levels of
frequency. As a result, theory under-predicts the deterrence power of auditing mech-
anisms.
There are many possible explanations for behavioral differences across individu-
als. They differ in cognitive ability in understanding a mechanism, or they vary in
monetary incentives, or they have diverse interpretations on the “socially appropri-
ate” behavior in a particular situation. In Chapter 3, for example, third-party judges
need to make a decision whether to uphold punishment proposals from cooperators
on defectors. The result is that responses of the subjects vary substantially. As a result,
the actual performance of an economic institution often deviates from the theoretical
prediction, which often assumes that players are homogeneous. Understanding how
a specific kind of heterogeneity triggers systematic behavioral differences helps to in-
crease the predictable power of economic models and permits an investigation of the
robustness of an institution.
The second part of the dissertation aims at addressing how heterogeneity affects
the performances of institutions predicted by standard game theory. In order to have
tight control over the environment, I induce exogenous heterogeneity among subjects
and compare their behavior under identical interaction rules. Doing so facilitates an
understanding of the conditions under which the current properties of an institution
break down.
One source of behavioral heterogeneity I investigate is being a group or an indi-
vidual. In the business world, many decisions are made by groups such as boards
4 INTRODUCTION
of directors or management teams. However, much of the economic theory does not
distinguish between the two types.
Chapter 4 investigates how group decision makers differ from individual decision
makers in terms of market performance. In particular, it compares the behavior of
individuals and groups in a repeated sequential Stackelberg market game. Previ-
ous experimental literature on intergroup-interindividual decision making suggests
that groups are more selfish than individuals. That means in a sequential two-player
Stackelberg game, group decisions are predicted to be closer to the subgame-perfect
equilibrium than those of individuals.
However, we find that the behavior of groups is farther away from the subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the stage game than that of individuals. To a large extent,
this result is independent of the method of eliciting choices (truly sequential play or
strategy method) and the model used to account for the observed first- and second-
mover behavior. The reason lies in the aggregation of individual preferences among
group members. In a repeated sequential game, individuals proposing punishment
on “greedy” first movers and reward on “nice” ones wins the debate in group discus-
sions. Therefore, collective decisions are polarized in a different direction compared
to one-shot games, which was the exclusive focus of the literature. Although the
difference between groups and individuals are to the opposite of what previous liter-
ature expects, it still implies that ignoring decisions made by groups or individuals is
likely to decrease the prediction power of an economic model under a specific set of
interaction rules.
In public goods provision, an important source of heterogeneity lies in the abilities
of individuals or the cost of cooperation. Take an example of building some street
lamps in a neighborhood. As households differ in wealth or the need to use these
street lamps, they have different incentives to invest in building such a public good.
Think of another example where a group of individuals that must complete a project
for which all group members will receive equal credit. However, the effort of some
group members, because of higher productivity in the required task, yields greater
benefits for all than the same effort from other members. In both cases, the marginal
cost or benefits from contribution differ across households or individuals, making it
more difficult to reach consensus on the appropriate level of contribution.
Chapter 5 examines the extent to which a punishment mechanism functions when
group members have heterogeneous marginal cost and benefit of contribution. In
a public goods game setting, I vary the marginal per capita return (MPCR) among
group members, so that there are two high and two low productivity players. A well
established finding in the experimental public goods literature is that a decentralized,
peer punishment mechanism increases cooperation (e.g. Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr
and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2002), Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton et al. (2007)).
However, comparatively little attention has been paid to scenarios in which agents
have asymmetric impacts of contributions on group welfare.
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Experimental results indicate that in the absence of sanctions, productivity het-
erogeneity hampers cooperation. Allowing punishment in these groups significantly
enhances the average contributions of group members, but does not increase wel-
fare. In groups in which cooperation is highly successful, high-productivity agents
actively punish low-productivity agents in initial periods. However, conditional on
individual contributions, high-productivity agents receive more punishment, and be-
have more responsively by raising their contributions in the next period.
1.3 The effect of heterogeneity on institutional choices
In reality, economic institutions are neither manna from heaven nor exogenously im-
posed by a fictitious Walrasian auctioneer. In contrast, members of a society often
endogenously select the (explicit or implicit) rules that govern their interactions in so-
cial and economic exchanges. Examples include the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (i.e. Kyoto-protocol).
Members of these organizations agree upon a series of rules of conduct. If a member
later catches another violating certain rules, it could file a suit against the rule viola-
tors and demand sanction. Endogenously elected institutions also exist in many areas
of daily life. For instance, households in a neighborhood gather together and agree
upon the maintenance of their own gardens. If a neighbor thinks one’s garden is not
being taken good care of, s/he could directly complain to the neighbors, or even ask
the community to intervene.
If all individuals are homogenous and their preferences for cooperation are per-
fectly aligned, it might be much less of a problem to agree upon the same institutional
rule. For instance, Ertan et al. (2009) show that effective sanction institutions emerge
from a simple voting process when individuals are symmetric.
However, this may not be the case if players are heterogeneous. If an institution
is enacted to facilitate the enforcement of a norm, the heterogeneous structure of the
environment may lead to conflict in the voting process and thus to inefficient out-
comes. This may make it more difficult to achieve consensus on which institution to
implement and may lead to a conflict between different types of agent. Such conflicts
may prove sustained and durable, with adverse long-term effects on efficiency.
Chapter 6 shows an example of how heterogeneity could lead to suboptimal insti-
tutional choice. More specifically, this chapter investigates the effect of heterogene-
ity on institution selection via a voluntary contributions game. Players may punish
others after contributions are made and observed. Following Chapter 5, we induce
heterogeneous productivity of contributions by varying the marginal-per-capita re-
turn among individuals: two high and two low productivity players. Every two or
eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime,
in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment di-
rected toward them. The punishment system can be conditional on type and contribu-
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tion history. The data indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions
and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of
productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of groups converge to this system. The
result is due to self-defensive voting: subjects attempt to shut down the punishment
channels that might target themselves.
The final chapter of this dissertation is a brief conclusion. It summarizes key
lessons from each chapter and discusses future research questions.
CHAPTER 2
DETERRENCE EFFECT OF AUDITING RULES 1
2.1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a central research topic in public economics. To combat tax evasion,
researchers have studied various auditing mechanisms, in which taxpayers have to
pay fines if they are caught evading taxes. The simplest way to model the auditing
procedure is to assume that each taxpayer is independently selected for audit with a
constant probability. In this paper, we term this the traditional rule. Due to its sim-
plicity, the traditional rule been widely assumed and studied in the tax compliance
literature (see, for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974), Moser
et al. (1995), Zimbelman and Waller (1999), Boylan and Sprinkle (2001), Kim et al.
(2005), Kim and Waller (2005), Alm et al. (2009) and Kleven et al. (2010)).
1This chapter is joint work with Andrew Yim. We are particularly grateful for the valuable sugges-
tions by Ralph-C Bayer, Luc Bissonnette, Eddy Cardinaels, Vilen Lipatov, Wieland Müller and Charles
Noussair. We thank James Alm, Cedric Argenton, Rudolf Avenhaus, Jochen Bigus, Kim Bloomquist,
Folkert Botma, Liesbeth Bruynseels, Douglas DeJong, Lata Gangadharan, Karla Johnstone, Steven
Kachelmeier, William Kinney, Tobias Klein, Ben Li, Ksenia Panidi, Jan Potters, Ernesto Reuben, Jason
Shachat, Joel Slemrod, Bin Srinidhi, Konrad Stahl, Jeroen Suijs, Stefan Trautmann, Peter van Oudheus-
den, Zongxin Qian, Arthur van Soest, Gijs van de Kuilen, Ann Vanstraelen, Eyal Winter, Shlomo Yitzhaki
and seminar participants of Tilburg University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Vienna,
Maastricht University, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, the GSS interdisciplinary
workshop at CentER, 2010 Behavioral Decision Research in Management (BDRM) Conference held at
Carnegie Mellon University and 66th Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance
(IIPF), 6th PhD Presentation Meeting of the Royal Economic Society at London, UK, Annual Meeting
of the Spanish Economic Association (SAEe) at Madrid, Spain, and Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion and
Money Laundering Conference at Muenster, Germany for helpful comments. We thank Chung Kim and
Michael McKee for sharing their experimental instructions, and CentER lab for financial support. Siqi
Pan and Huojun Sun provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours.
7
8 DETERRENCE EFFECT OF AUDITING RULES
Albeit simple and easily applicable, the traditional rule has some undesirable fea-
tures. To begin with, the traditional rule is far from being a realistic description of
the actual practice. Most organizations, public and private alike, plan their activities
such as auditing according to the committed budget of a period. Once the budget is
allocated for a certain purpose, it becomes difficult to be reshuffled during the course
of a fiscal year. Hence, if the proportion of the “red-flagged” (suspicious) tax returns
reports varies significantly across years, it is difficult for the auditor to maintain a
target audit probability. Moreover, given the fact that the auditor has to formulate an
auditing strategy given a fixed budget, such a simple random auditing rule may not
be an efficient way to use the audit resources of a tax agency.
In addition, most of the current studies focus on a one-to-one interaction between
a tax authority and a taxpayer, while neglecting the impact of social interactions of
taxpayers on evasion decisions. Recent studies on tax behavior from an economic
psychology perspective argue that decisions to comply are affected by personal, so-
cial and societal norms (Kirchler (2007)). Personal norm, which is defined as “a moral
imperative that one should deliberately comply”, is associated with factors such as
moral reasoning, religious beliefs and political party preference. Social norm, accord-
ing to Wenzel (2005), is “prevalence or acceptance of tax evasion among a reference
group” (e.g. friends, colleagues or acquaintances). Societal (or cultural) norms, which
reflect the general attitude towards tax evasion in a large population, are often termed
tax morale or civic duty. In summary, the compliance decisions of taxpayers do not
merely depend on their isolated assessments of economic variables such as income,
audit probability and fine, but also on their beliefs on what they should do and what
others do. Given the limited audit resources of a tax authority for a fixed period of
time, the interdependent beliefs of the taxpayers may affect their compliance deci-
sions, and consequently the ex-post probability of being audited. This could lead to
distinctive decision dynamics and equilibria across societies.
A recent paper by Yim (2009) analyzes an auditing rule known as the bounded rule
to address these undesirable features of the traditional rule. He argues that owing to
a budget constraint, a tax authority cannot perform more than some fixed number of
audits. Hence, the bounded rule is a variable-rate rule. That means a tax authority
should always exhaust all the audit resources, i.e. audit up to the maximum number
given the budget constraint if necessary. Because the number of reports selected for
audit is bounded by the audit capacity, the audit probability facing a taxpayer varies.
A taxpayer has to infer the audit probability by forming expectations on others’ deci-
sions. Through this channel, he naturally incorporates the analysis of beliefs via game
theory. The main result of Yim (2009) is that given that taxpayers are self-interested
utility maximizers, the bounded rule could induce the same level of compliance as
the traditional rule.
This paper asks two research questions. First, is the actual compliance under the
bounded rule the same as the traditional rule widely studied in the literature? In par-
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ticular, does the bounded rule trigger more thoughts on others’ decisions and hence
lead to different levels of compliance? Second, how does the level of strategic uncer-
tainty affect behavior? That is, how will taxpayers react when they are less certain of
the actual audit probability faced? Are they more or less likely to think that others
will cheat on taxes?
This paper takes an experimental approach to examine the bounded rule empiri-
cally. Compared to field data, the laboratory provides tight controls on tax reporting
institutions (audit probability, tax rate, and income level). Moreover, it also allows us
to measure tax evasion behavior repeatedly and inexpensively without the measure-
ment errors which exist in field data (see the discussions in Torgler (2002)).
Our laboratory setting follows the key features of a classical tax compliance game
first developed by Graetz et al. (1986). Every taxpayer has a certain probability of
receiving high or low income. Knowing a certain auditing rule, they have to decide
simultaneously and independently whether to report their income truthfully to the
tax authority. The traditional rule audits every low-income report with a constant
probability. The bounded rule audits a randomly selected sample of low- income re-
ports whenever the number of these reports exceeds the maximum number of audits
allowed by the budget, or otherwise all of the low-income reports. Depending on
the treatment, the tax authority implements either the traditional or the bounded rule
after deducting taxes according to players’ reported income.
To examine the first question, we select parameters for the bounded rule such that
1) the deterrence effect of the bounded rule in this treatment is the same as that of
the traditional rule; and 2) the level of strategic uncertainty is low in that players are
more certain about the audit probability. To study the second question, we increase
the level of strategic uncertainty among players. The equilibria depend on the inde-
pendent beliefs of the taxpayers. If they are too optimistic (pessimistic) about their
underreporting decisions, they will all choose underreporting (honestly reporting) in
equilibrium.
The main results of our experiment are the following. Consistent with the the-
oretical predictions, the bounded rule induces the same level of tax compliance as
the traditional rule. When the level of strategic uncertainty increases, the bounded
rule becomes even more effective in deterring tax evaders even though the maximum
number of audits of a tax authority does not change. The data also show that theory
over-predicts the level of evasion. In other words, the compliance level under both
rules is higher than theoretical predictions. To explain this, we develop a bounded
rational model where taxpayers play the more profitable strategy with higher proba-
bilities. We find that behavior in our data is consistent with loss aversion combined
with random decision errors.
Our paper makes the following contributions to the tax compliance literature. To
begin with, this study is the first empirical examination of the bounded rule, which
explicitly models interactions among taxpayers and therefore offers the possibility of
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modeling the effect of norms on tax evasion decisions in the language of economics
(i.e. game theory). By comparing the level of compliance induced by the bounded
rule and a well studied flat-rate rule in a controlled laboratory experiment, we set the
stage for using this rule to examine the effect of norms on taxpayers’ decisions in the
future.
In addition, experimental data suggest that uncertainty from other taxpayers’ ac-
tions could be a source leading to the “tax-compliance” puzzle. That is, even though
taxpayers may be aware of the limited audit capacity of a tax authority, the uncer-
tainty of others’ decisions makes it difficult to access the actual audit probability. This
is particularly so when the degree of uncertainty is high. From the policy viewpoint,
strategic uncertainty could be used as a very good resource to deter tax evasion.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes studies aiming at de-
veloping and testing non-random auditing rules in the literature. Section 2.3 describes
the tax-compliance model and auditing rules that are examined in the experiment.
Section 2.4 constructs an experimental design and presents the testing hypotheses.
Section 2.5 analyses the experimental data with both nonparametric and parametric
methods. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
2.2 Conditional audit mechanisms
The traditional rule and its variants are widely studied in the literature (see the lit-
erature review by Andreoni et al. (1998), Alm and McKee (1998) and Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002)). A meta study by Blackwell (2007) based on twenty laboratory exper-
imental studies finds that an increase in audit probability or fine rate leads to higher
compliance, but the tax rate has no significant effect.
Some papers argue that an efficient way to deter tax cheaters is by letting auditing
probabilities depend on history (Harrington (1988), Landsberger and Meilijson (1982)
and Greenberg (1984)). If taxpayers are caught to be non-compliant in the current
period, their future audit probability and fines are increased. Friesen (2003) proposes
an alternative mechanism where the fine and audit probability decreases when tax-
payers are compliant in the current period. Friesen argues this mechanism reduces
auditing costs compared with the strategy suggested by Harrington (1988).
Cason and Gangadharan (2006) experimentally test the Harrington (1988) model
by assigning a higher (lower) auditing probability and a more severe fine to taxpay-
ers who are detected evading (complying with) taxes. The model predicts that tax-
payers with lower compliance cost should not evade taxes in this setting. The data
qualitatively support this finding. Clark et al. (2004) conduct an experiment to com-
pare two specific schemes - Harrington’s past-compliance rule (Harrington (1988))
and Friesen’s optimal rule (Friesen (2003)) – against the random auditing rule. The
data suggest that the random auditing rule generally deters tax evaders effectively,
although more audits are needed compared to the optimal rule. The past-compliance
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rule is intermediate both in terms of deterrence and cost of audit.
Another strand of literature lets audit probability depend on reported income.
Reinganum and Wilde (1985) analyze an “audit cutoff” policy in which an audit is
triggered if the reported income is below a certain threshold, and otherwise no au-
dit if the reported income is above the threshold. They show that there exists an
equilibrium where the audit probability is decreasing in the level of reported income;
and that all taxpayers underreport, although by an amount which decreases in true
income. Follow-up papers conclude that if the audit probability could depend on re-
ported income, the optimal strategy for the auditor is to randomly audit individuals
who report below some threshold level of income. In equilibrium, only low-income
taxpayers report honestly, while high-income taxpayers report exactly at the thresh-
old level (Sanchez and Sobel (1993), Cremer and Gahvari (1996), Mookherjee and Png
(1989), Scotchmer (1987) , Bayer and Cowell (2009)).
The above models require the auditor to announce and commit to an audit policy
before receiving taxpayers’ reports. Many later papers assume that the auditor is
also a strategic player who chooses an audit probability based on reported income.
Graetz et al. (1986) consider a model with two levels of true income for taxpayers
and an unlimited budget for the auditor. They characterize a unique mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium for the interaction between taxpayers and the auditor. Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002) provide detailed discussion on these alternative auditing rules.
Alm et al. (1993) experimentally compare the effectiveness of several auditing
rules: a purely random rule; a forward-looking rule which increases future auditing
probabilities of current tax evaders; a backward-looking rule which triggers audits of
taxpayers if they are caught cheating on taxes in the current period; and a cut-off rule
combining a sure audit below a threshold on reported income and a small, random
audit above the threshold. They find that the cut-off rule is the most effective in de-
terring tax evaders. Unlike the bounded rule, however, the cut-off requires a large
number of random audits. Apart from that, the endogenous auditing rules in their
paper implicitly assume that the tax auditor does not face a budget constraint, as the
overall number of audits is based on the decisions of the taxpayers.
In all the above studies, the tax evasion game still focuses on the interaction be-
tween the auditor and a taxpayer, without inducing interactions among taxpayers.
Alm and McKee (2004) experimentally study a cut-off rule with audit probability de-
pending on a cut-off threshold as well as the deviation of an individual’s reported
income from the average of the incomes reported by all other players. This mecha-
nism induces a coordination problem for taxpayers who want to cheat on taxes. They
include treatments with and without pre-play communication. The main finding is
that pre-play communication helps players to strategically coordinate on reporting
the threshold income. Adding some random audits on the threshold into the original
mechanism helps to overcome the player coordination problem. Our paper differs
from theirs in that taxpayers within a group do not always receive the same level of
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income in a given period. Furthermore, the interaction induced by the bounded rule
among taxpayers does not always need to be a coordination game.
Gilpatric et al. (2011) study two endogenous audit mechanisms both analytically
and experimentally. The tournament audit mechanism audits K out of N players
for which the difference between the expected and actual production reports is the
largest. The generalized relative evaluation (GRE) mechanism audits a firm based on
how much lower the reported output is compared to other peers in the same group.
They find that compliance levels are similar between the two endogenous schemes
but are both higher than a simple random audit. Compared to their study, our simpler
setup with equally suspicious low-income reports allows us to clearly examine the ef-
fect of audit capacity on the interactions among taxpayers. With this setup, one can
understand whether the effects of the tournament / generalized relative evaluation
mechanisms studied by Gilpatric et al. (2011) are driven by the relative evaluation
feature of the mechanisms, or maybe other effects of an audit rule without relative
evaluation but with an audit capacity. Moreover, due to different setups of the mod-
els, the game of our study could be a dominance solvable game or a coordination
game instead of a game with a unique symmetric equilibrium in their setting. If the
audit capacity that characterizes the bounded rule does indeed capture a salient fea-
ture of the reality, then maybe a tax authority with its enforcement strength restrained
by the audit capacity also faces the uncertainty of ending up in the “bad” equilibrium
of a multiple-equilibrium game. It is an empirical issue to verify whether people can
tacitly coordinate to play the equilibrium undesirable to the tax authority. Our study
provides some evidence to answer the question.
The auditing rule proposed by Yim (2009) is the closest to our study. In this model,
a tax auditor first selects a committed budget to set aside resources that may be used
to support audits in the current period, given the income distribution of the taxpayers.
Knowing the budget selected by the tax auditor, the taxpayers simultaneously decide
to report their income. Then the auditor implements a certain auditing rule to catch
tax evaders. Yim analytically demonstrates that the bounded rule is the most efficient
auditing rule, which demands the lowest committed budget necessary to maintain a
given level of deterrence.
A key assumption distinguishing this paper from Yim (2009) is the ability of the
auditor to commit to an auditing strategy. In Yim (2009), the auditor interacts strate-
gically with taxpayers, and chooses the audit probability on observing the behavior
of taxpayers. In theory, we can construct the two auditing rules such that the induced
compliance level is the same when auditors and taxpayers play Nash equilibrium in
both games. Nevertheless, this requires a demanding understanding of the game and
mutual belief in each others’ actions. Any off-equilibrium decisions by the auditors
will lead to the behavior of the taxpayers being incomparable under the two rules.
In this study, we let the auditor commit to an auditing strategy so that the focus is
on the reactions of the taxpayers. Consequently, this paper should not be considered
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as a direct test of Yim’s model, as the properties of the bounded rule explored in this
study are fundamentally different. Instead, it focuses on examining whether and how
human subjects react to the two rules.
2.3 Model description
The model of this paper builds upon Yim (2009), which follows some basic features
of a classic tax-compliance game developed by Graetz et al. (1986). Consider a player
population of size N. For simplicity, the model assumes two income classes: high and
low, denoted IH and IL, respectively, where IL < IH. Each player has a probability q
of being a high-income taxpayer (H-type) and 1− q of being a low-income taxpayer
(L-type), where 0 < q < 1. Players know the type distribution as well as their own
types, but they do not know the exact types of the other players. Each player has
to decide simultaneously and privately whether to report high income (IH) or low
income (IL) to the tax authority. Let TH and TL for the tax payment by high- and low-
income taxpayers, respectively, where TH < IH, TL < IL, and TL < TH. If cheaters
are audited, then a fine F is imposed on top of the tax they should have paid (F > 0).
However, taxpayers who report truthfully are never fined and incur no cost if they
are audited. The following analysis assumes that players are homogeneous, rational,
risk-neutral profit maximizers.
The traditional rule can be presented easily. Any taxpayer who has filed a “low-
income” report will face a flat probability aTR of being audited independently. Since
reporting truthfully does not incur any cost when being audited, L-type players al-
ways report their income truthfully. If they report high income, they will be taxed TH,
which is strictly larger than the tax TL they need to pay if they honestly state income.
For H-type players, the honest-reporting payoff is IH − TH. If they underreport, the
payoff is IH − TL if they are not audited, and IH − TH − F if they are audited. There-
fore, they choose to underreport if and only if the expected profit is strictly larger:
(1− aTR)(IH − TL) + aTR(IH − TH − F) > (IH − TH).
If the audit probability is less than the threshold ā defined by
a = (TH − TL)/(F + TH − TL),
the H-type players will underreport. Otherwise, if the audit probability is larger
than ā, they choose to report truthfully.
The bounded rule is characterized by the maximum number of K audits allowed,
given a budget. It then constructs an audit sample size contingent on the number of
“low-income” reports L. If L is smaller than or equal to the audit capacity K, the audi-
tor will audit all L reports. However, if L is strictly larger than K, then the auditor will
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randomly audit K reports. Expressed more formally, every “ low-income” taxpayer
under the bounded rule faces the following audit probability:
aBD =
{
1 if L ≤ K
K/L if L > K
for L = 0, 1, ...N.
The key feature of the bounded rule is that the audit probability aBD is no longer
exogenously given. Instead, it depends on the audit capacity K and the number of
reported “low-income” files L. The latter is a function of population size N and
the ex-ante probability q being an H-type. The following proposition characterizes
a property of the bounded rule.
Proposition 2.1 For any given N and q, the auditor can always choose an audit capacity K
for the bounded rule such that it induces the same compliance level as the traditional rule.
Proof: See appendix 2.A.
The intuition of Proposition 2.1 is as follows. Any audit probability aTR under the
traditional rule induces all-or-none compliance behavior. If the maximum number
of K is so high that all “low-income” reports will always be audited, H-type players
will have no incentive to underreport. On the other hand, if K is zero (meaning that
no audit is conducted regardless of the number of “low-income” reports submitted),
then H-type players will underreport with certainty. Between these two extreme cases
there exists a threshold K̄ such that any K > K̄ sustains compliance behavior regard-
less of the actual income-realization parameter q. That is, even in the scenario where
all taxpayers claim low income, the audit probability is still high enough to deter tax
evasion.
To induce full compliance, however, the committed budget K does not always need
to be larger than K̄. Put differently, even when K < K̄, the bounded rule is still able
to induce full compliance. Depending on the parameters, the interactions among
taxpayers induced by the bounded rule could either be a dominance-solvable game
with one unique equilibrium, or a coordination game with multiple equilibria. We




The tax-compliance game in all treatments has three stages: (i) income reporting and
tax deduction, (ii) audit and fine deduction, and (iii) feedback. Subjects receive either
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Table 2.1: Experimental treatments
Treatment High-income Audit probability a Number of Number of
probability q or capacity k subjects sessions
Baseline 0.5 a = 0.4 64 4
Bounded 0.5 K = 2 64 4
Bounded-Hq 0.9 K = 2 64 4
high income (IH) e25 or low income (IL) e10 with probability (q) 0.5. Subjects are in-
formed about the group size N and the probability q. Based on the capacity constraint
in the lab, the size of the taxpayer population is fixed to be N = 8. The parameter q
is either 0.5 or 0.9 depending on the treatment. During the income-reporting stage,
they have to decide simultaneously and independently the type of income to report
to an auditor, which is simulated by a computer. The computer automatically deducts
taxes according to the reported income. The tax for subjects reporting “high income”
(TH) is e12.5, whereas the tax for subjects reporting “low income” (TL) is e2.5.2 Sub-
jects are told that taxes are deducted based on their reported income instead of true
income. For instance, H-type players receive e22.5, instead of e12.5, if they submit
“low-income” reports. Similarly, L-type players receive -e2.5, instead of e7.5, if they
submit “high-income” reports.3 In the audit stage, the computer implements either a
traditional rule or a bounded rule to audit “low-income” taxpayers.
Table 2.1 summarizes the treatment design.
Traditional: In this treatment, subjects filing “low-income” reports face an indepen-
dent audit probability of 0.4. This audit probability induces the same compliance rate
to the bounded rule.4 If they report honestly, nothing will happen to their final pay-
offs. However, if cheaters are caught by the auditor, then they need to pay back the
e10 of taxes evaded plus a fine (F) of e10.
Bounded: In this treatment, the audit probability depends on the total number of
“ low-income” reports received. The maximum number of audits to be conducted is
K = 2. This means that if the number of low-income reports does not exceed two,
2Experimental parameters concerning taxation are chosen to be in line with reality. For instance,
the real-world tax rates for high-income and low-income taxpayers are usually dependent on the levels
of their incomes. In particular, many countries such as Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and
the USA use a progressive tax system instead of a proportional one. Hence, this experiment adopts a
progressive tax system for the sake of facilitating subjects’ understanding.
3Even when a subject with low income makes a loss by submitting “high income” reports and that
decision is selected for payment, the potential loss is covered by a show-up fee of e3. During the
experiment sessions, this situation never actually happens.
4Due to the fact that the traditional rule induces all-or-none behavior in compliance, any audit proba-
bility a < 0.5 is theoretically equivalent to the bounded rule. Nevertheless, this statement only holds for
perfectly rational, risk-neutral players. To what extent this holds for risk averse players is an empirical
question to be tested.
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then all of them will be audited with probability 1. Otherwise, the audit probability
decreases monotonically with the number of “low-income” reports L. In particular,
the probability is 0.67 for L = 3; 0.5 for L = 4; 0.4 for L = 5; 0.33 for L = 6; 0.29 for
L = 7; and 0.25 for L = 8. This parameter K guarantees a unique Nash equilibrium
based on non-cooperative game theory (see analysis below). The fine for cheaters is
exactly the same as in the Traditional treatment.
Bounded-Hq: Everything in this treatment remains the same as the Bounded treat-
ment, except that the ex-ante probability of receiving high-income q becomes 0.9 in-
stead of 0.5. A high q roughly resembles a situation where each household in a rich
neighborhood is likely to be wealthy. Compared to the Bounded treatment, subjects in
this treatment face a higher degree of uncertainty, since fewer taxpayers will certainly
submit “low-income” reports. In other words, the fewer L-type players in the popu-
lation who honestly state their type with certainty, the more difficult for the H-type
players to pretend to be L-type. We are interested in knowing whether the bounded
rule loses its deterrence effect in the presence of multiple equilibria.
Admittedly, for each auditing probability in the traditional rule a, there exists more
than one set of parameters N, K, q that trigger the same level of deterrence in theory.
We select N = 8 based on the capacity of a conventional laboratory. Given N =
8, setting K = 2 gives us the possibility to examine the various properties of the
bounded rule with different parameters qs. To maximize the salience while not to the
extreme of q = 1 that all taxpayers in the experiment are surely H-income taxpayers,
we believe q = 0.9 strikes the best balance in this consideration.
2.4.2 Procedures
The experiments are conducted at the CentER Lab in Tilburg University from October
to December 2009. Tilburg University students, mostly majoring in economics or
business, participate as subjects in the experiment. Each treatment consists of four
sessions of 16 subjects each. The duration of a session is about 1 hour (including the
initial instruction and final payment to subjects). The average earnings are e16.23
(including the e3 show-up fee). The experiments are programmed and conducted in
Z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)).
At the beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to the computer
terminals. Before the experiment starts, subjects have to complete an exercise to make
sure they understand the rules of the game.
The game consists of 30 periods. At the beginning of each period, 16 subjects
are randomly allocated into two groups of eight. The random re-matching protocol
minimizes the chances that subjects encounter the same group of participants again.
It simulates a one-shot scenario but allows the subjects to be familiar with the game
environment. At the end of each period, a summary screen is presented to subjects
with feedback information including the subject’s true and reported income, and the
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final payoff for the period. Subjects are not informed of others’ payoffs.
Upon completing the tax-compliance experiment, subjects are asked to complete a
risk elicitation task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2002).The instructions
for the risk elicitation task are handed out only after the tax-compliance game. Hence,
the subjects are not aware of its existence beforehand. In this task, subjects have to
make selections of a set of 21 lottery pairs. Each lottery pair consists of a safe and a
risky lottery. The expected payoff of the risky lottery compared to the safe one is the
lowest in the first pair, and the highest in the last pair. The switching point from the
safe to the risky lottery reflects subjects’ risk tolerance level. These data are used to
explain behavior in the tax-compliance game.
At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to complete two questionnaires.
The first one concerns social background information such as gender, nationality, and
years of studying economics. The second one elicits subjects’ ethical orientation by
the Machiavellian IV scale personality test (see Christie and Geis (1970)).5
During the payment stage, one period of the tax game and the realization of one
lottery are randomly selected to determine the final payment of a subject. This ran-
dom payment scheme mitigates the potential income effect that subjects carry across
games and over different periods within a game.
2.4.3 Theoretical predictions
To derive testable hypotheses, we start by assuming that players are self-interested
profit maximizers. One could argue that some taxpayers are inequality-averse and
hence attempt influence income distributions in the population. In this setting, how-
ever, players do not know the actual realization of the others’ income types. The
incomplete information makes it difficult for the players to equalize payoffs of the
others. To simplify the analysis, we stick to the homoeconomicus assumption. We
then discuss how personal and social norms affect the robustness of predictions.
In this study, the deterrence effect is indicated by the underreporting rate in the
population: namely, the proportion of high-income taxpayers filing “low-income”
reports in a certain period. As discussed in Section 2.3, the analysis focuses on the
H-type players, as the L-type players have a dominant strategy of reporting honestly,
regardless of the auditing rules.6 In the following, let h be the honestly reporting
strategy for H-type players, and u be the underreporting strategy.
Traditional: As the audit probability aTR is set to be 0.4, an underreporting decision
is equivalent to selecting a lottery of e22.5 with probability 0.6 and e2.5 with proba-
bility 0.4. The expected payoff is therefore: E(πu) = e22.5× 0.6+e2.5× 0.4 = e14.5.
5Generally, this test measures a person’s predisposition to act in accordance with one’s own interests
over ethical standards. A higher score indicates that a person is more individualistic and loosely bound
to conventional moral standards.
6The actual percentages of honest reports among L-type taxpayers are 99.68% and 99.28% across
treatments, suggesting that they do play the dominant strategy.
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As it is strictly larger than the certain payoffe12.5 from an honest report, H-type play-
ers are expected to underreport.
Bounded: The H-type players again face the tax-evasion gamble of choosing a cer-
tain payoff of e12.5, or a high payoff of e22.5 if they are not audited but a low payoff
e2.5 otherwise. Unlike the traditional rule, however, the audit probability aBD is not
exogenously given. Instead, it depends on the players’ perception of the actions of
others. In particular, it depends on player i’s subjective belief on the likelihood of the
proportion of “low-income” reports turned in by another player, denoted by Bi.
A “low-income” report could come from two sources. The first source is from a
truth-telling L-type player with probability 1− q. Alternatively, it could come from
H-type players who dishonestly report that they have received low income. If a
player thinks that the underreporting probability of H-type players i is bi, this sce-
nario will occur with probability qbi. Hence, the overall probability of observing a
“low-income” report Bi for player i is the sum of the probabilities in these two situa-
tions: Bi = 1− q + qbi.
The Nash equilibrium in this treatment can be reached by iterated elimination of
dominated strategies. The intuition proceeds as follows. Reporting high income is a
dominated strategy for L-type players, since they have to pay a high tax and incur a
lower payoff than they would otherwise. If the H-type players believe that the L-type
obey dominance, then the strategy of reporting truthfully (h) is dominated. That is,
even when an H-type player believes that no other players evade taxes, the expected
payoff of underreporting is still higher than that of honest reporting. Such a high
expected payoff is caused by a low audit probability strictly less than 0.5, which stems
from the fact that all of the L-type players (about half of the population) state low
income truthfully. The calculation also guarantees that evading taxes is always the
best response for an H-type player when L-type players obey dominance. Proposition
2.2 derives the equilibrium underreporting decisions.
Proposition 2.2 Given the set of parameters (N, K, q) = (8, 2, 0.5), the game introduced
by the bounded rule is dominance solvable. In the equilibrium, both the L-type and H-type
players report “low income”.
Proof: See appendix 2.A.
Bounded-Hq: According to non-cooperative game theory, the introduction of the bounded
rule with the same audit capacity changes the interaction of players into a coordina-
tion game with incomplete information. We ignore other asymmetric equilibria in
a symmetric setting, as these equilibria require unrealistic coordination among sym-
metric players.
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Proposition 2.3 Given the set of parameters (N, K, q) = (8, 2, 0.9), the game has two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In the pure-strategy equi-
libria, L-type players play their dominant strategy of reporting truthfully. All H-type players
opt for underreporting (truth-reporting) if they believe other H-type players are going to cheat
with probability higher(lower) than 0.432. There is also a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, in which H-type players underreport with probability 0.432.
Proof: See appendix 2.A.
The analysis so far assumes that taxpayers are all homo-economicus, self-interested
profit maximizers. However, field studies categorised taxpayers as “typical taxpay-
ers”, “honest taxpayers” or “tax evaders” based on their attitudes towards tax evasion
(see Kirchler (1998)). Even in controlled laboratory experiments with low stakes and
punishment, many studies still find a considerable number of subjects who constantly
behave honestly (e.g. James and Alley (2002)). Recent economic-psychology research
on tax behavior has focused on the impact of norms on compliance. In particular, we
consider two types of norms that may affect taxpayers’ decisions. The first type is the
personal norm, which is defined as “a moral imperative that one should deliberately
comply” (Kirchler (2007), p59). The sources of personal norm, or tax ethics, could
be moral reasoning (e.g. Trivedi et al. (2003), Kirchler (1998)), strong religious beliefs
(e.g. Torgler (2003)) and political party preference (e.g. Wahlund (1992)).
How does the presence of some honest taxpayers affect predictions if they always
report income truthfully? It turns out that it does not change the direction in terms
of treatment differences. Recall that in the Bounded treatment, the optimal strategy of
the H-type players does not depend on their beliefs towards other H-type players. As
long as they believe that L-types will not play the dominated strategy (i.e. reporting
high income), they can form expectations on the proportion of “low-income” reports
filed in each realized income distribution. Given that the ex-ante probability of being
an L-type player is sufficiently high (q = 0.5), the certain payoff for an H-type player
to report honestly is lower than the expected payoff from underreporting, even when
s/he does not expect any other H-types to underreport. This ensures that all H-type
players will continue to underreport with or without honest players. The analysis in
the Traditional treatment is simpler. As player decisions are independent, the audit
probability facing self-regarding profit maximizers is unaffected by honest players.
In sum, if the percentage of intrinsically honest players is assumed to be the same in
both treatments, the compliance rate is the same.
This analysis for the Bounded-Hq treatment is a bit more complicated. Let each tax-
payer have a probability ρ of being an honest player. If ρ is sufficiently large, strate-
gic players will find underreporting too risky to be worth the attempt. If that is the
case, this modification could be considered as a refinement of the coordination game.
However, if ρ is small, the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium still exists, if a strategic
player has a strong belief in the noncompliance behavior of the other strategic play-
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ers. We find intrinsically honest players consist of 15% of all subjects in the Traditional
treatment. Assuming strategic players correctly anticipate that ρ = 0.15, the thresh-
old beliefs inducing underreporting behavior increases to 0.508. Nonetheless, the two
pure-strategy equilibria remain the same.
The second type of norm is the social norm, which according to Wenzel (2005),
is “prevalence or acceptance of tax evasion among a reference group”. That means
a taxpayer could be “conditionally honest”. If he believes that non-compliance is
widespread and a socially accepted behavior, then s/he is less likely to comply.
Assume that some players are affected by the social norm. In the Traditional treat-
ment, players do not have the opportunity to communicate or to infer the evasion
decisions of the others. Thus, the degree of compliance in the population will depend
on the proportion of taxpayers who think that others will honestly report taxes. In-
tuitively speaking, if the expectations of players are rational, the more self-interested
taxpayers who maximize their expected profit by underreporting their income in the
population, the less likely it is that “conditionally honest taxpayers will act honestly
as well.
Now turn to the Bounded treatment. Regardless of the existence of conditionally
honest taxpayers, self-interested taxpayers will underreport. Similarly to the Tradi-
tional treatment, the more self-interested taxpayers in the population, the less “condi-
tional honest” taxpayers will comply. If the distribution of two types of taxpayers is
the same across treatments (as the subjects are randomly selected from one large pop-
ulation), the presence of “conditional honest” taxpayers should have the same impact
on the level of compliance in both treatments.
Let bTR be the underreporting rate in the Traditional treatment, and bBD be the un-
derreporting rate in the Bounded treatment. The hypothesis is built upon Proposition
2.2:
Hypothesis 2.1 Given the set of parameters (N, K, q) = (8, 2, 0.5), the underreporting rates
are the same under both rules: bTR = bBD.
Although the predictions of the Traditional and the Bounded follow the same direc-
tion, this is less clear for the Bounded-Hq treatment. In the presence of multi-equilibria,
the beliefs and strategies of the self-interested taxpayers and conditional honest tax-
payers are inter-dependent. Although theory does not predict which equilibrium
players will select, experimental papers on coordination games might point out a
direction. Numerous laboratory studies on order-statistic coordination games (e.g.
Huyck et al. (1990), Huyck et al. (1991), Blume and Ortmann (2007), Chaudhuri et al.
(2005)) and stag-hunt games (e.g. Cooper et al. (1990). Cooper et al. (1992)) have re-
ported the attractiveness of a secure strategy. That is, players fail to coordinate on
the payoff dominant equilibrium in those experiments. The robustness of this result
seems to relate to a series of factors in game structures such as group size and the rel-
ative payoff attractiveness of the equilibria, as well as behavioral determinants such
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as initial choices and pre-play communication.7 Since the game structure and design
features in our Bounded-Hq treatment are similar to the coordination games tested in
the previous experiments, we expect a stronger attraction for the risk-dominant equi-
librium. That is, we hypothesize a higher tendency for subjects to honestly report
their income in the Bound-Hq treatment than in the Bounded treatment.
Let bHQ be the underreporting rate in the Bounded-Hq treatment.
Hypothesis 2.2 Given the set of parameters (N, K, q) = (8, 2, 0.9), the underreporting rate
in the Bounded-Hq treatment is lower than that of the Bounded treatment: bHQ < bBD.
2.5 Results
Treatment effects
This subsection focuses on the comparisons of underreporting rates across treatments.
Table 2.2 summarizes the descriptive results of non-compliance behavior and profits
across experimental treatments. Columns 2 to 4 contain averages over all 30 periods
of play, and columns 5 to 7 contain the results for the last 10 periods, where the be-
havioral pattern is more stable. A session is an independent observation, due to the
fact that players of eight are rematched for each period in the Bounded treatment. All
the statistical tests in this section are two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
Results are summarized as follows:
Result 2.1 Hypothesis 2.1 is supported. The observed underreporting rates are not statisti-
cally different between the two treatments.
Support: The overall underreport frequency is 60.83% in the Traditional treatment
and 57.11% in the Bounded treatment where players receive high income. A two-
sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the underreport
frequencies of the two treatments are the same (p = 0.386). In the last 10 periods, the
difference across treatments becomes slightly larger, but is still not statistically signif-
icant (p = 0.564). Note that the statistical power of Result 2.1 is limited due to the
fact that each treatment only consists of 4 independent observations. To see whether
our conclusion on Hypothesis 1 is robust, we have run a logistic regression using
subject-period observations. The dependent variable equals 1 if an H-type subject un-
derreports in a period and 0 if s/he honestly reports in the period. The independent
variable is whether the observation comes from the Bounded or Flat-rate treatment
(with or without social demographic controls). Based on a standard error corrected
for clustering by subject, the estimated coefficient of the treatment variable is negative
but statistically insignificant. This further confirms that the underreporting rates in
the two treatments are statistically indistinguishable.
7For a comprehensive review on the conditions of coordination failure, see Devetag and Ortmann
(2007).
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics across treatments
All 30 periods Last 10 periods
Traditional Bounded Bounded-Hq Traditional Bounded Bounded-Hq
All subjects
High-income probability 0.514 0.491 0.898 0.527 0.519 0.908
(0.007) (0.039) (0.024) (0.042) (0.038) (0.013)
Percentage of 79.741% 78.853% 40.312 % 77.969 % 75.935% 32.971%
“low-income” reports (0.074) (0.015) (0.053) (0.066) (0.018) (0.055)
Average earnings 10.675 11.044 11.404 10.321 11.156 11.133
(0.172) (0.240) (5.669) (0.234) (0.585) (4.922)
Revenue ratio 0.921 0.853 1.051 0.999 0.854 1.083
(0.027) (0.018) (0.025) (0.049) (0.072) (0.042)
Traditional v. Bounded p<0.05 p<0.05
Bounded v. Bounded-Hq p<0.05 p<0.05
H-type subjects
Underreport frequency 60.829% 57.114% 33.951% 58.163% 53.321% 26.160%
(base: H-type) (0.144) (0.144) (0.038) (0.143) (0.052) (0.046)
Traditional v. Bounded p=0.386 p=0.564
Bounded v. Bounded-Hq p<0.05 p<0.05
Cheating frequency 31.303% 28.335% 30.365% 30.625% 27.345% 23.753%
(base: all players) (0.070) (0.036) (0.033) (0.083) (0.047) (0.045)
Traditional v. Bounded p=0.685 p=0.485
Bounded v. Bounded-Hq p=0.342 p=0.248
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses. To control for repeated measures, we take the averages of
variables over 30/10 periods for each session. We treat each session as an independent observation. All
the non-parametric tests reported in this table are two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests.
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Result 2.2 Hypothesis 2.2 is supported. The non-compliance rate in the Bounded-Hq treat-
ment is significantly lower than it is in both the Traditional and the Bounded treatments.
Support: In line with what is found in the previous literature on coordination
games, subjects in our experiment fail to coordinate on the payoff dominant equi-
librium in which they all underreport their income. The overall underreport rate in
the Bounded-Hq treatment is 33.95% over all 30 periods, and drops to 26.16% in the
last 10 periods. The deterrence effect of the bounded rule is the strongest, as the non-
compliance frequency is significantly lower compared to the other two treatments
(p < 0.05). This difference is already salient in the first period, and remains highly
significant throughout the game.
There are other interesting results worth discussing. Let us first focus on the Tra-
ditional and Bounded treatments. The three rows on top of the table report statistics
concerning all subjects. The first row indicates that the actual probability of being
an H-type in both treatments is very close to their pre-specified levels with repeated
drawing. The second row displays the percentage of low-income reports among all
reports (i.e. reports from L-type players and the untruthful ones by H-type play-
ers). The average earnings presented in the third row are not statistically significant
(p = 0.114). The fourth row reports the revenue ratio of the tax authority across
treatments. Revenue ratio is defined as the actual revenue of the auditor (i.e. tax col-
lection and fines from catching cheaters minus audit cost) over the revenue collected
if nobody ever cheats on taxes. Since cost per audit is not defined explicitly in the ex-
periment, we treat it as zero. The result indicates that the revenue ratio is the highest
in the Bounded-Hq treatment due to a higher efficiency in catching tax cheaters (see
audit selection rates).
The fact that the revenue ratio is higher in the Traditional treatment than in the
Bounded treatment is caused by the assumption of zero audit cost assumption in this
setting. The intuition behind this is simple. When tax fraud generates extra revenues
and audit resources are negligible, the auditor is always better-off spending all of the
resources on catching cheaters. Therefore, this result implies that the bounded rule
generates less net profit for the tax authority if the audit cost is sufficiently low.
Now turn to the Bounded-Hq treatment. If we use the cheating rate (i.e. the per-
centage of tax fraud in the entire population) instead of the underreporting rate for
comparisons, we find no difference between the Bounded-Hq and the Bounded treat-
ment, despite the fact that players have more opportunities to cheat in the Bounded-
Hq treatment (p = 0.342 throughout 30 periods and p = 0.248 in the last 10 periods).
Considering the number of audits is even less in the Bounded-Hq treatment, the result
suggests that the cost-effectiveness of the bounded rule is still robust regardless of the
base of comparisons.
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Individual behavior
Figure 2.1 displays the distribution of the underreporting rate for H-type players
across treatments. The horizontal axis represents subjects’ underreporting frequency
throughout the game (i.e. the percentage of times when they receive high income and
decide to underreport). The vertical axis represents the proportion of players having
similar underreporting frequency in each treatment.
Figure 2.1: Individual underreporting frequency distribution
The main message conveyed by Figure 2.1 is that theory has limited explana-
tory power over the individual-level data for the Traditional and Bounded treatments.
Only 29.13% of the subjects in the Traditional treatment and 23.43% of subjects in the
Bounded treatment behave exactly in accordance with theory. That is, they underre-
port whenever they receive high income throughout the experiment. The percentage
of subjects who always report their income truthfully is 12.5% and 15.63%, respec-
tively. 8 Even corrected for these players, the theory underpredicts the deterrence
effect of both auditing rules. According to Figure 2.1, around 60 percent of the sub-
jects switch between the two options with various levels of frequency. This pattern
is the same in both treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.322). On the other hand,
the distribution of the underreporting frequency Bounded-Hq is significantly differ-
ent (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05). Only about 7% of all subjects choose to submit
8Since we do not elicit the beliefs of the players in the game, we do not identify whether a person
who honestly states their income is intrinsically honest or conditionally honest.
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“low-income” , while 33% of the subjects honestly state their income throughout the
experiment.
Choice models under uncertainty
This section attempts to develop alternative models that explain the stochastic com-
ponent of behavior. Theory based on individual profit maximization predicts that
strategic players will always choose to submit “low-income” , while honest players
will always report the type of income they receive. In either case, the choice should
be consistent across periods. Figure 2.1 clearly indicates that is not the case. In the
following, we exclude data from the Bounded-Hq treatment since learning adds too
much dynamics and complicates the analysis.
We propose a model, the discrete-choice model, that allows us to better understand
individual behavior in the experiment. The discrete-choice model is a framework to
relax the perfect rationality assumption and to accommodate boundedly rational be-
havior (McFadden (2001)). Models in this framework are motivated by empirical
studies in which observed decisions exhibit some noise (see, e.g., Fischbacher and
Stefani (2007), Loomes (2005), Rieskamp (2008) and Wilcox (2010)). Such noise could
come from observed sources like decision errors, but could also come from other
unobserved or unmodeled channels such as individual perceptions of the game, or
sensitivity to payoff changes. Due to the presence of such noise, people make de-
cision errors and hence do not behave consistently with their choices. Our Baseline
treatment is essentially a non-strategic choice-under-uncertainty problem for H-type
players. Therefore, the classic individual discrete-choice model is a natural setting
to explore behavioral anomalies. The bounded treatment introduces interactions of
players. A general way to incorporate decision errors is the quantal response equilib-
rium first proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), which is based on the random
utility-maximization model of McFadden (1973).
According to the discrete-choice framework, H-type players will choose to un-
derreport if and only if the difference in the expected utilities is sufficiently large to
exceed a stochastic error denoted by ε; i.e.,
EU(πu)− πh > ε.
In the expression, πu and πh denote the expected profits from underreporting and
reporting honestly, respectively. The parameter ε is commonly assumed to be inde-
pendently and identically distributed across players and actions with a Type 1 ex-
treme value (“logit”) distribution. The error can come from many sources, including
the inability to calculate the expected payoff or trembling hands during decision mak-
ing. A standard result of the discrete-choice model framework is that under the above
error distributional assumptions, the underreporting probability b̂ is given by the re-
lation below:
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b̂ = Pr EU(πu)− πh > µε
= 1/{1 + exp[−(EU(πu)− πh)/µ]}. (2.1)
The parameter µ > 0 captures the sensitivity of subjects’ choices to the relative
payoffs of the two choices. When µ approaches infinity, players choose underreport-
ing and honest-reporting with equal probability, independent of the relative expected
payoffs. When µ decreases, on the other hand, players put less probability weight on
choices that yield suboptimal payoffs, and the probability that they make the opti-
mal choice converges to 1 when µ approaches 0. Put differently, µ is an index of the
measurement error when subjects calculate expected utility from underreporting.
Within this framework, this paper further relaxes the assumption of risk neutrality.
In particular, three behavioral models are estimated and compared: risk-aversion,
and loss aversion with and without combining probability weighting. In the risk-
aversion model, subjects are assumed to have a CRRA-form utility function u(π) =(
π1−r
)
/ (1− r).9 This model offers the possibility of explicitly testing the assumption
of risk neutrality. If the estimated r is significantly different from zero, then the null
hypothesis that subjects are risk neutral can be rejected.
While the observed compliance behavior can be explained by risk attitude, it is also
consistent with the notion of loss aversion. Recent research has shown that that loss
aversion provides a much better account of tax evasion both in the lab and in the field
(see, e.g., Elffers and Hessing (1997), Yaniv (1999), King and Sheffrin (2002), Dhami
and Al-Nowaihi (2007) and Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2010)). The loss-aversion model
characterizes individuals as loss averse in terms of reference income, denoted by R.
For a given amount of money, x > 0, and the value function v(x) (specified below),
losses are weighted more than gains (| − v(−x)| > v(x)). This study follows Dhami
and Al-Nowaihi (2007) and Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2010) by taking the honest post-
tax income as the reference point: R = IH − TH. The rationale for this reference point
is as follows. If the reference point is selected differently, say, the initial income or the
income after cheating detection, then taxpayers are always in the domain of losses or
gains. In those cases, the asymmetry of gains and losses disappears, and the analysis
falls back completely to an expected-utility framework.10 The income relative to the
reference point is as follows:
πi =
{
IH − TH − F− R for i is caught.
IH − TL − R for i is not caught.
The form of the utility function follows Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It is defined
9Alternative utility forms such as CARA and power-expo utility do not change the fit of the data.
10More specifically, such a framework is called a rank dependent expected utility theory (RDEU),
which can be considered as expected utility theory applied with a transformed cumulative probability
distribution. See Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) for more detail.
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separately over gains and losses: U(πi) = παi if πi ≥ 0, and U(πi) = −λ(−πi)β if
πi < 0. The α and β are the parameters controlling for the curvature of the utility
functions, and λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. Subjects are considered loss-averse
if λ > 1.
Besides value functions, subjects could also have a nonlinear transformation of
the probability scale (i.e. they overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high
probabilities (see, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979))). In order to examine the ef-
fect of subjective probability weight, this paper estimates a third model combining
the loss-averse utility form with a probability-weighting function. In particular, this
paper adopts a popular form of the one-parameter probability-weighting function:
w(p) = pδ/(pδ + (1− p)δ), where δ ≥ 0. Note that if δ < 1, the weighting function
has an inverted “ S” shape, which is concave for low probabilities and convex for high
probabilities, and crosses the diagonal at the probability of 1/3.
Recall that H-type players are choosing between a safe lottery and a risky one
with fixed probabilities in the traditional rule, but endogenous probabilities under
the bounded rule. In the following, denote parameter “a” as the perceived audit
probability in the Bounded treatment. The estimated parameter a answers the follow-
ing question: If a bounded rule is transformed into the context of a traditional rule,
which exogenous audit probability “a” best justifies behavior? Moreover, how do risk
attitude, probability weighting, or loss aversion influence subjects’ perception of the
audit probability? The conditional log-likelihood is the following:















0.6× 22.5 + 0.4× 2.5 for i ∈ Traditional
(1− a)× 22.5 + a× 2.5 for i ∈ Bounded
where yi,t = 1(0) denotes that subject i underreports (reports honestly) in the tax-
compliance game in period t. Table 2.3 reports the estimation results of various be-
havioral models.
To gain enough identification power, we pool data from both the risk elicitation
task and the tax compliance game. Note that data of the tax compliance game contain
two moments (i.e., the fraction of subjects selecting the “risky” lottery in the tradi-
tional rule and that in the bounded rule) given a fixed payoff structure. Hence, they
do not have the identification power for more than two parameters. Incorporating
risk elicitation data increases the identification power substantially since there are
sufficient payoff variances among different lottery pairs.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































At first glance, all parameters in these models are significant, suggesting that the
alternative behavioral models help to explain the compliance behavior in our study.
For instance, the risk-aversion specification suggests that subjects are risk averse in
both treatments, as the CRRA coefficient r is significantly larger than zero. It indi-
cates that risk aversion helps to explain our data. In fact, compared to a restricted
model with pure noise, the risk aversion specification significantly increases the fit
of the model for both treatments (Likelihood Ratio test: p < 0.001). The perceived
audit probability for a risk-averse subject in the Bounded treatment is about 0.34. The
explanation is straightforward. To induce a similar compliance pattern among sub-
jects who are risk-averse, the audit capacity of the bounded rule can be set smaller,
such that it induces the same deterrence effect compared to a traditional rule with
audit probability a = 0.336. In other words, fewer resources are needed to achieve
the same level of deterrence for risk-averse subjects as for risk-neutral ones.
Table 2.3 also shows that the loss-aversion specification increases the log-likelihood
even more compared to the risk-aversion specification. Subjects in both treatments ex-
hibit a mild degree of loss aversion. The coefficients of the loss-aversion parameter
λ are larger than 1 in both treatments, which means that subjects are more sensi-
tive to loss than to the equivalent magnitude of gain. The slopes of the value func-
tion indicate concavity in the gain domain (α) and convexity in the loss domain (β).
Moreover, a Vuong test on non-nested models favors the loss-aversion model over the
risk-aversion model (p < 0.05). If subjects are loss-averse, the bounded rule is even
cheaper to implement, as the induced deterrence rate only needs to be the same as a
traditional rule with audit probability a = 0.306.
The third specification combines loss-aversion utility and probability weighting.
However, the likelihood of this specification does not improve significantly. More-
over, the probability-weighting parameter δ is not significantly different from 1 for
both treatments (p = 0.438 and 0.397 respectively). This means that the average
subjective probability of the subjects is pretty much in line with the objective audit
probability. Overall, the results seem to indicate that the driving force for the ob-
served compliance frequency is more likely to be found in the way they view losses
and gains, rather than in how they assess probabilities.
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Figure 2.2: Observed and predicted underreporting rates
Figure 2.2 displays the observed and predicted underreporting rates based on risk-
and loss-aversion models. Since estimation results suggest that probability weighting
does not explain the data well, parameters are taken from the second specification of
loss aversion without probability weighting. Among the three models, the one using
loss aversion fits our data the best. Result 2.3 summarizes the section.
Result 2.3 The proportion of compliance behavior in both treatments is consistent with the
presence of loss aversion together with some stochastic decision errors, although not in proba-
bility weighting.
2.6 Learning and social characteristics
Figure 2.3 depicts the average underreporting rates across treatments. The dynamics
in the Traditional and Bounded treatments look similar. In contrast, the average under-
reporting rate in the Bounded-Hq is visibly lower and declines steadily over periods.
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Figure 2.3: Underreport rate over 30 periods
In the post-experiment questionnaire, subjects are asked to provide social demo-
graphic information such as gender, nationality. We also elicit their risk attitude and
tendency to be opportunistic (i.e. the Mach IV score). This information allows us
to study how subjects form and adjust their underreporting decisions under differ-
ent rules. The first specification concerns compliance behavior. We use the following
random-effect probit model specification:
yit = γ× xit + ui + εit (2.2)
The variable y equals 1 if subjects decide to underreport, and is equal to 0 other-
wise. Furthermore, x is a vector of explanatory variables, the ui represent individual
random effects and γ is a vector of parameters. The explanatory variables include
subjects social backgrounds such as gender, nationality and experience of economics.
They also contain a history of play such as underreporting performance in the previ-
ous period, period number and its square term.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The panel on the left presents the impact of both social characteristics and learning
experience in the game. The panel on the right only considers the impact of social
characteristic information alone. Various effects are found in the regressions. The first
one concerns the effect of learning. In the Bounded treatment, detection experience in
the previous round decreases non-compliance propensity. Interestingly, players with
a background in economics are more likely to underreport, which seems to suggest
that training in economics results in behavior more in line with homo-economicus.
These effects, however, do not exist in the other two treatments.
The only social characteristic information which has a consistent impact on under-
reporting decision is risk attitude, i.e. the total number of safe lotteries selected in
the risk elicitation task. In all treatments, with and without controlling for learning,
the number of safe lotteries selected is negatively correlated with the propensity of
underreporting. In other words, the more risk averse a subject, the less likely it is that
he or she cheats in the tax evasion game.
In the Traditional and Bounded treatments, men are more likely to underreport than
women are, regardless whether we control for learning or not. This is consistent with
a general pattern that men are less risk averse than women. Interestingly, this im-
pact of gender is no longer significant in the Bounded-Hq treatment. Apart from these
variables, no other social demographic information affects behavior significantly and
consistently.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
This paper examines the bounded rule as a more realistic representation of the au-
diting procedure which naturally integrates social interactions and interdependent
beliefs among taxpayers. Constrained by a budget, it audits all “red-flagged” reports
whenever the total number of these reports is no more than the maximum number of
audits allowed by the budget, and merely the maximum otherwise. In the parameter
regions where it induces “all-or-none” outcome in compliance, it is equivalent to a
traditional rule. In addition, there exists a region where the bounded rule induces
coordination among taxpayers.
The paper then examines these properties of the bounded rule in a controlled lab-
oratory experiment. Subjects receive either high or low income with a predetermined
probability. On knowing a certain auditing rule (traditional or bounded), they report
income to the tax agency. We construct three treatments: a traditional rule, a bounded
rule with an unique Nash equilibrium and a bounded rule which induces coordina-
tion. The experimental results indicate that the compliance rate in the bounded rule
is the same as that in the traditional rule. The deterrence effect of a bounded rule
becomes much stronger where it introduces multiple equilibria. It deters subjects
from coordinating on the payoff-dominant equilibrium with a low implementation
cost. The above result indicates that strategic uncertainty aversion is an independent
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source of deterrence in this setup.
In the first two treatments, participants in our experiments do not follow the sharp
predictions of the model. The compliance rates are higher than the prediction, even
taking into account the 10% to 15% players who consistently report their income hon-
estly. About 60% of the subjects switch their decisions alternatively. To better account
for this, we adopt a bounded rational model incorporating noise into decision mak-
ing. In this framework, we estimate and compare several choice models. Among var-
ious specifications, loss aversion combined with stochastic errors are more successful
at tracking observed data patterns.
The results from the auditor revenue comparisons also suggest that the net revenue
collected under the bounded rule is lower than under the traditional rule if cost per
audit is sufficiently low. Catching tax cheaters brings in extra revenue for tax agencies.
As a result, it is worth investing the effort when the cost of doing so is low. That
said, tax auditing in reality is indeed costly, not only because of the expenditure in
hiring and training auditors, but also the complicated and time-consuming auditing
procedures. Furthermore, a recent paper by Feld et al. (2010) suggest that a more
aggressive auditing program may lead to a crowding out effect of tax morale and
thus an increased shadow economy in Germany. A less aggressive auditing strategy
supported by the bounded rule, on the other hand, could help to reduce the distrust
of taxpayers toward tax agencies.
This study is just a first step into the investigation of the bounded rule. In our
current setup, taxpayers can only decide whether to underreport or honestly report.
In future studies, the model could be extended to allow choices on the extent of un-
derreporting. Another possible extension might involve introducing a human audi-
tor to further examine the strategic interactions. This would be useful, due to the
fact that taxpayers can communicate with each other in reality. Alm and McKee
(2004) show that such cheap-talk communication could help taxpayers to coordinate
on zero-compliance (payoff-dominant) equilibrium. However, if a strategic auditor
could observe this, s/he would be able to adjust the audit capacity accordingly to




Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let K̄ = [aN], as K̄ needs to be an integer. Thus, aBD = min{1, K/L} = min{1, [aN]/L}.
Since L 6 N, aBD > ā. That means, in the scenario where all players declare low
income, the audit probability aBD is equal to ā. The H-type players are indifferent be-
tween the decisions of underreporting and reporting honestly. If K > K̄ , that means
the lowest probability of being audited is strictly larger than ā. Hence, any K > K̄ is
sufficient to support full compliance.
The simplest case to induce zero compliance is to set K = 0. Because of zero
audit, self-regarding, profit-maximizing H-type players always report low income,
regardless of their beliefs towards other H-types. More generally, if K < [ā], the
bounded rule cannot induce any compliance for strategic players regardless of the
income distribution. In other words, in the worst-case scenario in which only one
H-type player claims low income, the audit probability he or she faces is lower than
[a]. Hence, strategic H-type players will underreport.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
This subsection contains two parts. The first part proves that given that all players are
rational, strategic expected profit maximizers, the game introduced by the bounded
rule is dominance solvable. The second part shows that this claim still holds by intro-
ducing conditionally or intrinsically honest players.
The proof is trivial that reporting high income is a dominated strategy for the L-
type players. To prove that the best response of H-type players is underreporting
given that L-type players display dominance, the expected payoff from underreport-
ing should be strictly larger than the sure payoff from reporting truthfully. Moreover,
this holds regardless of the beliefs that H-type players hold towards the other H-
types.
First assume that an H-type player anticipates that nobody else will underreport.
That is, b0 = (b1, b2, ..., bN−1) = (0, 0, . . . , 0). In this situation, “low-income” reports
are submitted by L-types. Since the probability of being an L-type is q = 0.5 for every
other player, the probability that exactly n out of N− 1 players submit “low-income”
reports follows the binomial distribution Bin (n, N − 1; q) = Bin (n, 7; 0.5). Let πF
denote the profit of a tax cheater if caught (e2.5), and πS the profit of a cheater if not





Bin(n; N − 1, q)× {min( 2
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The sure payoff of reporting truthfully is 12.5. Hence, a self-interested, risk neutral
H-type player will underreport.
The remaining proof shows that for any given set of beliefs held by an H-type
player, the expected payoff from underreporting is always not less than E(πl |b0).
Assume that player N thinks the first N − 1 players underreport with probability
b = (b1, b2, ..., bN−1) . The probability that player i submit “low-income” is Bi =
1 − q + qbi = 12 (1 + bi). Note that Bi ∈ [
1
2 , 1]. To facilitate notation, define an in-
dex vector I = (i1, i2, ...i7), with i1 6= i2 6= ...i7. Each index takes a value from the set

























It turns out that for any given bi, ∂E(πl)/∂bi = (∂E(πl)/∂Bi) · (∂Bi/∂bi) > 0.11
This means that the expected payoff from underreporting is increasing in the (subjec-
tive) propensity to evade taxes. Hence, given any set of beliefs b = (b1, b2, ..., bN−1),
E(πl |b) ≥ E(πl |b0). Hence, the best response of the H-type players is to underreport.
The second part of this subsection proves that the introduction of conditionally or
intrinsically honest players does not change the directions of treatment difference.
Let ρ be the probability that a player is conditionally honest, and 1 − ρ be the
probability that a player is a strategic, self-regarding profit maximizer, where 0 ≤
ρ < 1. We do not allow ρ = 1, since at least one strategic player is thinking of this
problem. In our setting, in particular, the number of conditionally honest players ρN
can be any number from 0 to 7 out of 8 players. We further assume that the ρ is the
same in both treatments.
The strategy of the conditionally honest players is as follows. When they receive
low income, they will always report truthfully. When they receive high income, they
will honestly report their income if they think the number of other players cheating
11Calculation is available upon request.
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on taxes (1− ρ)N is not higher than a certain threhold λ ∈ [0, 7], and underreport
their income otherwise.
To prove the statement, we only need to show that the inclusion of honest players
does not affect the strategy of the profit maximizers. When the strategic players are
assigned to be L-types, they gain a higher payoff by reporting truthfully, regardless of
the auditing rule implemented. In the Traditional treatment, H-type profit maximizers
only compare a certain payoff of reporting truthfully and the expected payoff from the
tax evasion gamble if they underreport. Hence, the existence of honest players will
not affect their choices. In the Bounded treatment, the subjective beliefs of strategic,
H-type players of the number of “low-income” reports now become: Bi = (1− q) +
q(1− ρ)b. Given that q = 0.5, 0 ≤ ρ < 1, B still lies in the interval [ 12 , 1]. Therefore,
Proposition 2.2 still holds.
Anticipating that strategic profit maximizers will cheat when they receive high in-
come, the conditional honest players will assess the self-interested profit maximizers
in the population. If the proportions (1− ρ)N ≤ λ, they will honestly report their
income. If (1− ρ)N > λ, they will underreport.
We assume that belief is mutually rational in equilibrium. Hence, in the presence
of conditionally honest players, the non-compliance rates of both treatments become:
∑ Bin(n; N, q)(1− ρ) =
{
(1− ρ) if (1− ρ)N 6 λ
1 if (1− ρ)N > λ
The analysis of intrinsically honest players are simpler since their strategies could
be reformulated by setting λ = 7. As (1− ρ)N 6 7 always holds, the compliance
rates of both treatments with intrinsically honest players become:
∑ Bin(n; N, q)(1− ρ) = (1− ρ) .
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Let σi(j) be the probability that type i player (H-type or L-type) will use strategy j (u
or h). There are two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in this
treatment:
{(σH(u) = 1, σL(h) = 1), (σH(h) = 1, σL(h) = 1), (σH(u) = 0.432, σL(h) = 1)}.
In other words, the two pure Nash equilibria are 1) all H-type players underreport
and 2) all H-type players honestly report. L-type players always honestly report.
Let us examine the former case. Given that an H-type player thinks that all other
H-types choose strategy u, s/he will have an expected payoff of 17.5 by playing strat-
egy l. By deviating to h, the payoff decreases to 12.5. Since we assume symmetry
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among players, no one has an incentive to deviate from underreporting, which con-
stitutes an NE.
A highly similar analysis applies to the latter case. Given that all other H-type
players play strategy h, a strategy deviation from h to l will yield a lower expected
payoff for H-type players (from 12.5 to 3.59). Hence, no one has an incentive to devi-
ate.
On top of the two pure equilibria, the game also has a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which each H-type player is indifferent between the strategy of honest-
reporting and underreporting. Given the game parameters, the underreporting prob-
ability b that induces utility indifference is b∗SE = 0.432.
Experiment instructions
Instructions comparison
The instructions given in the next subsection are for the Bounded treatment. These
instructions differ from those given for the other treatments as follows:
• Traditional treatment
1. The second bullet (concerning matching protocol) of the list under “Task
Description” in the instructions for the “Tax Compliance Game” is absent.
2. The “Audit Probability Table” is absent.
3. The phrase “see audit prob. table” in the “Payoff Table” becomes 0.4.
• Bounded-Hq treatment
1. In the third bullet of the list under “Task Description” in the instructions
for the “Tax Compliance Game” , the probability of receiving e25 becomes
0.9, and accordingly the probability of receiving 10 becomes 0.1.
2. In the “Payoff Table” (immediately before “Payment Method” in the in-
structions for the “Tax Compliance Game”), the probabilities in the second
column become 0.9 and 0.1, respectively.
2.A.1 Instructions of the Bounded treatment
• Please read these instructions carefully!
• Please do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the entire exper-
iment.
• If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to you to answer
it.
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• You will receive a show-up fee of e3 for completing all tasks in the experiment,
independent of your performance.
Task Description
• This session consists of 30 periods of play; each period is completely indepen-
dent of the others.
• Of the participants in the room, two groups of 8 participants will be randomly
formed at the beginning of each period. You will not know the identity of the
other players in your group in any period.
• At the beginning of each period, you will receive a taxable income of either e25
or e10. The probability of receiving e25 is 0.5; the probability of receiving e10
is 0.5.
• Your task is to report your income to the auditor, which is played by a computer.
The amount that you report is your decision. You can report either e25 or e10,
regardless of your received income.
After-tax Income Determination
Your after-tax income in this period is determined by the following two steps: tax
payment and an audit.
Step One: Tax payment
The tax rate is 50% for those who reported e25 and 25% for those who reported
e10. Suppose the income you received is e25:
• If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as
tax. So your after-tax income in this period equals e25 – e12.5 = e12.5.
• If you reporte10 to the auditor, the auditor will chargee2.5 (25% ofe10) as tax.
So your after-tax income in this period equals e25 – e2.5 = e22.5.
Suppose the income you received is e10:
• If you reporte10 to the auditor, the auditor will chargee2.5 (25% ofe10) as tax.
So your after-tax income in this period equals e10 – e2.5 = e7.5.
• If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as
tax. So your after-tax income in this period equals e10 – e12.5 = -e2.5.
• In sum, the auditor charges tax based on your reported income, instead of your
received income.
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Step Two: Audit
The auditor does not know your received income unless your report is audited
later.
Auditing procedure:
• If your reported income is e25, it will not be audited. That means what you
have earned in step one (e12.5 or -e2.5) will be your after-tax income (if your
received income is e25 and e10, respectively).
• Regardless of your received income, if your reported income is e10, there is a
chance that your report will be audited. The outcome is as follows:
– Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is also
e10. Then what you have earned in step one (e7.5) will be your after-tax
income, no matter whether your report is audited or not.
– Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is e25.
If your report is not audited, you will keep the e22.5 earned in step one; if
audited, you will get e2.5.
Auditing probability:
• The number of reports the auditor will audit depends on the number of players
reporting an income of e10 in a group.
- If the number of e10 income reports is equal to two or less, the auditor will
audit all of the e10 reports.
- If the number of e10 income reports is three or more, then two out of such
reports will be randomly selected for audit.
– The “Audit probability table” below shows the audit probabilities for a
player who reported an income of e10.
Audit Probability Table
Number of e10 reports 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Audit Probability 100% 100% 100% 66.7% 50% 40% 33.3% 28.6% 25%
• The “Payoff Table” below summarizes all of the possible scenarios you may
encounter in one period and the related payoffs:
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Payoff Table
Received Probability Reported Audit After-tax Income After-tax Income
Income Income Probability if audited if NOT audited
e25 0.5 e25 0 e12.5 e12.5
e10 see audit prob. table e2.5 e22.5
e10 0.5 e10 see audit prob. table e7.5 e7.5
e25 0 −e2.5 −e2.5
Payment Method
• At the end of this experiment, one out of 30 periods will be selected to deter-
mine your payoff for this task. The computer program will generate a random
number from 1 to 30. This number will determine one of the 30 periods. Your
performance in that period determines your payoff.
• You will be paid based on your after-tax income for the randomly selected pe-
riod.
• Because each period is equally likely to be selected for payment determination,
you should make your decision in each period as if that period would be se-
lected for payment.
• Your payoff will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment along with
your earnings in the other task(s).
We will now show you what the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
In “Screen 1” , you can decide the amount of income to report to the auditor. Please
select either “e10” or “e25”, and confirm your choice by pressing the “Report” but-
ton.
Warning: Before pressing the button, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot
change your decision after you have pressed OK.
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SCREEN 2
“ Screen 2” is the feedback table you will receive regarding your after-tax income.
You will find information on the initial taxable income you received, the income you
reported and your after-tax income in this period.
Click on OK when you finish checking the information.
Note that the purpose of the screen shots is to clarify the procedure, rather than to




In this task, you are asked to make decisions related to 21 choice pairs. In each
choice pair, you need to select between two lotteries labeled “Lottery A” and “Lottery
B”. Please, take your time and read each choice pair carefully. An example of a typical
choice pair is given below:
Choice Lottery A e5.5 with probability 0.5 or e3.5 with probability 0.5 Your Lottery A 
No.1 Lottery B e9 with probability 0.5 or e0.5 with probability 0.5 choice: Lottery B 
Payment Method
• You need to make choices for all 21 choice pairs. However, only one of the
21 choices you have made will be chosen for the payoff determination of this
task. First, the computer program will generate a random number from 1 to
21. This number will determine a choice pair. Then, the computer program will
simulate the lottery you have chosen and reveal the outcome on your screen.
The outcome of this lottery will determine your payoff.
• For example, suppose that the computer program has generated a random num-
ber 2. It will then check what you have selected in choice pair number 2. Sup-
pose that you have chosen Lottery A in that choice pair. Then the computer
program will simulate Lottery A and reveal your payoff (either e5.5 or e3.5).
Your payoff will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment along with
your earnings for the other task.
It is important that you fully understand the lottery selection task. Please raise
your hand if you have any questions at this moment.
12The risk elicitation task is conducted after the tax-compliance game. However, the subjects do not
know the existence of this task when they are playing the tax-compliance game.
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Post-experimental Questions
Questions on Treatment Manipulation
Please evaluate the following statements with respect to the tax reporting task:13
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly
agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly agree
1. The instructions were clearly formulated.
2. I felt that I performed well on the task.
3. I received plenty of time to carry out the task.
4. I was motivated to do well on the task.
5. The task was fun to perform, motivating me to achieve a payoff as high as pos-
sible.
6. I considered the tax reporting task to be fairly complex.
7. My payoff is determined not only by my own decision, but also by the decisions
of the other players.
8. When making my decision, I thought about what other players might do.
9. I feel obliged to report the received income in each period.
10. The chance I have received e25 is about 50%.14
Questions on Background Information
Please answer the following survey questions. Your answers will be used for this
study only. Individual data will not be exposed.
1. What is your gender?
2. What is your nationality?
3. How many years have you already studied in economics?
4. Have you ever had a course related to game theory?
5. Have you ever had a part-time job?
13The first five questions are used to understand the subjects’ perception about the experimental setup
and instructions in general. We do not expect to find differences across treatments. The last five ques-
tions focus on capturing different types of manipulations of the treatments; therefore, we expect to see
differences across manipulations.
14In the Bounded-Hq treatment, the chance should be 90%, instead of 50%.
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Questions on Mach IV Scale15 In the following you will find a list of statements.
Please read them carefully and indicate to what extent you agree or disagree. Even if
in some cases you would like to say that your answers depend on the circumstances,
you should only choose one of the answers. Since all responses are anonymous you
can answer freely. There is nobody on whom you need to make a good impression.
Only if you answer very honestly can the results be used.
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion,
5=slightly agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly disagree
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Most people are basically good and kind.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out
when they are given a chance.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, people won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishon-
est.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real rea-
sons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the crim-
inals are stupid enough to get caught.
14. Most people are brave.
15. It is wise to flatter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that there’s a sucker born every minute.
15Questions 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16 and 17 are reverse coded.
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18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put
painlessly to death.
20. Most people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their
property.
CHAPTER 3
PEER PUNISHMENT IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA GAME WITH
THIRD-PARTY APPROVAL 1
3.1 Introduction
Punishment is a common means of enforcing cooperation in a society. A large num-
ber of laboratory studies have been conducted to investigate the effect of peer punish-
ment mechanisms where the punishment proposers are also the enforcers (see, e.g.,
Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a), Mas-
clet et al. (2003), Falk et al. (2005), Nikiforakis (2008)). In this paper, we take a first
step to understand how sanctions promote cooperation when punishment enforcers
are independent of proposers.
In many situations in a society, the party proposing sanctions toward wrong-doers
is often not the one implementing sanctions. Litigation is a typical example. When a
party (say, a cyclist) files a suit against another (say, a careless car driver who injures
the cyclist), judges have the right to uphold the damage compensations. Arbitra-
tors or mediators widely exist as cheaper and more flexible alternatives to the courts.
Upon hearing a case like contract negotiation or product liability, arbitrators impose a
legally binding decision on the disputants. Even in societies where codes of conducts
are not formally written down as laws, tribal leaders often act as judges to settle dis-
putes among other tribe members. Informal third parties are also commonly seen in
1This chapter is joint work with Erte Xiao. We thank Daniel Houser, Martin Kocher, Wieland Mueller,
Charles Noussair, Jan Potters, Arno Riedl, as well as participants at the Carnegie Mellon University,
Tiber work-in-progress seminar, M-BEES 2011 conference, the 10th Tiber Symposium on Psychology
and Economics, and the 2011 ESA European conference in Luxembourg for valuable comments. We
gratefully acknowledge the financial support from CentER lab funding at Tilburg University. Maolong
Xu and Bastian Henze provided excellent assistance for the experimental sessions.
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modern organizations. Project managers or team leaders, for instances, are respon-
sible for reconciling disagreement and accusations among team members by coming
up with a joint decision that applies to everybody.
Previous studies on third-party punishment assume third parties can directly pun-
ish other players after observing the outcome of a game (see, e.g. Fehr and Fis-
chbacher (2004b), Kurzban et al. (2007), Charness et al. (2008), Xiao and Kunreuther
(2010)). Emotions such as anger (to norm violators) and guilt (the responsibility to
punish norm violators) can trigger third-party punishment (Nelissen and Zeelenberg
(2009). However, we are not aware of a setting where punishment proposals could
only be implemented upon approval from an independent third party.
In this paper, we argue that two possible factors could influence the performance
of a third-party approval mechanism.
On the one hand, requiring an independent third party’s approval can improve the
efficiency of a peer punishment mechanism. More specifically, the presence of a third-
party judge helps to reduce antisocial punishment. Experimental studies have docu-
mented evidence of antisocial or perverse punishment (that is, punishing the cooper-
ators) when peer punishment is allowed (e.g. Casari and Luini (2009), Cinyabuguma
et al. (2006), Rand et al. (2008), Herrmann et al. (2008), Nikiforakis (2008), Ertan et al.
(2009)). Motives such as vengeance or spite trigger antisocial punishment (Herrmann
et al. (2008), Nikiforakis (2008), Ertan et al. (2009), Xiao (2010)). Hence, these studies
argue for the importance of “shunning retaliation and centralizing punishment in the
hands of the state” (Herrmann et al. (2008)). A third party, as an outsider, is more
likely to veto antisocial punishments as his judgment is less likely to be influenced
by vengeance and more likely to be consistent with the existing social norms (Cubitt
et al. (2011), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a), Xiao and Kunreuther (2010)). As a result,
punishment proposals targeting cooperators can be rejected by norm-seeking third
parties. Hypothesis 3.1 sums up the discussion above:
Hypothesis 3.1 A third-party approval mechanism increases the efficiency of a peer punish-
ment mechanism by decreasing antisocial punishment.
On the other hand, although less emotional third parties can make better judg-
ments based on social norms, they can also reduce the punishment’s severity level,
leading punishment to be less effective. Previous studies support the view that costly
punishment is used to express negative emotions (e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2002), San-
fey et al. (2003), Xiao and Houser (2005), Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009)). However,
the transmission of emotion via punishment might be less effective if it needs ap-
proval from a third party. An emotionally-detached third party is likely to turn down
severe punishment proposals for efficiency reasons, even though these proposals tar-
get defectors. In response to this, players of the game might adjust their punishment
proposals. That is, they might decrease the severity of the punishment to increase
the success rate, and therefore reduce the effectiveness of punishment. In summary,
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Hypothesis 3.2 states:
Hypothesis 3.2 A third-party approval mechanism decreases the efficiency of a peer punish-
ment mechanism by decreasing punishment of defectors.
Note that the above two hypotheses point in different directions with respect to
the effectiveness of a third-party approval mechanism. As a first step to study which
effect dominates, we compare the effectiveness of a third-party approval mechanism
to the one from second-party punishment in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma exper-
iment. In the baseline, players can directly impose costly sanctions after observing
each other’s actions. In the target treatment, players make punishment proposals to
an independent third party. Punishment will be implemented at the proposer’s cost
if the third party approves it.2 This third player does not participate in the social
dilemma game, nor is his earnings associated with the outcomes or the judgment
decisions. 3
We find that both cooperation rates and earnings are significantly lower in the
third-party approval treatment compared to the baseline. Although the third parties
reject both antisocial punishment, they also reduce the punishment for defectors. The
empowerment of a third party also decreases the proposed punishment for defectors.
Since antisocial punishment only consists of a small proportion of all data, the neg-
ative effect overtakes the positive one, deteriorating cooperation in our setting. The
results suggest that the intervention of a third party is a double-edged sword. It can
reduce the effectiveness of the peer punishment mechanism in promoting coopera-
tion (as we find in our setting) but it might help to promote cooperation if antisocial
punishment is pervasive.
2In naturally occurring environments, institutions can empower the third party in various ways. For
example, the third party can have the right to revise the punishment. As a first step, we adopt a binary
decision mechanism to understand the impact of the third party’s intervention. We find the cooperation
rate is lower with the third party’s intervention as the punishment is less severe. It is possible that the
cooperation rate could be higher if the third party could, say, double the proposed punishment amount.
In our experiment, we do not observe sufficient evidence showing the third party’s decisions vary with
on the proposed punishment amount. For example, punishment proposals on defectors lower than 6
tokens are approved in 57 out of 107 cases (53.3%) and those higher than 6 tokens are approved in 118
out of 184 cases (64.1%). The correlation between approval rate and proposed punishment amount is
not significant. This implies that even allowing the third party to revise the proposal may not promote
cooperation in our setting. Further studies are needed to understand how different ways of empowering
the third party influence the outcome.
3Previous studies on the beahvior of an impartial third party suggest that they behave in accordance
with the existing social norm even without any monetary incentives. On the other hand, incentivising
the decisions of the third parties turns them into stakeholders and hence opens the possibility of a bias in
their judgment. For instance, Xiao (2010) finds that third parties in a sender-receiver game punish lying
senders truthfully in the absence of monetary reward from the decision. However, when they can benefit
monetarily by punishing a sender, most third parties increase punishment to the sender regardless of
the message sent. As a result, deception occurs more often compared to the baseline where third parties
are not stakeholders of the game. More generally, the use of non-incentivized methods, such as survey
questions, is standard in the study of social attitudes (see, e.g. Cubitt et al. (2011).)
50 PEER PUNISHMENT WITH THIRD-PARTY APPROVAL
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe
the experiment design and procedure. In Section 3.3, we present an analysis of the
data. Finally, in Section 3.4, we make some concluding remarks.
3.2 Experiment
3.2.1 Design
As shown in Table 3.1, our experiment consists of two treatments: third-party ob-
server (baseline) and third-party approval (TPA). The only difference between these
two treatments is that in the baseline, the third party observes the experiment. In the
TPA treatment, the third party plays the role of a judge in that he will decide whether
to implement the punishment decision proposed by the players.
Table 3.1: Treatment design
Third-Party Observer (Baseline) Third-Party Approval (TPA)
37 groups 38 groups
(2 players and 1 observer) (2 players and 1 third-party judge)
In both treatments, subjects are randomly assigned to a group of three and remain
in the same group and the same role throughout the experiment. To facilitate discus-
sion, we name them person A, person B and person C. Each treatment consists of 20
periods and each period consists of two stages. In the first stage, person A and per-
son B decide simultaneously whether to cooperate in a standard prisoner’s dilemma
game (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Payoff table of the prisoner’s dilemma game
Person B
Option I Option II
Person A Option I 30, 30 15, 40
Option II 40,15 20,20
If both players choose to cooperate, they both earn 30 tokens. If both of them de-
fect, then they both earn 20 tokens. If one chooses to defect while the other cooperates,
the defector earns 40 tokens while the cooperator earns 15 tokens. The exchange rate
is 40 tokens to 1 euro.
In the second stage, after seeing each other’s choices and earnings in the first stage,
A and B simultaneously and independently decide how many tokens they want to
deduct from each other’s accounts. Every three tokens deducted from the other’s ac-
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count costs a player one token. In the baseline treatment, the punishment decisions
are implemented immediately. Person C is simply an observer of the experiment. In
the third-party approval treatment (TPA), C has to decide whether to implement the
punishment decisions proposed by A and B, if any. A and B’s punishment decisions
will be implemented only if C has approved them. In both treatments, all the deci-
sions are revealed to each player at the end of each period. In particular, to keep the
information symmetry between the two treatments, A and B can still see each other’s
punishment decisions even when C vetoes the proposals. C’s earnings in both treat-
ments are independent of the outcome of the game. The program randomly draws a
number from the prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix (15, 20, 30, 40) with equal proba-
bility. Moreover, person C only knows his own earnings at the end of the experiment,
while person A and B never know the actual earnings of person C. All the above is
common knowledge to every player in the experiment. This setting is to minimize
the possibility of C comparing his own earnings with those of the two other players’
during judgment.
3.2.2 Procedure
We conducted the experiment at the CentER lab at Tilburg University in 2011. A total
of 225 students participated as subjects in the experiment. Each subject only partici-
pated in one treatment. Subjects were paid the total amount they earned over the 20
periods and the average earnings were e12.90. The experiments were programmed
and conducted in Z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). At the beginning of each session, a
group of 15 to 18 subjects were randomly assigned to the computer terminals. The
experimenter read the instructions aloud to ensure everyone got the same informa-
tion. Before the experiment started, subjects had to answer all quiz questions correctly
to make sure that they understood the rules of the game.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Aggregate cooperation and earnings
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the dynamics of the average cooperation rates and earnings
over 20 periods of the play for person A and person B in both treatments. Cooperation
rates are constantly lower in the TPA treatment compared to the baseline treatment
(0.47 vs. 0.70, Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05 4). So are average earnings except for the
first and last period of the game (23.52 vs. 25.30, p < 0.10). Figure 3.1 also suggests
subjects anticipate the treatment effect. The cooperation rate of period 1 in the TPA
treatment is lower than the baseline (0.49 v.s. 0.65, p < 0.05). To understand the ob-
4All the non-parametric tests reported in this paper are two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. In
the analysis, we treat each group as an independent observation.
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served treatment effect on cooperation, we first show that our data is consistent with
the previous findings of the punishment effect on cooperation and then compare the
punishment decisions between the two treatments. We then study how third parites
approve punishment, as well as players’ reactions after being punished.
Figure 3.1: Average cooperation rate over period by treatment
Figure 3.2: Average earnings over period by treatment
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3.3.2 Punishment comparisons across treatments
To understand the observed treatment effect on cooperation, we test our hypotheses
by comparing the punishment decisions across treatments. Given that punishment
severity is determined by both the frequency and the amount, we report in Figure
3.3 the expected proposed and enforced punishment amount to the cooperators and
defectors across treatments.
We find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3.1 that third parties reject antisocial
punishment. As shown in Figure 2, in the TPA treatment, C significantly reduces
the implementation of antisocial punishment proposals (1.90 vs. 0.91, p < 0.05). The
data also support Hypothesis 3.2 that third parties lower punishment of defectors
(6.13 vs. 3.75, p < 0.1). Moreover, our data suggest an indirect effect of third parties’
interventions on the punishment proposals especially to the defectors, which may
also contribute to the low cooperation level in the TPA treatment. Compared to the
baseline, A and B propose much less punishment on defectors in the TPA treatment,
although the difference is not statistically significant (6.13 vs. 14.94, p = 0.13). The pro-
posed antisocial punishment remains very low in the TPA treatment as in the baseline
although it is marginally significantly higher than the baseline (1.90 vs. 1.07, p < 0.1).
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Figure 3.3: Expected punishment amount by treatment
Notes: For each group in each treatment, we calculate the product of the average punishment
towards cooperators/defectors and the frequencies of cooperation/defection decisions. The
expected punishment amount is the average of these products. Baseline-C means antisocial
punishment to cooperators in baseline; TPA-C represents antisocial punishment to coopera-
tors in TPA; Baseline-D means punishment to defectors in baseline; TPA-D means punishment
to defectors in TPA. In the baseline, the proposed punishment is also the enforced punish-
ment.
Consistent with the previous studies, our data suggest that antisocial punishment
decreases cooperation while punishment imposed on defectors increases cooperation.
In both treatments, cooperators, if not punished, continue cooperating in about 90%
of cases in the next period. In contrast, if punished, cooperators in both treatments
continue cooperating in less than 50% of cases. Defectors, if not punished, cooperate
in the next period in less than 10% of cases in both treatments. But when they are
punished, they switch to cooperation in 22.58% of cases in the baseline and 35% of
cases in the TPA treatment.
As we discussed above, our hypotheses indicate that the overall effect of the third
party’s intervention is determined by how often antisocial punishments occur. In our
experiment, antisocial punishment occurred only in a few cases. In particular, coop-
erators are punished in 17 out of 1036 cases (1.64%) whereas defectors are punished
in 80 out of 444 cases (18.02%) in the baseline. In the TPA treatment, cooperators are
proposed to be punished in 54 out of 716 cases (7.54%) whereas defectors are pro-
posed to be punished in 291 out of 804 cases (36.19%). As a result, the third party’s
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intervention leads to a lower cooperation rate because it largely decreases the posi-
tive impact of punishment on defectors. Interestingly, the lower cooperation rate in
the TPA in period 1 seems to suggest that subjects have anticipated the ineffectiveness
of the mechanism.
Result 3.1 Third parties lower both antisocial and normal punishment. Moreover, the pres-
ence of a third party lowers punishment proposals towards defectors, resulting in a decrease
in cooperation and average earnings.
3.3.3 Third-party decisions
Table 3.3 shows how Person C approves A and B’s punishment decisions in each
scenario.
Table 3.3: Third-party judgment decisions
Punishment Always In Always Total
scenario reject Between approve
Cooperator punishes Defector 14.29% 23.81% 61.90% 100%
(3) (5) (13) (21)
Defector punishes Cooperator 64.71% 23.53% 11.76% 100%
(11) (4) (2) (17)
Defector punishes Defector 19.04% 66.67% 14.29% 100%
(4) (14) (3) (21)
Cooperator punishes Cooperator 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 100%
(1) (1) (1) (3)
Notes: The upper number of a cell is the percentage of third parties approving a
certain category of punishment proposal throughout the experiment. The number
in the parenthesis is the absolute number. For instance, the number 14.29% means
“14.29% (3) of all Person C’s (12) who had to decide whether to punish the defector as
proposed by his cooperator counterpart rejected punishment proposals.”
We find that nearly 65% of all Person Cs always reject antisocial punishment pro-
posals. This percentage is much higher than the rejection rate of the proposals target-
ing at defectors. On the contrary, more than 60% of Person Cs approve cooperators’
decisions of punishing defectors during the experiment.
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Table 3.4: Third-party judgment decisions





Approves cooperators punishing defectors only 19.355%
(6)
Vetoes defectors punishing cooperators only 16.129%
(5)
Approves cooperators punishing defectors & 19.355%





Notes: “Approves everything” means that a third party permits every punish-
ment proposal regardless of the actions of the punishers in the game and the
periods of the proposals made. “Vetoes everything” means a third party shuts
down every punishment proposal throughout the experiment. “Approves co-
operators punishing defectors only” means that the only form of punishment a
third party consistently approves is letting cooperators punish defectors. “Vetoes
defectors punishing cooperators only” means that a third party only consistently
disallows cooperators punished by defectors but judges inconsistently for other
forms of punishment. “Approves cooperators punishing defectors & Vetoes de-
fectors punishing cooperators” means that a third party vetoes antisocial and ap-
proves normal punishment consistently. “Others” means a third party does not
make consistent judgment of any kind. Seven third-party judges never have the
opportunity to make any decisions during the entire experiment and hence are
excluded from the analysis.
Table 3.4 summarizes the strategies of Person Cs in approving punishment pro-
posals. Note that we do not have complete strategies for every third-party judge
since most of them do not have the opportunity to judge in all possible scenarios.
Nonetheless, we find the criteria of third party judgment mostly consistent. Nearly
40% of them firmly agree that cooperators can punish defectors, although not so for
the other cases. Around 35% consistently veto antisocial punishment proposals. Only
less than 20% of all third parties are unpredictable when facing antisocial punishment
proposals by defectors or normal ones by cooperators.
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between proposed and approved punishment in
TPA treatment
Figure 3.4 depicts the correlation between proposed punishment approval rates
based on the nature of the proposals. The horizontal axis represents punishment pro-
posals within a certain range (increment of 10). The vertical axis is the punishment
approval frequencies. For instance, punishment proposals toward defectors which
are less than 10 tokens are approved 61.9% of the time. The size of an observation
stands for the number of observations. The larger a circle/diamond, the larger the
number of observations of a certain category.
We find that over 80% of all punishment proposals are lower than 20 tokens re-
gardless of the nature. Antisocial punishment proposals are rejected more frequently
than normal ones towards defectors.5 However, we do not detect a strong correlation
between the number of punishment proposals and approval rate. It implies that the
approval decisions of the third parties do not merely depend on punishment magni-
tudes but other factors.
To provide a quantitative analysis of how Person Cs approve punishment deci-
sions, we conduct a probit regression analysis of Person C decisions in TPA treatment.
Previous research indicates that third parties are willing to incur cost to punish norm
violators (Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a), Ottone (2005) Xiao and Kunreuther (2010)).
Hence, third parties in our setting should take into account who initiates the punish-
5The pattern seems to reverse for proposals larger than 20. However, this pattern is far from conclu-
sive due to the lack of sufficient observations. For punishment proposals larger than 20, there are only 3
observations for antisocial proposals (5.55%) and 19 for normal ones (6.53%).
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Table 3.5: Third-party judgment regression
one cooperator and one defector defectors only
β1 Punishment -0.831** –
proposer is a defector (0.386) –
β2 Positive 0.026 -0.186**
punishment proposal difference (0.064) (0.073)
β3 Negative -0.010 0.156
punishment proposal difference (0.085) (0.121)
β4 The punished 0.133 -0.001
also proposes punishment (0.343) (0.314)
β5 Period 0.013 0.014
(0.030) (0.015)
β0 Constant 0.419 0.404
(0.376) (0.364)
Observations, individuals 84,26 237,21
Notes: * 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level. We only exclude all the
data when neither players propose punishment. A Likelihood-Ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that
the third-party judgment decisions are statistically equivalent if only one player defects versus the case
where both players defect. Hence we run two separate equations. A logit regression yields similar results.
ment and to whom the punishment is sent. Furthermore, third parties also care about
distributional outcomes (Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez (2010)), which means in our
setting, how much the two proposals differ. We include all these factors as indepen-
dent variables. We also control for a time effect, and take into account within-subjects
correlation by letting standard errors cluster on third-party IDs.
Table 3.5 presents the results. Ceteris paribus, a third party is significantly less
likely to approve a proposal if it is filed by a defector and targeting a cooperator (β1).
Controlling for that, however, punishment magnitude does not influence third-party
decisions. Another interesting pattern is also evident in the table. If punishment
proposals come from one defector to another defector, a third party is less likely to
approve the one with larger punishment magnitude (β2), but not significantly more
likely to approve the one with smaller punishment magnitude (β3). This finding
seems to indicate that third parties are sensitive to relative punishment magnitude
only when both players have identical actions and earnings in the game. In the cases
where both players defect, nobody is more “right” or “wrong”. Therefore, a third
party may find it harder to justify a punishment proposal if it asks for a lot of deduc-
tions from the other party.
Result 3.2 Third parties have consistent but heterogeneous judgment criteria on punishment
proposals. Their judgment is affected by players’ actions and relative proposal magnitudes.
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Table 3.6: Reaction to punishment across treatments
What happens at period t− 1 Player i was Player i was Player i was Player i was
a defector a cooperator a defector a cooperator
β1 PunAmtReceived -0.889 -2.367*** -0.271 -2.267***
from a defector (0.623) (0.483) (0.374) (0.596)
β2 PunAmtReceived 1.378*** 5.243 -6.265 -1.872*
from a cooperator (0.374) (22.711) (84.227) (1.072)
β3 Period -0.082 -0.033** -0.066*** -0.057***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
No. of observations 404 1002 745 699
individuals 42 66 58 60
Likelihood -97.425 -188.610 -167.651 -199.065
Notes: 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level.
Third parties are more likely to accept punishing defectors than cooperators. When both play-
ers defect, third parties are more likely to reject the player with larger punishment proposals.
3.3.4 Player reactions to punishment
One main reason why a punishment mechanism is effective in promoting cooperation
is that defectors cooperate more after being punished. For example, many previous
papers on social dilemma games find that low contributors on average respond to
punishment by raising their contributions in the subsequent period (Masclet et al.
(2003); Falk et al. (2005)). Table 3.6 reports players’ reactions to punishment in both
treatments. The coefficient β1 measures the effect of the total punishment amount
received from a defector on subject i’s propensity to cooperate in period t, and β2 is
this effect if punishment cames from a cooperator. We control for the time effect (β3)
and individual unobserved characteristics.
The estimates in Table 3.6 show that in the baseline treatment, if player i is a defec-
tor, then there is a positive relation between the punishment points from a cooperator
and the extent of player i’s cooperation propensity (β2). However, this effect is not
significant in the TPA treatment. It is also worth noting that cooperators react nega-
tively to punishment from defectors in both treatments (β1).
Result 3.3 Defectors in the TPA treatment are less responsive to punishment compared to the
baseline treatment when they are punished by cooperators.
3.4 Conclusion
We conducted experiments to study the impact of peer punishment on promoting
cooperation when the punishment proposers are independent of enforcers.
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Our experimental data suggest that independent punishment enforcers diminishes
punishment both for cooperators and defectors. One implication is that when antiso-
cial punishment is not pervasive, the intervention of a third party reduces the effec-
tiveness of the peer punishment mechanism in promoting cooperation.
Our study provides the first evidence that third-party intervention could lower
cooperation in social dilemmas although it also controls antisocial punishment. As a
first step, we exclude many features of the punishment mechanism with third-party
approval in the naturally occurring environment. For example, we randomly assign
a subject to be a third party in the experiment. In reality, the right to the enforcer
is either legalized by law (such as judges) or elected by the governed people (such
as tribal leaders). Moreover, a third party often benefits from good reputations and
cooperation amongst the parties involved. In future studies, we consider allowing a
third party endogenously elected by players. It is also important to study how differ-
ent empowerment of a third party affects judgement and cooperation. For instance,
which third-party approval mechanism elicits the highest cooperation from the par-
ties involved? If the third party can, say, double the proposed punishment amount,
will that change the robustness of our main results?
Nevertheless, our findings draw attention to the importance of studying how these
features influence effective punishment institutions when an independent third party
is empowered with enforcement rights.
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3.A Appendix
Subject instructions for TPA treatment
Instructions
Thank you for coming to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully!
Talking is not allowed at any time during this experiment. If you have a question,
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you.
This experiment consists of 20 periods. Each participant is in the role of either Person
A, or Person B, or Person C. Each participant’s role will be randomly determined by
the computer at the beginning of the experiment and remain the same during the
experiment. The computer will also randomly group a Person A with a Person B and
a Person C at the beginning of the experiment. Each participant will stay in the same
group during the whole experiment (i.e. 20 periods).
Each period consists of two stages as described below:
Stage 1: Person A and Person B will simultaneously and individually decide whether
to choose “Option I” or “Option II”. Each one’s earnings are determined as follows:
(a) if both Person A and Person B select Option I, each earns 30 tokens; (b) if both
Person A and Person B select Option II, each earns 20 tokens; and (c) if one selects
Option I and the other one selects Option II, the one who chooses Option I earns 15
tokens and the one who chooses Option II earns 40 tokens. The payoff table below
lists all the possible payoff outcomes for each possible scenario. The number on the
left in each cell is Person A’s payoff and the number on the right is Person B’s payoff.
Table 3.7: Payoff table
Person B
Option I Option II
Person A Option I 30, 30 15, 40
Option II 40,15 20,20
Person C’s earnings in each period is determined by a random process. The computer
will randomly assign 30, 15, 40 or 20, with equal chance, as Person C’s earnings in the
first stage of each period. Person C will not know this randomly assigned payoff
amount until the end of the experiment. Neither Person A nor Person B will ever
know Person C’s randomly payoff throughout or after the experiment.
Stage 2 At the beginning of the second stage, all participants of a group will be
informed of the decisions and earnings of the Person A and the Person B of the
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group. Again, Person C’s earnings will not be revealed to anyone including Person C
him/herself.
First, Person A will have an opportunity to individually propose to the Person C
in his/her group whether to deduct any amount of tokens from the matched Person
B’s payoff. Every three tokens deducted from Person B’s payoff, if approved by Person
C (see details below), will cost Person A one token. Meanwhile, Person B will also
have the same opportunity to propose to Person C whether to deduct any amount of
tokens from the matched Person A’s payoff. Similarly, every three tokens deducted
from Person A’s payoff, if approved by Person C, will cost Person B one token.
The maximum deduction amount a person can impose on the other is 40 tokens.
That is, you can propose to deduct from the other person’s payoff by any amount of
tokens between 0 and 40. However, the amount should be an integer number (e.g. 0,
1, 2. . . ).
Next, Person C will see both Person A’s and Person B’s decisions and payoffs in
the first stage, and also Person A’s and Person B’s proposals in the second stage.
• If either Person A or Person B proposed any deduction for the matched Person
B or Person A, then Person C will have to decide whether to approve the pro-
posal(s). If Person C decides to approve the proposed deduction amount, then
the deduction will be implemented. In this case, the proposer’s earnings will
also be deducted by one-third of the deduction amount as we noted above. Per-
son C’s payoff will not change no matter what decision he/she makes. (Note:
Person C does not know his/her randomly assigned payoff in the first stage when making
this decision).
• If neither Person A nor Person B proposed any deduction, then Person C does
not have any decision to make. No change will be made for any one’s earnings.
At the end of each period, each participant will see the decisions of each one in
his/her group, the final earnings of Person A and B in that period.
Each period will proceed in the same way. Each participant will play 20 periods
with the same participants. Your final earnings are the sum of your earnings over 20
periods. After all the 20 periods finished, each participant will receive a cash payment
in private. The exchange rate of tokens to Euro is:
40 tokens = 1 Euro
Examples
Below are some examples to illustrate how payoffs in each period are determined.
Suppose, in one period, in the first stage, Person A chose Option I and Person
B chose Option II. Thus, Person A earns 15 tokens and Person B earns 40 tokens in
the first stage. Suppose, in the second stage, Person A proposed to deduct 9 tokens
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from Person B’s earnings and Person B proposed to deduct 6 tokens from Person
A’s earnings. Also, suppose the computer randomly assigns 30 tokens as Person C’s
earnings in that period.
• If Person C approved Person A’s proposal but rejected Person B’s proposal, each
one’s earnings in this period are as follows:
– Person A’s earnings = 15− 3 = 12
– Person B’s earnings = 40− 9 = 31
– Person C’s earnings = 30
• If Person C approved both proposals in the above scenario, then each one’s
earnings in this period are as follows:
– Person A’s earnings = 15− 3− 6 = 6
– Person B’s earnings = 40− 2− 9 = 29
– Person C’s earnings = 30
• If Person C rejected both proposals in the above scenario, then no one’s earnings
would be changed. Each one’s earnings in this period are as follows:
– Person A’s earnings=15
– Person B’s earnings=40
– Person C’s earnings=30
Now suppose in the second stage of that period, Person A proposed to deduct 8
tokens from Person B’s earnings and Person B did not propose any deduction amount.
In this case, Person C only needs to decide whether to approve Person A’s proposal.
• If Person C approved it:
– Person A’s earnings = 15− 2.67 = 12.33
– Person B’s earnings = 40− 8 = 32
– Person C’s earnings = 30
• If Person C rejected it, then no one’s earnings would be changed:
– Person A’s earnings=15
– Person B’s earnings=40
– Person C’s earnings=30
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Summary
To repeat, each participant will play in the same group for 20 periods. Each period
consists of two stages. In the first stage, each Person A and Person B will decide
whether to choose Option I or Option II which will decide each one’s earnings in the
first stage. Person C’s earnings in a period will be randomly determined by the com-
puter (Person C will know this amount only at the end of the experiment after all the
decisions have been made. Person A and Person B will not be informed about this
amount throughout the experiment). In the second stage, after knowing Person A
and Person B’s decisions in the first stage, Person A (Person B) will decide whether to
propose any deduction amount to the paired Person B (Person A). The proposed de-
duction amount will implemented only if Person C approves it. Person C’s earnings
will not change no matter whether s/he approves the proposal(s).
Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment.
The next several pages outline the procedure of the experiment and the computer
screens when Person A, Person B and Person C make their decisions.
In the first stage, Person A and Person B simultaneously decide which option to
choose. Person C will be waiting.
SCREEN 1
In the second stage, Person A and Person B receive feedback regarding the outcome
of the first stage. Then each proposes to the matched Person C whether to deduct any
amount of tokens from the matched Person A’s or Person B’s earnings.
SCREEN 2
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Next, Person C will see both Person A’s and Person B’s decisions and payoffs in the
first stage, and also Person A’s and Person B’s proposals in the second stage. Then,
Person C decides whether to approve or reject the proposal if any. Note: Once Person
C clicked the “OK” button, s/he cannot change the decision.
SCREEN 3
At the end of each period, each participant (Person A, B and C) will see the outcome
of that period.
SCREEN 4
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CHAPTER 4
GROUPS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL PLAY IN SEQUENTIAL MARKET
GAME 1
4.1 Introduction
Many decisions in private, public, and business life are not taken by individuals, but
by groups of individuals. Think, for instance, of households, public authorities, court
juries, boards of directors, or management teams.2 Recently growing experimental
research on interindividual-intergroup comparisons in controlled laboratory experi-
ments suggest that groups differ from individuals from many aspects. Hence, in the
presence of systematic differences in decisions made by individuals and groups, it
would be risky to export results observed in interindividual decision making to do-
mains were groups interact with each other (see, e.g., Cooper and Kagel (2005)).
Recently growing experimental research on interindividual-intergroup compar-
1This chapter is joint work with Wieland Müller. We are grateful to David Vonka for technical con-
sulting and help. We thank Marco Castillo, Guillaume Fréchette, Daniel Houser, Rudolf Kerschbamer,
Charles Noussair, Ragan Petrie, Jan Potters, Andrew Schotter, Matthias Sutter, Jean-Robert Tyran and
seminar participants at Innsbruck University, Tilburg University, New York University, George Mason
University, the 3rd Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium, and the ESA world
meeting 2010 in Copenhagen, and the Symposium on Industrial Organization and Management Strat-
egy 2011 in Chengdu for helpful comments. Furhermore, we thank James C. Cox, Daniel Friedman, and
Steven Gjerstad as well as Sau-Him Paul Lau and Felix Leung for making available estimation codes.
Wieland Müller acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Re-
search (NWO) through a VIDI grant.
2For example, the chairman’s office of the News Corporation is a group of five persons meeting
every week to consider “every acquisition and item of capital expenditure” (FT May 20th, 2003). More
generally, the organization literature has long researched the roles of management teams in firms. As
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) point out, decision makers are informed, influenced and sometimes
constrained by others, both inside and outside the organization.
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isons has so far derived the result that, indeed, often there are differences in the be-
havior of individuals and groups. More precisely, although there are exceptions, one
result that emerges from the literature is that often groups appear to be more selfish
than individuals. This has mainly been shown in the context of two classes of games.
The first class consists of simple, sequential-move, two-player games such as the ul-
timatum game (Bornstein and Yaniv (1998), and Robert and Carnevale (1997)), the
trust game (Cox (2002), and Kugler et al. (2007)), the centipede game (Bornstein et al.
(2004)), and the gift-exchange game (Kocher and Sutter (2007)). 3 Bornstein (2008) (p.
30) summarizes much of this literature by stating that:
“Groups, it seems, are more selfish and more sophisticated players than
individuals, and, as a result, interactions between two unitary groups are
closer to the rational, game-theoretical solution than interactions between
two individuals.”
Note that the literature Bornstein summarizes in this quote is based on experi-
mental games in which individuals and groups interact only once. The second class
consists of games that authors characterize as having a “Eureka” component, mean-
ing that once the solution or equilibrium is found, it is recognized as a clear solution
of the game. Based on results from, e.g., signaling games (Cooper and Kagel (2005)
and beauty contests (Kocher and Sutter (2005), Sutter et al. (2009) (p. 391) state that
“It can be considered a stylized fact in the literature that teams are gener-
ally closer to game-theoretic predictions than individuals in (interactive)
games in which rationality and correct reasoning are the predominant task
characteristics.”
Moreover, to the extent that groups and individuals converge to the same equilib-
rium in these repeated “Eureka”-type games, groups are found to do so much faster
than individuals.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on interindividual-intergroup compar-
isons by studying a Stackelberg market game which, arguably, belongs to the first
class of games above. A particular aim is to study the effect the time horizon of inter-
action has on the behavior of individuals and groups - a topic that has not yet been
thoroughly studied in this class of games. Our results are in (partial) contrast to the
quotes above. In fact, in our one-shot Stackelberg markets we find no significant dif-
ferences in the behavior of groups and individuals, and in our repeated Stackelberg
markets we find that the behavior of groups is further away from the subgame-perfect
equilibrium than that of individuals. That is, we show that once a simple sequential-
move game (belonging to the class of games summarized by Bornstein et al. (2008))
3One exception is provided by Cason and Mui (1997) dictator games where, in some cases, group
dictators give more than individual dictators. In their re-examination, Luhan et al. (2009) team dictators
to be more selfish than individual dictators.
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is repeated, the behavior of groups relative to that of individuals goes in the opposite
direction to what is stated in Bornstein’s summary. In particular, group play diverges
from the (refined) game-theoretic solution.
The Stackelberg (1934) model is among the most frequently applied models of
oligopolistic competition. In a Stackelberg duopoly market game, one firm (the first
mover) makes its quantity decision first. Then, knowing the first mover’s choice, the
other firm (the second mover) decides on its quantity, before the market clears. In case
of linear market demand and symmetric and constant marginal costs, in the subgame
perfect equilibrium the first mover produces and earns twice as much as the second
mover. Moreover, the second mover’s best response is a linear and downward slop-
ing function of the leader’s quantity choice.4 We chose a Stackelberg game because it
has a very attractive feature: For each of the first mover’s quantity choice, a second
mover can, by its own quantity choice, express a wide range of preferences over own
and the other player’s income.5
We implement this market game by having either individuals or groups of three
subjects act in the role of the first and the second mover. Subjects acting in groups
have to unanimously agree on the quantity being produced. The decision making
process within groups is aided by access to a chat tool. The members of a group are
able to exchange written messages until they reach a joint decision.
Comparing first mover quantities across treatments is straightforward. In the one-
period games we find that although the average group leader quantity is somewhat
higher than the average individual leader quantity, the difference is insignificant. In
the multiple-period games, in contrast, we find that average leader quantities chosen
by groups are significantly lower than average leader quantities chosen by individ-
uals. Comparing second mover behavior across treatments is less straightforward
as we observe followers’ choices in response to varying first mover choices. Nev-
ertheless, for the one-period games we find that, if anything, the observed average
response function of groups is closer to the best-response function than that of indi-
viduals, which is in line with earlier experimental results. But, again, we fail to detect
statistical differences. In the multiple-period game treatments, average observed re-
action functions of followers display a specific non-monotonic pattern not predicted
by standard theory. However, this pattern is predicted and can be accounted for by
models of other-regarding preferences. We use maximum-likelihood techniques to es-
timate average follower response functions for the multiple-period treatments, using
either Lau and Leung (2010) implementation of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model
of inequality aversion or the Cox et al. (2007) model of emotion-driven reciprocity.
As the standard best response function of followers is nested in both of these mod-
4Experimental evidence on individual-player Stackelberg duopoly markets and how they compare
to simultaneous-move Cournot duopoly markets is reported in Huck et al. (2001).
5This feature distinguishes the Stackelberg game from other sequantial games such as the ultimatum
game or the trust game.
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els, we have a clear and unambiguous method to test which of two observed average
response functions is closer to the prediction of subgame perfectness. Irrespective of
which of the two models we use to account for followers’ reaction functions, we find
that the one employed by groups is further away from the standard best response
function than that of individuals.
Since individuals and groups partly choose markedly different quantities as first
movers, differences we observe in individual and group second-mover decisions might
be driven by different experiences second movers make in the individual and the rel-
evant group-player treatments. We control for this by also eliciting choices in four
additional treatments employing the strategy method (Selten (2008)) in which, simul-
taneously with the first movers making their decision, the second movers have to in-
dicate how they would react to each of the first movers’ quantities. Thus, this method
gives us the complete response function of second movers. The results of the con-
trol treatments largely confirm the results obtained in the main treatments with truly
sequential play. In the one-shot sessions, behavior appears to be in line with results
reported in the literature as group leaders and followers are closer to the prediction
of subgame perfectness, although the differences are insignificant. In the multiple-
period treatments, we find, again, that in comparison to individuals, groups choose
lower leader quantities and employ response functions that are further away from the
standard best response function.
Our paper makes two main contributions. The literature reports so far that in
simple, two-player, sequential-move games groups often appear to be closer to the
game-theoretic prediction than individuals if the game is played only once. We show
for a game belonging to this class of games that once the game is repeated, the re-
sult is turned around in the sense that groups are shown to be further away from the
game-theoretic prediction. The Stackelberg market game is, arguably, not a “Eureka”-
type problem that has a clear solution, which, once found, is clearly seen as such by
players. Instead, a Stackelberg duopoly market is a game that, as the other games
summarized by Bornstein et al. (2008), leave more room for otherregarding prefer-
ences. In these games, the presence of profit-maximizing and otherregarding motives
might play out differently depending on whether the game is played by groups or
by individuals and depending on the time horizon of interaction. In fact, to explain
our results, in the discussion section we provide evidence that there is heterogeneity
in subjects’ types. Concentrating on second movers, we find that they are often ei-
ther myopic profit maximizers (who always best respond to a first mover’s quantity),
strategic rewarders and punishers, or preference-driven rewarders and punishers. 6
The latter two types’ behavior is indistinguishable until the last period (until which
both types employ a reward-and-punishment scheme). In the last period, however,
strategic punishers and rewarders play best-response, while preference-driven pun-
6This categorization is reminiscent of types in public-good games identified in Luhan et al. (2001) or,
more recently, Reuben and Suetens (2009)).
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ishers and rewarders continue to employ a reward-and-punishment scheme. Subjects
of these varying types play largely uninfluenced by each other in the individual treat-
ments but influence each other via group discussions in the group treatments. We
illustrate how this can lead to different results depending on the different time hori-
zons adopted in our and earlier experiments. Our results suggest that the apparent
consensus in the literature regarding sequential two-player games, as summarized by
the Bornstein (2008) quote above, needs to be modified to accommodate for differen-
tial effects of the time horizon of interaction and possibly other design features - a
point we discuss in more detail in the concluding section. In any case, the answer to
the question of who behaves more like a game theorist, groups or individuals, is not
independent of the time horizon of interaction.
Our second main contribution is on a methodological level. We run both one-
period and multiple-period games and employ the strategy method for the first time
in a “group” experiment and in a repeated Stackelberg market game.7 Doing so
not only enables us to control for different first-mover actions across treatments, but
also to uncover the shape of complete response functions in (repeated) individual
and group Stackelberg markets. The heterogeneity in followers’ behavior mentioned
above implies that average response functions in both the individual and the team
treatments show a somewhat surprising pattern: they slope downward for low leader
quantities, slope upward for intermediate leader quantities (around the Cournot quan-
tity), and slope downward again for higher leader quantities. This results suggests
that it is not justified to account for response functions in e.g. sequential market
games by running simple linear regressions. As other authors and we demonstrate,
structural estimation of other-regarding preference models are able to account for the
shape of average and complete individual response functions and are, thus, theory-
driven alternatives to account for follower behavior.8
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives a brief
overview of the related literature, concentrating mainly on the earlier studies of in-
terindividual and intergroup decision making in sequential two-player games. Sec-
tion 4.3 introduces the experimental design and the main hypotheses. In Section 4.4
we report our results and present the estimations of structural models accounting for
second-mover behavior. In Section 4.5 we discuss our results and Section 4.6 provides
a summary and offers some concluding remarks.
7Huck and Wallace (2002) elicit complete-response functions in a one-shot Stackelberg experiment.
However, we will show that the behavior these authors elicit (basically, a linear and downward sloping
reaction function) does not constitute behavior of subjects who are given the opportunity to learn over
the course of various rounds of play.
8Note that observed behavior is in line with that predicted by social-prefernce models, despite the
fact that we use non-neutral “firm” language in the instructions and employ random-matching in the
multiple-period treatments to weaken, to the extent possible, other-regarding motives.
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4.2 Related literature
There is now a considerable number of studies comparing behavior of individuals
and groups in experimental games. We mainly confine our overview to the papers
most relevant for our purposes, that is, to sequential two-player games and market
games. Doing so, we only very briefly describe the main results of these studies, rel-
egating design details of the most relevant studies to Table 4.9 in the Appendix 4.A.
Bornstein (2008) and Engel (2010) provide more complete overviews of the experi-
mental literature on the behavior of groups.
The early studies on group decision making literature focus on ultimatum game.
Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) find that groups in the role of the proposer offer less than
individuals, and groups in the role of the responder showed a willingness to accept
less. Robert and Carnevale (1997) also analyzed an ultimatum game, in which, how-
ever, no responders were present. These authors find similar results as Bornstein and
Yaniv (1998) with respect to proposers.
Subsequent studies replicate this finding in other games. Cox (2002) analyzes an
trust game (Berg et al. (1995) and reports no differences between groups and indi-
viduals playing in the role of the trustor. However, groups in the role of the trustee
are reported to return significantly less than individuals. Kugler et al. (2007), on the
other hand, find that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
However, if there are differences, both studies point in the direction of more selfish be-
havior on the part of groups. Kocher and Sutter (2007) conduct a gift-exchange game
and find that groups acting in the role of the employer and that of the employee chose
lower wages and, in return, lower effort levels, respectively, than individuals. Born-
stein et al. (2004) have both individuals and groups play two centipede games and
report that groups exit the game significantly earlier than individuals. One excep-
tion is provided by Cason and Mui (1997) in a dictator game. They discover that in
some cases, group dictators give more than individual dictators. However, a recent
re-examination by Luhan et al. (2009) indicates that group dictators are more self-
ish than individuals, possibly caused by replacing the face-to-face discussion among
group members with electronic chat. Bosman et al. (2006) study a power-to-take game
where first movers can claim any part of the second movers’ income. Then, second
movers decide how much of the income to destroy. The authors do not find any dif-
ferences between groups and individuals both in terms of the first-mover take rates
and the income destroyed.
Some studies compare the behavior of groups and individuals in more complex IO
settings. Bornstein et al. (2008), building on work by Bornstein and Gneezy (2002), an-
alyze Bertrand price competition between individuals and between groups. They find
that winning prices were significantly lower in competition between two- or three-
person groups than in competition between individuals. In contrast to the results
of Bornstein et al. (2008), Raab and Schipper (2009) find no differences in behavior
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by individuals or groups in Cournot competition. Nonetheless, this finding is still
consistent with the previous literature in that individual players have already closely
followed the Cournot equilibrium. Note, however, that earlier studies show that the
Nash equilibrium is a good predictor in individual-player Cournot markets (see, e.g.,
Huck et al. (2004)). Cooper and Kagel (2005) analyze limit-pricing games (Milgrom
and Roberts (1982)) and report that teams consistently play more strategically and
learn faster than individuals. Similar finding is reported in Kocher and Sutter (2005)
via a beauty-contest game. Feri et al. (2010) report that groups can coordinate more
efficiently than individuals.
In sum, it seems fair to say that most studies that find differences in interindividual
and intergroup comparison find that groups tend to behave more in line with game
theoretic predictions, appear more selfish, and show less regard for others, leading
Bornstein et al. (2008) and Sutter et al. (2009) to the summaries stated in the Introduc-
tion.
4.3 Experimental design, procedures, and hypotheses
4.3.1 The Stackelberg duopoly game and its predictions
In our Stackelberg duopoly game, two firms face an identical inverse demand func-
tion p = max{30− Q, 0} with Q = qL + qF. Both players have constant unit costs of
c = 6 and no fixed cost. Firms choose their quantities sequentially. First, the Stackel-
berg leader (L) decides on its quantity qL , then, knowing qL, the Stackelberg follower
(F) decides on its quantity qF. The subgame perfect equilibrium is given by qL = 12
and the follower’s best-reply function qF(qL) = 12− 0.5qL, yielding qF = 6 in equi-
librium. Joint profits are maximized if qL + qF = 12 and the Nash equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move game (Cournot market) predicts qL = qF = 8.
The noteworthy feature of the Stackelberg game is that the slope of the payoff
function is flatter for followers than for the leaders around the Stackelberg outcome
(12,6).9 That means a slight deviation from the Stackelberg follower quantity 6 will
cause larger differences in profits for the leaders than for the followers. Hence, the
slopes of the payoff function around the Stackelberg outcome creates sufficient incen-
tives for followers to reward or punish leaders.
The following two motivations lead us to choose a Stackelberg game. First, in
contrast to other sequential two-player games, a second mover in a Stackelberg game
has a much richer strategy space. For instance, in an ultimatum game, the choice set of
the responder is a binary set containing just two alternative, “accept” and “reject” . In
9The payoff function for the follower is (24 − qF − qL)qF. Taking the derivate with respect to qF
becomes 24− 2qF − qL. The payoff function for the leader is (24− qF − qL)qL. Taking the derivate with
respect to qF becomes -qL. Hence, in the neighborhood of the Stackelberg equilibrium (12,6), the slope
of the leader profit with respect to the changes of qF will be steeper than that of the slope of the follower
profit.
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contrast, a second mover in a Stackelberg game has much more room to reciprocate
a leader’s action, both positively and negatively. As Cox et al. (2008) (p. 33) point
out “The [Stackelberg] duopoly games are especially useful because the follower’s
opportunity sets [...] have a parabolic space that enables the follower to reveal a wide
range of positive and negative trade-offs between her own income and the leader’s
income.” The second motivation concerns potential results. Huck et al. (2001) find in
their individual-player Stackelberg games, that, on average, first movers produce less
and second movers produce more than predicted by theory. Hence, there is room for
groups to be closer or farther away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction
than individuals.
4.3.2 Treatment design
Table 4.1: Experimental design
Treatment Sequential Strategy Individual No. No. No.
Name Method Method Players Players Periods Subjects Groups
“SEQ-IND-1” Yes No Yes No 1 18 9
“SEQ-TEAM-1” Yes No No Yes 1 36 6
“SM-IND-1” No Yes Yes No 1 18 9
“SM-TEAM-1” No Yes No Yes 1 36 6
“SEQ-IND-15” Yes No Yes No 15 36 6
“SEQ-TEAM-15” Yes No No Yes 15 72 4
“SM-IND-15” No Yes Yes No 15 36 6
“SM-TEAM-15” No Yes No Yes 15 72 4
Our experiment is based on a 2×2×2 factorial design, varying the number of pe-
riods of interaction (1 period or 15 periods), varying who acts in the two player
positions of the Stackelberg game (individuals or groups), and varying the method
of eliciting choices (truly sequential play or strategy method). We refer to the eight
treatments as follows. The one-shot individual and group treatments with truly se-
quential play are called “SEQ-IND-1” and “SEQ-TEAM-1”, while the one-shot individ-
ual and group treatments which employ the strategy method are called “SM-IND-1”
and “SM-TEAM-1”. The corresponding multiple-period treatments are, respectively,
called, “SEQ-IND-15”, “SEQ-TEAM-15”, “SM-IND-15”, and “SM-TEAM-15”. Table 4.1
gives an overview of the design. Information about profits was given in the form of a
payoff table (see Table 4.11 in the Appendix). Next, we describe the setting in each of
the four treatments in detail.
Treatment SEQ-IND: This is a baseline treatment which is similar to the Stackelberg
experiment in Huck et al. (2001). In each period, the first mover chose a quantity
(selected a row in the payoff table). Knowing the quantity chosen by the first mover,
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the second mover then decided about his own quantity (selected a column in the
table).
Treatment SEQ-TEAM: This is the team baseline treatment which was, with respect
to timing, identical to SEQ-IND except that players were teams (consisting of three
participants each) instead of individuals. To reach a joint decision, members of a team
could exchange messages within a team via an electronic chat box.10 There was no
restriction regarding the contents of messages sent, except that (a) the discussion must
be in English; (b) the language used should be civil and (c) subjects cannot identify
themselves by revealing their names, seat numbers, etc. Subjects would enter their
quantity decisions into a box in the decision screen and were then able to submit them
to the other group members. All submitted quantity decisions of own group members
then appeared on the screen of each group member. As long as not all submitted
quantity decisions were the same, the chat box remained open and group members
could continue discussing their decision. When all submitted quantity decisions of
a team were the same, the decision screen (including the chat box) disappeared and
subjects had to wait until the experiment continued.11
Treatment SM-IND: In this treatment, individual first and second movers made
decisions according to the strategy method. That is, while first movers decided about
a single quantity, second movers were, at the same time, asked to make a quantity
decision for each of the 13 possible quantities the first mover could choose. When all
subjects had made their decisions, the computer randomly matched first movers and
second movers, and selected the relevant quantity of the second mover (that is, the
quantity the second mover chose for the quantity chosen by the first mover).
Treatment SM-TEAM: This treatment is similar to treatment SM-IND, except that
players are groups instead of individuals. The same communication technology as in
treatment SEQ-TEAM was employed to facilitate group decisions. In particular, each
member of a second-mover group had to indicate an entire strategy consisting of how
it would react to each of the 13 possible choices of a first-mover team. At any point
in the process of entering this strategy, second-mover group members could submit
their strategy (entered so far) to the other group members. Similar to the individual-
player treatments, all entered quantities submitted so far appeared on the screen of
each group member. There were no restrictions in place regarding the order in which
10Electronic chat keeps the anonymity among subjects. As this paper is about studying how groups
differ from individuals, it is best to use electronic chat in order to exclude the possible influences from
other attributes (say, physical attractiveness) on communication.
11Our design follows the previous experimental studies on intergroup-interindividual decision mak-
ing studies. Note that the focus of these studies is “how groups behave differently from individuals”,
instead of “through which channel do groups behave differently from individuals - communication
among team members, or mechanisms in aggregating their preferences”? One design to answer the
latter question, we need an additional treatment in which subjects can talk to each other in the same
role but then make independent decisions. Alternatively, one could exogenously impose various voting
mechanisms and compare how they change the joint decisions of groups.
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follower quantities for the 13 possible first-mover choices had to be entered on the
decision screen. Again, the chat box remained open as long as group members had
not yet entered the same complete strategy.
4.3.3 Experiment procedures
The experiment with 18 sessions was conducted at CentER Lab of Tilburg Univer-
sity in April, May, October 2009, and September 2010. Each session consisted of 18
subjects. A total number of 324 Tilburg University students participated in the study.
Each subject took part in only one session. Each session consisted of either 1 period
or 15 periods. In the repeated sessions, all 15 periods of play counted toward final
earnings. There were no practice periods at the beginning of any session. On aver-
age, a one-shot session lasted about 45 minutes, whereas the repeated sessions lasted
about 1 hour and 45 minutes (including the time to read the instructions and payment
of the subjects). On average, a subject in a one-shot (repeated) session earned e7.29
(e18.51). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software
(Fischbacher (2007)).
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to be either
a first or a second mover, and these roles remained fixed throughout the entire ses-
sion. In the team treatments, a team was formed by three players12 who belonged to
the same team for the entire experiment. Hence, a team-treatment session consisted
of three first-mover teams and three second-mover teams. First-mover and second-
mover teams were randomly rematched with each other in each of the 15 periods of
the experiment. In order to control for the size of the random matching group, the 18
subjects in an individual-player session were divided into three cohorts of six subjects
(three of which were first and they other three were second movers).
The instructions use non-neutral language, referring, e.g., to “firms,” “product,”
or “profits”. With the instructions, subjects received a payoff table (see the Appendix)
which, to ease comparison, was the same as used in Huck et al. (2001). The payoff
table showed all possible combinations of quantity choices and the corresponding
profits. The numbers given in the payoff table were measured in a fictitious currency
unit called “Points”. Each firm could choose a quantity from the set 3,4,...,15. The pay-
off table was generated according to the demand and cost functions given above. 13
In each period, each individual first- or second-mover earned the amount indicated in
the table for the selected quantity combination of both firms. In the team treatments,
12There is a large body of social psychology literature on the size of a small groups. The majority of
them stipulate that the lower bound should be three people, for “a dyad (that is, two persons) is a much
simpler social system” (see Fisher (1980).
13Due to the discreteness of the strategy space, such a payoff table typically induces multiple equilibria
(see Holt, 1985). To avoid this, the bi–matrix representing the payoff table was slightly manipulated.
By subtracting one Point in 14 of the 169 entries we ensured uniqueness of both the Cournot–Nash
equilibrium and the subgame perfect Stackelberg equilibrium.
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each member of a first- or second-mover firm also earned the amount indicated in the
table for the selected quantity combination of both firms.
In the 15-period treatments, first and second movers (individuals or teams) were
randomly rematched with each other in each period.14 In the repeated game treat-
ments, starting from the second period subjects were informed about the results of
the previous round in their own market, including the quantity of the first mover, the
(relevant) quantity of the second mover, and own profits.
4.3.4 Hypotheses
Recall that the Stackelberg market game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hence, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a repeated Stackelberg market
game is to play the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game in each pe-
riod of interaction. This implies that the selfish behavior in each period is described
by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game, even if our subjects in the 15-
period treatments viewed the experiment as a finitely repeated game, despite the fact
that we employed random-matching across periods. 15 However, in the experimental
economics literature it is known that play in finitely repeated interactions might be
more cooperative even if the stage-game equilibrium is unique and subjects are ran-
domly rematched across rounds within relatively small groups (see, e.g., Selten and
Stoecker (1986), or Andreoni and Miller (1993). Yet, in repeated interactions it is a
priori not clear how groups would behave in comparison to individuals. Will groups
have a tendency towards more selfish behavior in comparison to interindividual in-
teraction as suggested by the earlier literature reviewed in Section 4.2? Or will there
be a trend towards more cooperation in intergroup interaction as this, in the long run,
would promise higher profits? The few studies reported in the economics literature
find that groups in repeated interactions play more strategically and converge faster
to the stage game equilibrium than individuals (Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Kocher
and Sutter (2005)). Hence, based on these earlier results and those reviewed in Section
4.2, we should expect groups to be behave more in accordance with the prediction of
subgame perfectness than individuals in both the one-period and the multiple-period
treatments. More precisely:
Hypothesis 4.1 Group first movers will choose quantities closer to the Stackelberg leader
14One might argue that the sequency of one-shot games does not behave like a real one-shot game,
and therefore the desired treatment condition is not completely created. Nonetheless, random matching
across repetitions was also employed in the team versus individual play signaling games reported in
Cooper and Kagel (2005). Note that, given the choice of a multiple-period treatment, random match-
ing across periods constitutes a minimal change compared to a one-shot treatment. It is left for further
research to analyze the effect of fixed matching across periods on interindividual and intergroup com-
parison in our Stackelberg market game.
15Random matching across repetitions was also employed in the team versus individual play signal-
ing games reported in Cooper and Kagel (2005).
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quantity than individual first movers, and group second movers’ response functions will be
closer to the standard best response function than that of individual second movers, indepen-
dent of the duration of the interaction.
4.4 Experimental results
We report the results in two sections with the purpose of comparing behavior of indi-
viduals and groups in related treatments. The first section briefly presents summary
statistics of our treatments, formal tests for differences in first mover behavior, and
visual evidence of second mover behavior. In the second section we concentrate ex-
clusively on second-mover behavior in the 15-period treatments, as accounting for
it and formally testing for differences across treatments is much less straightforward
than in the case of first movers. In fact, to account for the observed non-monotonic
second-mover behavior, we are lead to estimate two social preference models: the
(simplified) inequality-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as put forward by
Lau and Leung (2010) and the parametric model of emotion-driven reciprocity by Cox
et al. (2007). To purge the data of learning effects at the beginning of the 15-period ses-
sions (especially in the strategy-method treatments) and, at the same time, preserve
sufficient power for maximum-likelihood estimations, in the results section we report
and use data from periods 3-15, if not otherwise indicated.
4.4.1 A first look at the data
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of average quantity choices and payoffs for each
treatment. The results of the 1-period (15-period) treatments are presented in the
upper (lower) half of this Table. For the strategy-method treatments, only the relevant
quantities of the second movers are taken into account (i.e., only quantity choices of
second movers at quantities actually chosen by first movers).
In all treatments, we note that average first-mover quantities are clearly smaller
and average second-mover quantities clearly larger than the predictions along the
subgame perfect equilibrium path, which predicts quantity 12 for first and quan-
tity 6 for second movers. To facilitate comparison, note that the average first (sec-
ond) mover quantity observed in the 10-period random-matching Stackelberg game
of Huck et al. (2001) was 10.19 (8.32). Hence, average quantities of 10.40 (7.78) chosen
in our treatment Seq-Ind-15 (which comes closest in terms of design features to this
earlier study) are similar to those reported in Huck et al. (2001).
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Table 4.2: Summary of experimental results: Average quantities and payoffs
Prediction Truly Sequential Play Strategy Method
SEQ-IND SEQ-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM
Leader Follower Leader Follower Leader Follower Leader Follower Leader Follower
1-period treatments
Individual 12 6 9.11 8.11 9.33 7.67 9.67 7.11 10.67 7.00
Quantities (2.32) (2.09) (2.42) (1.03) (3.00) (1.36) (2.07) (1.10)
Total 18 17.22 17.00 16.78 17.67
Quantities (1.86) (1.79) (1.64) (1.51)
Individual 72 36 59.78 53.89 62.00 54.33 65.44 49.56 69.33 45.33
Payoffs (18.19) (20.09) (18.86) (10.33)
15-period treatments
Individual 12 6 10.40 7.78 8.27 8.01 9.35 7.88 8.64 8.22
Quantities (0.32) (0.96) (0.14) (0.12) (0.45) (0.15) (0.30) (0.32)
Total 18 18.14 16.4 17.28 16.89
Quantities (0.90) (0.90) (0.29) (1.17)
Individual 72 36 57.59 43.42 60.54 59.23 57.90 51.16 59.09 55.97
Payoffs (18.64) (17.67) (11.29) (15.29) (19.60) (22.23) (15.06) (16.45)
Total 108 100.91 119.77 109.06 115.06
Payoffs (6.89) (2.27) (1.17) (3.76)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 4.3 presents the statistical tests of the summary statistics. Concentrating on
leader quantity, we find that first movers in treatment SEQ-IND choose significantly
higher quantities than first movers in the corresponding team treatment SEQ-TEAM.
This contradicts our main hypothesis.
Concerning follower quantities, it unambiguously appears that individual second
movers behave more “selfishly” than team second movers, as the slope of the re-
sponse function employed in the individual-player treatment SEQ-IND are signifi-
cantly closer to the ones of the standard best-response function than the intercept and
slope of the response function in the team-player treatment SEQ-TEAM. We do not
have non-parametric tests for follower quantities directly as such comparisons leads
to control for leader quantities. Last but not least, we find that group players produce
less jointly and earn more than individual players in the squential treatments.
In contrast of the many differences found in the sequential treatments, average
first-mover choices in treatment SM-IND and the corresponding group treatment SM-
TEAM do not differ significantly. For completeness, in column 3 and 4 of Table 4.3 we
also report results across the two individual and the two team treatments. These re-
sults show that the differences brought by the use of elicitation method are in general
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weak.
Table 4.3: Results of statistical tests for first- and second movers
Leader quantity
Parametric: estimates for the coefficient β1.H0 : β1 = 0.
Non-parametric: Mann-Whitney ranksum tests
Comparison based on player types Comparison based on elicitation method
SEQ-IND SM-IND SEQ-IND SEQ-TEAM
versus versus versus versus
SEQ-TEAM SM-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM
2.132*** 0.485 1.209*** -0.373
(0.399) (0.607) (0.470) (0.302)
p < 0.05 p = 0.394 p = 0.109 p = 0.468
Follower quantity
Parametric: estimates for the coefficient β3.H0 : β3 = 0.
0.324*** 0.195** 0.254 0.013
(0.078) (0.090) (0.293) (0.035)
Total quantity
p < 0.05 p = 0.670 p = 0.229 p = 0.564
Total profit
p < 0.05 p = 0.670 p = 0.262 p = 0.387
Notes: Estimated equation for leader quantities: qLijt = β0 + β1 × TREATM + εijt, where q
L
ijt
is the quantity chosen by first-mover subject/group i in session j in period t and TREATM
is a dummy used to code the treatments included in the regressions. In all regressions, the
dummy variable TREATM is coded such that it is equal to 1 for the treatment mentioned in
the upper entry in each column of this table and it is equal to 0 for the treatment mentioned
in the lower entry in each column. The coefficient β1 measures the difference in average first-
mover quantities in the two treatments included in the regression. A test of the hypothesis
H0 : β1 = 0 will show whether or not the difference is significant. For testing behavior of the
followers, we estimate the equation qF = β0 + β1 × TREATM + β2qL + β3 × TREATM× qL +
εijk. In all regressions, the dummy variable TREATM is coded such that it is equal to 1 for
the treatment mentioned in the upper entry in each column of this table and it is equal to 0 for
the treatment mentioned in the lower entry in each column. In order to account for possible
non-independence of observations, we ran the regressions clustering data by subject or group
and by session and using general linear latent and mixed models, GLLAMM (S.Rabe-Hesketh
and A.Skrondal (2005). We report as p-levels P > |t|. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Standard errors in parentheses. Using Tobit regression techniques delivers very similar results.
None of the tests are significant for the 1-period treatments.
CHAPTER 4 81
Figure 4.1: Distribution and frequency of choice pairs (Solid line is best re-
sponse function)
To learn about the distribution of first mover and, at the same time, about output
pairs (qL, qF) of first and second mover choices, refer to Figure 4.1. Note that the larger
is a dot in this figure, the more often the corresponding output pair was chosen. The
solid line in the panels of Figure 4.1 represents the best-response function. Hence, this
figure enables us to see how first and second mover choices match with each other,
and how they deviate from the standard game theoretical prediction. Inspecting fig-
ure 4.1, we make a number of observations. First, in the group treatments, Cournot
outcomes are most common (42.9% in SEQ-TEAM and 44.2% in SM-TEAM; 8.1% in
SEQ-IND and 25.6% in SM-IND). In contrast, in the individual treatments there is
more mass on outcomes that include first-mover quantities higher than the Cournot
quantity of 8. This is particularly the case in treatment SEQ-IND where we observe
a lot of pure Stackelberg outcomes (12, 6) (14.5% in SEQ-IND and 11.1% in SM-IND;
0.0% in SEQ-TEAM and 3.8% in SM-TEAM). Second, as already observed in Cox et al.
(2007) in reference to the Huck et al. (2001) data, we see that the data in all panels
of Figure 4.1 appear to be heteroscedastic as increasing (and decreasing, in case of
all data of the strategy-method treatments) first mover choices lead to higher disper-
sion of second mover choices. Third, there is a lot of overproduction (which can be
interpreted as punishment) by second movers for first mover quantities higher than
8, whereas we see underproduction (which can be interpreted as rewarding) for first
mover quantities smaller than 8.
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4.4.2 Second-mover behavior
Let us first consider second-mover behavior in the 1-period treatments. Figure 4.2
shows the average response function observed in the 1-period treatments (for the
sequential-play treatments in the left and for the strategy-method treatments in the
right panel). As the sequential-play treatments only deliver a few data points, no
clear picture emerges in the left panel of Figure 4.2. If anything, the average response
function of team players seems to be closer to the best response function than that
of individual players in the sequential play treatments. A clearer picture emerges
in the right panel showing the average response functions in the strategy-method
treatments. We make two observations. First, for leader quantities smaller than the
Cournot quantity of 8, the average team response function exactly coincides with the
best-response function, whereas the average response function of individuals runs
slightly below the best response function. The latter implies that individuals on aver-
age have a slight tendency to reward what could be interpreted as “nice” first-mover
behavior. Second, for leader quantities larger than the Cournot quantity of 8, the
average response functions of individual and teams are very similar and both run
above the best response function, implying that both individuals and teams slightly
punish what could be interpreted as “greedy” first-mover behavior. Although there
is weak visual evidence indicating that the observed response functions of teams are
closer to the best-response function than that of individual players in the 1-period
treatments (which is in line with earlier results in the literature and our hypothesis),
the estimation of simple response functions do not deliver any statistically significant
differences.
Figure 4.2: Average response functions observed in the one-period sequen-










































There are no observations for leader quantities 10 and 11 in treatment SEQ-IND-1.
Next turn to second-mover behavior in the 15-period treatments. The two panels
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in Figure 4.3 show the average response functions in the 15-period truly sequential
(left panel) and the 15-period strategy-method treatments (right panel). Inspecting
the two panels of Figure 4.3, it seems fair to state that the average observed response
functions of team second movers are farther away from the best-response function
than that of individual second movers in the 15-period treatments. Importantly, the
two panels in Figure 4.3 as well as simple diagnostic tools: 16 This suggest that team
second movers reward more and punish harder than individual followers. Interest-
ingly, all observed response functions show a particular and perhaps somewhat sur-
prising “first slope downward, then slope upward, then slope downward” pattern.
This is most transparent in the strategy-method treatments. More precisely, the re-
sponse functions in the strategy-method treatments are downward sloping for leader
choices between 3 and 7, they slope upward for leader choices between 7 and 11/12,
and then slope downward again for higher leader choices. Due to the more limited
number of different choices of first movers in the sequential treatments, this pattern
is less clear in the left panel of Figure 4.3. 17
16 Recall that the theoretical response function of followers is given by qF(qL) = 12− 0.5qL . Estimat-
ing such response functions as a quick diagnostic tool for our data and comparing the results of the
relevant 15-period treatments delivers the following results (The details are provided in Web Appendix
4.A.) First, both the intercept and the slope of the response function employed in the individual-player
treatment SEQ-IND-15 are significantly closer to the ones of the standard best-response function than the
intercept and slope of the response function in the team-player treatment SEQ-TEAM-15. This suggests
that individual second movers behave more “selfishly” than team second movers. Second, the reaction
function in treatment Seq-Ind is downward-sloping, while the reaction function in treatment SEQ-TEAM
is upward-sloping. This suggests that team followers reward more and punish harder than individual
followers. Third, repeating this exercise for the “relevant” data (i.e., only second-movers’ reactions at
quantities actually chosen by first movers) in the 15-period strategy-method treatments confirms the
result obtained for the truly sequential treatments.
17Reaction functions on the individual and group level show considerable heterogeneity ranging from
best-response behavior to flat response functions (reflecting a basic reward-and-punishment scheme) to
response functions that resemble the shape of those shown in the right panel of Figure 4.3. We come
back to this issue in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.3: Average response functions observed in the 15-period sequential
treatments (left) and the 15-period strategy-method treatments
(right)
While estimated linear and monotonic response functions may serve as a quick
diagnostic tools, from the preceding discussion we conclude that simple linear esti-
mations are inappropriate and incapable of accounting for patterns observed in the
average and individual response functions. Furthermore, although basic patterns are
easily identifiable on the individual and team level in the strategy-method treatments,
this is not easy in the sequential treatments as in the latter treatments we sometimes
observe second-mover behavior only for a possibly small subset of first-mover quan-
tities, which leads to identification and categorization issues. This raises two prob-
lems. First, how can we appropriately account for (average) response functions in the
various treatments? Second, how can we formally compare second-mover behavior
across treatments?
We can solve these problems by employing two recently suggested structural mod-
els. First of all, it turns out that the patterns observed in Figure 4.3 (and at the individ-
ual and group level) are consistent with the predictions of models of other-regarding
preferences, especially the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Therefore, in the next
section we will account for followers’ observed response functions by structural es-
timation of the Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion as suggested
in Lau and Leung (2010). Furthermore, we also estimate and discuss Cox et al. (2007)
model of emotion-driven reciprocity. For the time being we will ignore which other-
regarding motive drives the results. The important point is that independent of the
model we estimate, individuals appear to be more “ self-regarding” than teams. We
are able to make this statement as the standard selfish best response function is nested
in both of these social preference models we estimate. Therefore, we have a clear and
unambiguous method to decide which of two observed average response functions is
closer to the prediction of subgame perfectness.18
18Surely, in the group treatments it is the group decision making process that maps individual mem-
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4.4.3 A closer look at the data: structural estimations
Estimating a model of inequality aversion
Lau and Leung (2010) suggest that the experimental results of the Stackelberg mar-
kets reported in Huck et al. (2001) can be explained using a simplified version of the
inequality-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In particular, Lau and Leung
suggest that the population of second movers consists of a mixture of “ standard”
and “ non-standard” preference types. Standard types are assumed to use the theo-
retical best-response function, whereas non-standard types are assumed to act as if
maximizing a utility function of the Fehr and Schmidt type. In their paper, Lau and
Leung first derive the response function of non-standard types. Interestingly, it turns
out that this response functions accurately predicts the shape of the average response
functions we observe in our data (see Figure 4.3). Lau and Leung then develop a
maximum-likelihood model in which a share φns of second movers are non-standard
types and a share of 1 − φns of second movers are standard types. Estimating this
model, using the random-matching Stackelberg data of Huck et al. (2001), they show
that a substantial share (about 40%) of the second movers in Huck et al. (2001) appear
to have preferences of the Fehr-Schmidt type. The fact that in our strategy-method
treatment data we directly observe individual response functions that are consistent
with either those of standard or non-standard types is a rationale to apply the model
by Lau and Leung to our data to account for follower behavior. In the following we
will shortly introduce the model put forward by Lau and Leung, closely following
their exposition. We will then estimate it for our four treatments.
Denote player i and j’s payoffs by πi and πj, respectively. Then, Fehr and Schmidt
preferences are given by
ui = πi − αi max{πj − πi, 0} − βi max{πi − πj, 0} (4.1)
where 0 ≤ βi < 1, βi ≤ αi, i, j = L, F with i 6= j. The parameter αi measures player
i’s aversion towards disadvantageous inequality, whereas the parameter βi measures
player i’s aversion towards advantageous inequality. For estimation purposes, Lau
and Leung make two assumptions. First, they assume that there are two types of
second movers. The first type of second movers have standard selfish preferences
and, hence, play according to the standard best response. These second movers are
referred to as standard types (S). The second type of players have Fehr-Schmidt pref-
erences and maximize utility as given in 4.1. These second movers are referred to as
ber’s preferences into a decision of the group. Hence, in estimating these models also for the group
treatments we maintain an as-if assumption, according to which a group’s decision is a reflection of
this “group’s preferences.” (See also Kocher and Sutter (2007), p.71) Given the specific non-monotonic
shape of the observed response functions of groups and individuals, we employ these other-regarding
preference models as a technical device in order to more adequately estimate and compare response
functions.
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non-standard types (NS). Second, Lau and Leung assume that all non-standard types
have the same (dis)advantageous inequality parameter. Hence, αi = a and βi = b
for all non-standard players. Lau and Leung assume that the share of non-standard
types in the population is given by φns ∈ [0, 1] where φns is to be estimated from the
data. Hence, the basic assumptions of Lau and Leung’s simplified version of the Fehr-
Schmidt model are as follows: Pr(αi = a & βi = b) = φns, Pr(αi = βi = 0) = 1− φns,
where 0 ≤ φns < 1, 0 ≤ b < 1, b ≤ a.
Recall from above that a standard-type follower reacts according to the best re-
sponse function given by qSF(qL) = 12− 12 qL. Regarding the response function of non-
standard followers, Lau and Leung show that it is given by
qNSF (qL) =

12− qL2(1−b) if qL ∈ A
qL if qL ∈ B





























Note that the best-response function is piecewise linear. 19 Note also that it slopes
downward for low, slopes upward for intermediate, and slopes downward again for
high first-mover quantities. Hence, it predicts the pattern observed in Figure 4.3. To
briefly gain some intuition, consider the case of qL ∈ A. Best responding to such
a quantity choice, maximizes a second mover’s profit but reduces utility of a non-
standard type due to advantageous inequality. If qL is small enough, the non-standard
second mover finds it preferable to reduce quantity below the best response which
reduces advantageous inequality by more than it decreases own profits.
To derive the likelihood function, let xi and yi represent the i th observed tuple
of observed leader and follower choices. Lau and Leung assume that a follower
with standard [non-standard] preferences chooses according yi = qSF(xi) + ε i [yi =
qNSF (xi)+ ε i], where ε i is iid according to a normal distribution N(0, σ
2) and qSF(xi) and
qNSF (xi) are as given above. Since Lau and Leung assume a share φns of non-standard
and a share of 1− φns standard second movers, the probability density of observing
yi is given by
(1− φns)× fS(yi|xi; σ) + φns × fNS(yi|xi; a, b, σ)
where fS(yi | xi; σ) [ fNS(yi | xi; a, b, σ)] is the probability density of observing yi when
the second mover has standard [non-standard] preferences.20 The log likelihood func-
tion of observing the sample (xi, yi)
NTreatm
i=1 of leader and follower choices is then given
19Note also that the standard best response is obtained when a = b = 0.











and fNS(yi) = fA(yi)1−DB(xi)−DC(xi) × fB(yi)DB(xi) × fC(yi)DC(xi)

















Table 4.4: Estimation results for Lau-Leung’s implementation of the Fehr and
Schmidt model (φns = 1)
Truly Sequential Play Strategy Method
All Data Relevant Data
SEQ-IND SEQ-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM
φns 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
– – – – – –
a 0.303*** 0.629*** 0.279*** 0.641** 0.358** 0.500***
(0.085) (0.129) (0.068) (0.273) (0.151) (0.160)
b 0.216*** 0.252*** 0.192*** 0.215** 0.215*** 0.400***
(0.029) (0.017) (0.062) (0.090) (0.035) (0.001)
σ 1.506*** 0.862*** 1.485*** 1.740*** 1.658*** 1.322***
(0.164) (0.190) (0.200) (0.423) (0.263) (0.224)
LL -427.864 -198.222 -4599.221 -3334.489 -436.902 -262.242
N 234 156 2535 1690 227 156
Hypothesis aSEQ-IND = aSEQ-TEAM aSM-IND = aSM-TEAM aSM-IND = aSM-TEAM
Testing & & &
bSEQ-IND = bSEQ-TEAM bSM-IND = bSM-TEAM bSM-IND = bSM-TEAM
p = 0.075(χ22 = 5.17) p = 0.077(χ
2
















(1− φns) fS(yi) + φns
[
fA(yi)1−DB(xi)−DC(xi) × fB(yi)DB(xi) × fC(yi)DC(xi)
]}
where NTreatm is the number of observations in the treatment under consideration.
To control for non-independence of observations, we cluster standard errors on indi-
viduals or groups.
In an effort to first estimate the average response functions, as shown in Figure
4.3, we set φns = 1, that is, in a first step we assume that there are only non-standard
types. The estimation results are given in Table 4.4.
We note that the parameter estimates of the inequality-aversion parameters a and
b are significantly different from 0 in all treatments and data sets. Note also that the
parameter estimates of a and b are in line with the restrictions 0 ≤ b < 1 and b ≤ a
imposed by the Fehr and Schmidt model. Most importantly for the purpose of de-
ciding which observed average response function is closer to standard best-response
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Table 4.5: Estimation results for Lau-Leung’s implementation of the Fehr and
Schmidt model
Truly Sequential Play Strategy Method
All Data Relevant Data
SEQ-IND SEQ-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM
φns 0.277 0.773*** 0.276*** 0.418*** 0.279*** 0.543***
(0.175) (0.077) (0.011) (0.015) (0.092) (0.132)
a 1.713 0.949*** 1.035*** 1.479*** 15.584 3.327**
(1.513) (0.256) (0.029) (0.054) (15.727) (1.147)
b 0.383 0.470*** 0.823*** 0.828** 0.605*** 0.476***
(0.673) (0.034) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.024)
σ 1.094*** 0.717** 0.818*** 1.034*** 0.968*** 0.931***
(0.117) (0.200) (0.013) (0.020) (0.140) (0.190)
LL -426.523 -196.848 -4149.451 -3232.943 -377.509 -241.571
N 234 156 2535 1690 227 156
Hypothesis aSEQ-IND = aSEQ-TEAM aSM-IND = aSM-TEAM aSM-IND = aSM-TEAM
Testing & & &
aSEQ-IND = bSEQ-TEAM bSM-IND = bSM-TEAM bSM-IND = bSM-TEAM
p < 0.001(χ22 = 40.93) p = 0.006(χ
2
2 = 7.634) p = 0.002(χ
2
2 = 9.82)
function (characterized by a = b = 0), we observe that both the disadvantageous
inequality parameter a, and the advantageous inequality parameter b is larger in the
team treatment than in the relevant individual treatment. For instance, while in SEQ-
TEAM the parameter a is estimated as 0.629, is only 0.303 in treatment SEQ-IND. This
is in contrast to the main hypothesis according to which the observed response func-
tion of teams should be closer to the standard best-response function than the one of
individuals. The test results reported on the bottom of Table 4.4 indicate that we can
(weakly) reject the hypothesis that in each of two relevant treatments comparisons
the parameters a and b are the same.
We next estimate the full model, dropping the restriction φns = 1, and concentrate
on the estimated share of standard and non-standard types in two related treatments.
The results are shown in Table 4.5.21 With the exception of treatment SEQ-IND, the
share φns of nonstandard types is estimated to be significantly larger than 0 in all treat-
2110 out of 4998 choice pairs result in negative payoffs to both players (1 in SEQ-TEAM; 3 in SM-IND
relevant data; 5 in SM-TEAM all data and 1 in SM-IND all data). Since the utility function in (4.2) is de-
fined only for non-negative payoffs, we truncate these observations at qF = 24− qL which implies zero
payoffs for both players. Furthermore, seven observations in treatment SM-IND, second movers reacted
with quantities above the best-response to first-mover quantities smaller than 8. A possible explanation
is that individual second movers exposed to the strategy method are likely to make more errors, espe-
cially at first mover quantities they do not actually observe very often in the course of the experiment.
In the SM treatments (all data), observations from three individuals and two teams were dropped due
to extreme responses to leader quantity 3 and 15, causing difficulties in finding convergence.
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ments and range from about 0.27 in the individual treatments to 0.773 in treatment
SEQ-TEAM. More importantly for our purposes, the share of non-standard types is
estimated to be consistently higher in the group treatments than in the corresponding
individual treatments. These differences are highly significant in all treatments (and
data sets) as indicated by the test results presented at the bottom of Table 4.5.22 This
again is strong evidence against our main hypothesis according to which groups are
expected to be more in line with the predictions of subgame perfectness.
Estimating a model of reciprocity
Recently, the behavior of second-movers in Stackelberg markets was also accounted
for by a model of emotion-driven reciprocity (Cox et al. (2007)). Surely, next to or be-
sides inequality aversion, reciprocity is a motivational force for second-mover behav-
ior. Furthermore, the response function of the Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad model is flex-
ible enough to, in principle, rationalize the shape of the observed average response
functions shown in Figure 4.3. Therefore, as a robustness check of our finding that
team second-movers are less (myopically) selfish than individual second-movers, we
also estimated the model put forward by Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad. We present
the details in Web Appendix 4.A , but note here that the estimation results show that
the “ emotional state” of groups is more pronounced (both positively and negatively)
than that of individuals. In particular, an estimated reciprocity parameter is signif-
icantly larger in the groups treatments than in the corresponding individual-player
treatments. Hence, the results of this robustness exercise show that team followers
appear to behave more reciprocal (or less self-regarding) than individual followers.
This is, again, not in line with our main hypothesis.
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 A potential explanation of the results
Summarizing our results derived so far, we can state the following. In the one-shot
treatments we find weak evidence that is in line with previous results reported in
the literature according to which groups are closer to the subgame perfect equilib-
rium prediction than individuals (although the differences we find are small and not
significant). In our 15-period treatments, in contrast, we find that in comparison to
individuals, groups choose lower quantities as first movers and reward more and
punish harder as second movers. In other words, groups in our repeated game treat-
ments appear to be less “selfish” than individuals. This raises the question of how the
different results in our and the earlier experiments can be explained. We believe that
22We apply Wald test for testing parameter significance. We first accommodate data from different
treatments into a large, unrestricted model. Then we put restrictions on coefficients to see whether they
are equal to zero.
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a possible explanation rests on the observation that there is substantial heterogeneity in
subjects’ types and the fact that different time horizons were used in our and the earlier
experiments.
Regarding heterogeneity of subjects’ types, we present substantial evidence that
most subjects belong to one of three categories: (myopic) profit maximizer (PM),
strategic rewarder and punisher (Strat-R&P), otherregarding preference-driven re-
warder and punisher (Pref-R&P) (can be equality aversion/reciprocity). We will iden-
tify these types by concentrating on second-mover behavior, which is easily inter-
pretable. PMs always maximize their payoff in response to any first-mover choice.
S-R&Ps reward “nice” low leader quantities and punish “greedy” high leader quan-
tities during all but the final round, where they revert to best response. These types
arguably want to strategically “ educate” leaders to choose lower quantities, until the
final round where they revert to opportunistic behavior. Pref-R&P behave like Strat-
R&Ps in all rounds. Since these types do not revert to payoff maximizing behavior
even in the final round, their reward and punishment behavior can be interpreted as
stemming from other-regarding preferences. Note that the existence of such or sim-
ilar types has been reported in other studies in the literature (see, e.g., Luhan et al.
(2001) and especially Reuben and Suetens (2009) for the existence of Strat-R&Ps and
Pref-R&Ps).
Many earlier experiments reporting groups to be more “ selfish” than individu-
als (see Section 2) employ one-shot interaction between subjects. In contrast, we have
subjects interact repeatedly over 15 rounds (using random re-matching of individuals
and teams). We believe that the heterogeneity in subjects’ types and the different time
horizons could explain the different results in our and the earlier experiments. For
this purpose, let us first consider the case of one-shot interactions. Assume that sub-
jects are either of the three types mentioned above. Of those, PMs and Strat-R&Ps will
behave according to subgame perfect behavior while Pref-R&Ps will deviate from this
behavior by displaying otherregarding concerns. Hence, behavior in inter-individual
one-shot treatments is likely to be a mixture of selfish and other-regarding behav-
ior. However, in the one-shot team treatments it is conceivable that both PMs and
Strat-R&Ps convince the potentially present Pref-R&Ps that deviation from subgame-
perfect behavior is not meaningful in a one-shot interaction. For instance, they might,
given the first mover quantity, convince a group member who is an emotion-driven
reciprocator to control feelings and to also vote for myopic best-response behavior.
Hence, behavior in inter-group one-shot treatments is likely to be more homogeneous
and more in line with the prediction of standard game theory. This would explain
why in earlier experiments groups were on average found to be more selfish than
individuals.
Consider now the case of multiple-period interactions. In the inter-individual
treatments, average behavior will be a mixture of other-regarding behavior (displayed
by both Pref-R&Ps and Strat-R&Ps) and PMs. However, in the multiple-round team
CHAPTER 4 91
treatments it is conceivable that Strat-R&P now side with Pref-R&Ps in an effort to
convince the potentially present PMs that more cooperative behavior (established by
reward and punishment) is the better thing to do (in the sense of achieving higher
payoffs overall) when the game is repeated multiple times. Hence, behavior in inter-
group multiple-round treatments is likely to be more homogenous and more in line
with cooperative behavior. This would explain why in our experiment groups were
on average found to be less selfish than individuals.23 We believe that the mechanism
we describe is are applicable to simultaneous-move dilemma games (such as pris-
oner’s dilemma) and to sequential games that allow for competitive and cooperative
outcomes (such as dictator, ultimatum, trust, or Stackelberg games). It is presumably
less applicable to so-called eureka-type problems that have a “ clear” solution that,
ones discovered, is recognized as such (e.g., limit-pricing or beauty-contest game). In
the remainder of this section, we provide evidence for the existence of the different
types of subjects mentioned above.
4.5.2 Evidence for the explanation of the results
The first kind of evidence is provided by the estimation results of the Lau and Leung
(2010) model presented in Section 4.4.3. There, the term 1− φns measures the share
of “ standard” or best-response subjects. As this share is estimated to be significantly
larger than 0, no matter which of the individual-treatment data sets we use, this pro-
vides evidence for the existence of myopic profit maximizers.
The second, more direct evidence is delivered by the inspection of the individual
response functions in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 in Web Appendix 4.A. These Figures show
the individual response functions of second movers in round 14 and 15, respectively,
in treatment SM-IND. Inspecting the response function in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we
find the following categorization. PMs: Subjects 6, 9, 14, 16, and 18 are pure myopic
profit maximizers. Moreover, subject 3 and 17 also play mostly best response, and
could, hence, also be classified as myopic profit maximizer.24 Strat-R&P: In period
14, subject 12 (13) basically plays best response for quantities smaller than 8 (9). In
round 15, however, both subjects choose best response behavior for all first-mover
23Note that the mechanism we propose here where some subjects in a group try to convince other
subjects of what is the “ right” thing to do depending on the time horizon is in line with “Persuasive
Argument Theory” (PAT) put forward in the psychological literature (see, e.g., J.A.F.Stoner (1961); Te-
ger and Pruitt (1967)). PAT suggests that if the mean response of the individuals exhibits a preference
towards a particular position, it is likely that the subjects will be exposed to more persuasive arguments
in favor of this position during the discussion. Therefore, the ex-post group outcome will shift towards
that particular initial position.
24Note that in treatment SM-Team, there are only 2 pure profit maximizers (teams 6 and 9) which can
be seen in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 in Appendix 4.A. Hence, we observe a lower share of profit maximizers
in the team treatment than in the individual treatment. This is consistent with our explanation above
according to which, through team discussions, PMs are likely to be convinced to abandon their behavior
in favor of some sort of reward-and-punishment behavior.
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quantities. Hence, these two subjects can clearly be identified as strategic players. To
a lesser extent, the same is true for subjects 10 and 11. The remaining subjects consist
of those that can be classified as Pref-R&P and “Others.” 25
The third kind of evidence is provided by the analysis of follower chat protocols.
We do this in view of illustrating two things: that statements made during the group
discussions can be (albeit not exclusively) assigned to subject types mentioned above,
and that many of the discussions can be easily characterized as a conflict between
the types of subjects mentioned above. To economize on space, we only concentrate
on followers in the main group treatment SEQ-TEAM-15 and SEQ-TEAM-1. Again,
followers’ discussions provide “richer” material.
We started the analysis by first listing all (interpretable) statements, proposals, mo-
tives, etc. that were voiced in any of the group chats. Then we tried to assign each
of these statements to a broader category which would also reflect the type categories
introduced above.26 These categories were: PM, Strat-R&P, Pref-R&P, Non-PM, and
“ other.” These categories are the column titles in Table 4.6. The complete list of all
statements collected under the respective broad category is provided in the first col-
umn of Table 4.12 in the Web Appendix. Statements summarized in category Non-PM
are those that, arguably, belong to either category Strat-R&P or Pref-R&P. However,
an assignment to either of these categories is not unambiguous which is why we sum-
marize them in a separate category.
The next step of the analysis was to try to briefly summarize each group’s discus-
sion in each round. It turned out that each discussion can be summarized by one of
eight headlines, which provide the row titles in the upper part of Table 4.6. Here R
stands for reward, PM for profit maximization, and P for punishment, respectively.
The upper half of Table 4.6 is a cross table of the short summaries of chats’ contents
(column 1) and the broad categories of statements made during the chats (row 2). For
instance, in the 23 cases that a round’s chat could be summarized as “quick agree-
ment on R,” there was 1 statement attributable to a Strat-R&P motive, 5 statements
attributable to a Pref-R&P motive, 30 statements attributable to Non-PM motive, and
6 statements that could not be summarized under a common headline.27 A different
cross table is provided in the lower half of Table 4.6. Here we cross the leader groups’
quantity choices with the broad categories of statements made. (A more detailed
overview of the cross table is provided in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 in the Web Appendix).
25These results are confimred by a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis (see Kaufman and
Rousseeuw (1990)) of individual response functions. The details are available from the authors upon
request.
26We attempt to identify the message itself instead of the subject who wrote the message. The latter is
much more difficult due to the lack of information during communication, or changes of mind during
the discussion, etc.
27Note that the sum of these statements do not sum up to 23, the number of observations listed in
column 2 in Table 4.6. This is so because typically many different statements were made during one
group’s discussion in a round of the experiment.
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Table 4.6: Analysis of chat protocols
Categories of motives mentioned in group discussions
Overall characterization







Quick agreement on R 23 1 5 30 6
Quick agreement on PM 90 94 3 5 3
Quick agreement on P 15 2 13 13 7
PM vs R, R “wins” 10 18 19 9 12 2
PM vs R, PM “wins” 5 9 9 3 8 2
PM vs P, P “wins” 20 23 10 13 16 8
PM vs P, PM “wins” 7 20 1 4 6 5
How much P? 10 3 1 3 10 6
Σ 180 167 (41.5%) 43 (10.7%) 53 (13.2%) 100 (24.9%) 39 (9.7%)
Leaders’
Choices
qL = 6 12 18 10 10 9 4
qL = 7 42 31 13 6 34 5
qL = 8 79 79 2 7 6 4
qL = 9 4 2 5 3
qL = 10 14 11 3 9 15 8
qL = 11 9 11 4 5 8 5
qL = 12 20 17 9 16 23 10
Σ 180 167 43 53 100 39
Note: Abbreviations used: R = Reward, PM = Profit maximization, P = Punishment.
The understandably less extensive categorization for treatment SEQ-TEAM-1 is pro-
vided in Table 4.7, which has a similar structure as 4.6.
With these preparations in place, we can come back to the two points we want to
illustrate with the help of the chat protocols. First, we observe that also in the chat
protocols we find ample evidence for various types of subjects. In fact, the column
sums in the upper (or lower) part of Table 4.6 suggest that respectively 47%, 12.2%,
and 15.0% of all interpretable statements made stem from subjects who can, respec-
tively, be classified as (myopic) profit maximizers, strategic teachers, and otherregard-
ing subjects. Second, row-wise inspection of Table 4.6 illustrates the conflicts that are
carried out in group discussions. Surely, and almost tautologically, in cases in which
there is quick agreement on an action, we typically only observe only one kind of
argument. For instance, if there is quick agreement on best response (which typically
happens in response to leader quantity 7 or 8, see the lower part of Table 4.6) there are
almost no statements made in favor of a different action. On the other hand, if there
is quick agreement on either reward or punishment, no statement is made in favor of
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Table 4.7: Analysis of chat protocols in treatment SM-Team-1
Categories of motives mentioned
in group discussions
Overall characterization Non-
of a round’s discussion No.obs. PM PM Other
PM vs R, PM “wins” 2 4 2 -
PM vs P, P “wins” 2 3 4 1
PM vs P, PM “wins” 2 6 2 5
∑ 6 13(48.1%) 8 (29.6%) 6 22.2(%)
Leaders’ Choices
qL = 6 1 2 1 -
qL = 8 2 5 2 2
qL = 10 1 1 1 1
qL = 12 2 5 4 3
∑ 6 13 8 6
Notes: Abbreviations used: R = Reward, PM = Profit maximization, P = Punishment. Percentages in
row “∑” refer to percentages of cases in the columns labled “Categories of motives mentioned in group
discussions”.
best response. The more interesting cases arise, of course, when a group’s discussion
can be characterized as a conflict between best response and a rewarding or a puni-
tive action. In these cases we typically observe arguments and statements that can be
attributed to all kinds of motives ranging from myopic profit maximization to strate-
gic teaching to other-regarding and non-profit maximizing behavior. For instance, in
the 10 group discussion that revolve around the question whether the leader group
should be best responded to or be rewarded (and rewarding is the result), we ob-
serve 18 statements made in favor of profit maximization, and, respectively, 19, 9, and
12 statements in favor of strategic teaching, otherregarding motives, and non-profit
maximization behavior. Not surprisingly, as there are many more statements made
against best response, in these cases a response is chosen that rewards the leader’s
action. Similar patterns can be observed in the other discussions that are character-
ized by conflicts among group members. Note the fact that in conflict-laden group
discussions it is typically the case that all kinds of arguments are exchanged, which
can be seen by reading row-wise the lower part of Table 4.6. For instance in response
to the collusive leader quantity qL = 6, we see statements coming from all “camps.”
Likewise for higher leader quantities (≥ 10).
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Table 4.8: Reactions of followers to previous leader quantities
qL = 6 qL = 7 qL = 8 qL = 9 qL = 10 qL = 11 qL = 12
(9) (14) (90) (6) (21) (4) (24)
Only leader qt−1L 7.14% 3.33% 8.33%
(1) (3) (2)
qt−1L and neighborhood 4.76% 4.17%
(1) (1)
qt−1L and other quantities 33.33% 25.57% 4.44% 33% 38.10% 75% 50%
not in the neighborhood (3) (4) (4) (2) (8) (3) (12)
No change 66.67% 64.29% 86.67% 67% 52.38% 25% 27.5%
(6) (9) (78) (4) (11) (1) (9)
Other quantities than qL 5.56% 4.76%
(5) (1)
Notes: “Only leader qt−1L ” means that a follower team only responds differently with respect to the leader
quantity in the previous period. “qt−1L and neighborhood” means that a follower team changes response
both regarding the leader quantity encountered in period t− 1 and the leader quantity either to the left or to
the right of qt−1L . “q
t−1
L and other quantities” means the response function changes not only at q
t−1
L and its
neighborhood but also in other places. “Other quantities than qL” means changes take place not at qt−1L . The
numbers in the parentheses represents the absolute numbers of cases.
Table 4.8 reports the chat protocols of follower teams regarding the reactions to
leader quantities. In the SEQ-TEAM treatments, followers simply react to the leader
quantities they are paired up with, and hence there is no strategic uncertainty in-
volved. In the following, we only include analysis for the SM-TEAM treatment.
Table 4.8 shows that for smaller leader quantities (especially for the Cournot quan-
tity qL = 8), the majority of team followers decide not to change their response func-
tions. The main reason, through their chats, is that they believe the future leader
quantities they match will remain the same and hence they are happy with the cur-
rent strategies. Nevertheless, for larger leader quantities around the Stackelberg out-
come, follower teams tend to change their strategies, not only with respect to the
leader quantities they encountered, but also to other leader quantities along the reac-
tion function. The reason could be that they are likely to be matched with a different
leader in the subsequent period (probability 0.67), and hence it pays off to reconsider
reactions to other possible occasions.
4.6 Summary and concluding remarks
In this study we compare the behavior of individuals and groups in a sequential mar-
ket game in both one-period and multiple-period game treatments. Our main finding
is a differential effect the time horizon of interaction has on the extent of individ-
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ual and group players’ (non)conformity with subgame perfectness. In the one-shot
treatments we find that although on average groups appear to be somewhat closer to
subgame perfectness than individuals, none of the differences in behavior are statis-
tically significant. However, in the repeated game treatments we find that groups are
less (myopically) selfish and more cooperative than individuals. These findings are to
a large extent independent of the mode in which we elicit choices or the model we em-
ploy to account for second-mover behavior. Importantly, our main finding is in (stark)
contrast to results in earlier studies reporting that groups appear to be more selfish
than individuals. A possible explanation for the different results in our and earlier
studies is that there is heterogeneity in subjects’ types, ranging from pure (myopic)
profit maximization to either strategic or preference-driven reward-and-punishment
behavior. Depending on the time horizon of the interaction, the exchange of per-
suasive arguments via discussions is likely to lead groups to (possibly) more selfish
behavior in one-shot interactions and to more cooperative behavior in repeated inter-
actions. Since subjects in inter-individual interactions can not exchange arguments
regarding what constitutes “meaningful” behavior in the face of different features of
the interaction, it is conceivable that their behavior reacts to a lesser extent to the time
horizon of interaction. Our main result implies that the statement “Groups, it seems,
are more selfish and more sophisticated players than individuals, and, as a result,
interactions between two unitary groups are closer to the standard, game-theoretical
solution than interactions between two individuals.” (Bornstein 2008, p. 30), which
summarizes much of the previous literature on interindividual and intergroup com-
parisons in simple, sequential-move games, needs modification.
Our results show that the second part of the above statement does not generally
apply to multiple-period game settings. In fact, for games that leave relatively more
room for otherregarding preferences, the time horizon of interaction seems impor-
tant, leading the play of groups either closer or farther away from the game-theoretic
prediction than that of individuals. In the light of our results (and to the extent that
the explanation of our results is convincing) it might be worthwhile to revisit other
simple sequential-move games (such as the ultimatum game, the trust game, the cen-
tipede game, and the gift-exchange game) to check for a possible differential effect of
the time horizon of interaction. While we concentrate on the effect of the time horizon
of interaction in interindividual and intergroup comparisons, much more research is
called for to analyze the effect of other design features such as the nature of communi-
cation within groups (e.g., face-to-face or anonymous chat) or the voting mechanism
(e.g., majority or unanimity voting). 28
The Stackelberg market game is, arguably, not of the “Eureka” type, where a so-
lution once found is recognized as such by players. Therefore the results of our re-
28Some studies, such as Elbittar et al. (2004), Gillet et al. (2009b), Gillet et al. (2009a) vary the na-
ture of managerial decision making processes within firms and analyse their impact on intergroup and
interindividual firm behavior.
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peated markets are not necessarily in contrast to the findings summarized by the sec-
ond quote in the Introduction, which summarizes results from repeated interaction
in games with a strong “Eureka” component. In these games, behavior of groups was
shown to converge much faster to the (same) game-theoretic prediction than individ-
uals. However, our repeated-game results show that neither groups nor individu-
als converge to a (refined) game-theoretic prediction, and, what is more, that groups
clearly diverge farther from it than individuals (see also Cox and Hayne (2006) and
Sutter et al. (2009)).
It is one question to check who is closer to game-theoretic predictions in interindi-
vidual and intergroup comparisons, another question is to check who earns higher
profits. In particular and perhaps not surprisingly, there does not seem to be a simple
relationship between higher conformity with game-theoretic predictions and higher
profits. For instance, Feri et al. (2010) show that groups are significantly better at
coordinating on more efficient outcomes and hence earn higher profits than individ-
uals, while Bornstein et al. (2004) show that groups exit earlier in one-shot centipede
games, leading to lower profits in comparison to individuals. On the other hand,
Cox and Hayne (2006) and Sutter et al. (2009) show that in some auction formats,
groups pay higher prices than individuals and are more often victim of the winner’s
curse than individuals and hence, groups make smaller profits than individuals. In
our repeated Stackelberg markets employing truly sequential play, however, we find
that groups earn significantly higher total profits than individuals, although groups’
behavior is farther away from the (refined) game theoretic prediction. These results
seem to suggest that more research is needed to explore when (type of game, etc.)
and why (design features, ease of collusion, etc.) groups earn more than individuals.
The answer to this question is important for a recommendation on when to entrust
decision making to groups instead of to individuals in real-world settings.
Our results also speak to the extensive psychological literature on individual-versus-
group decision making, especially regarding the so-called “discontinuity effect.” This
effect which, importantly, so far largely rests on observations in one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma games, refers to the finding of “intergroup interactions to be more competi-
tive, or less cooperative, than interindividual relations” (Wildschut and Insko (2007),
p. 175, emphasis added). Clearly, the results of our 15-period treatments show that,
indeed, there is a clear difference or discontinuity between inter-individual and inter-
group interaction. However, our results show that the “discontinuity” goes in the
opposite direction than stated so far in the psychology literature. Hence, the defini-
tion of the discontinuity effect might need modification, too, accommodating, among
other things, the time horizon of interaction. 29
In this paper, we also make progress in terms of methodology regarding the com-
29Note that Lodewijkx et al. (2006) discuss the possibility of the time horizon to have a differential
effect on interindividual versus intergroup comparisons. However, they do not provide convincing
evidence for this claim.
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parison of interindividual and intergroup behavior. First, we study both one-shot and
multiple-period treatments in a unified framework, whereas other studies either only
implement one-period or only multiple-period games. Second, in an additional set
of treatments we employ the strategy-method to control for the possibility that dif-
ferences in second-mover behavior observed across interindividual and intergroup
treatments are driven by different experiences second movers make in the two envi-
ronments. This also enables us to uncover the complete shape of the response func-
tion used by experienced Stackelberg followers. Independent of whether they were
elicited from individual or group followers, average response functions in repeated
Stackelberg markets display the same characteristic pattern. They slope downward
for lower leader quantities, slope upward around the Cournot quantity and slope
downward again for larger leader quantities. These results imply that it does not
seem to be warranted to just run linear regressions to estimate followers’ response
functions in repeated games, as done, for instance in, Huck et al. (2001). 30 Interest-
ingly, the specific shape of followers’ response functions is nicely predicted by models
of other-regarding preferences, such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Building on earlier
contributions by Lau and Leung (2010) and Cox et al. (2007), we demonstrate that
experienced followers’ response functions are more adequately accounted for by esti-
mating structural models of other-regarding preferences rather than by simple linear
regressions. This allows us to unambiguously test which of two response functions is
closer to the best-reply function, which can be view as a third methodological contri-
bution of our paper.
30It remains to be checked whether similar unexpected patterns can be observed in other sequential-
move games, such as price leadership or models of endogenous timing in oligopoly markets.
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4.A Appendix
Design details of related studies
Table 4.9: Design details of related studies
Study Game Time Commu- Group Voting
nication horizon size rule
Cason and Mui (1997) dictator one-shot face to face 2 unanimity
Luhan et al. (2009) dictator one-shot electr. chat 3 unanimity
Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) ultimatum one-shot face to face 3 unanimity
Robert and Carnevale (2002) ultimatum one-shot face to face 2/4 unanimity
Cox (2002) trust one-shot face to face 3 unanimity
Kugler et al. (2007) trust one-shot face to face 3 unanimity
Kocher and Sutter (2007) gift exchange one-shot face to face/electr. chat 3 unanimity
Bosman et al (2006) power-to-take one-shot face-to-face 3 unanimity
Bornstein et al (2004) centipede one-shot face to face 3 unanimity
Note: This table lists studies analysing intergroup versus interindividual behavior in sequential two-
player games using one-shot interaction.
Results of simple linear response function estimations
As a quick diagnostic tool, we estimate simple linear response functions employed
by second movers in the various treatments. We start with the truly sequential treat-
ments and estimate the equation qFijk = β0 + β1×DSEQ-TEAM + β2qL + β3×DSEQ-TEAM×
qL + ε ijk. In this equation, qFijt is the quantity chosen by second-mover subject/group
i in session j in period t. D SEQ-TEAM is a dummy that equals 1 if an observation stems
from treatment SEQ-TEAM and equals 0 if an observation stems from treatment SEQ-
IND.31 The estimations results are as follows. (Recall that the standard best response
function is given by qF = 12− 0.5qL.)









From these estimation results it follows that the observed response function in
treatment SEQ-IND (when DSEQ-TEAM = 0) is qF = 8.920− 0.111qL whereas the reac-
tion function in treatment SEQ-TEAM (when DSEQ-TEAM = 1) is qF = (8.920− 2.570) +
31As before, we cluster by subject and session to control for non-independence of observations and
estimate the equation using general linear latent and mixed models, GLLAMM (Sophia Rabe-Hesketh
and Anders Skrondal, 2005)
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(−0.111 + 0.324)qL = 6. 35 + 0.213 qL. Hence, the reaction function in treatment SEQ-
IND is downward-sloping, while the reaction function in treatment SEQ-TEAM is up-
ward-sloping. This means that team followers reward more and punish harder than
individual followers. Note that the estimates of the coefficients β1 and β3 are statisti-
cally significantly different from 0. This indicates that both the intercept and the slope
of the response function employed in the individual-player treatment SEQ-IND are
significantly closer to the ones of the rational best-response function than the intercept
and slope of the response function in the team-player treatment SEQ-TEAM. Hence,
it unambiguously appears that individual second movers behave more “rationally”
than team second movers. Again, this contradicts our main hypothesis. Given the
more “rational” behavior of individuals, it is no surprise that we observe individual
first movers in the truly sequential treatment to choose on average higher quantities
than team first movers (see Table 4.3).
Surely, the result of more reciprocal behavior in the sequential team treatment com-
pared to the sequential individual treatment might be due to the different experience
second movers make in the two treatments. To control for this feature, we estimate a
similar equation as above using the data observed in the strategy-method treatments.
For this purpose, we include all data of the complete response functions elicited in
the strategy-method treatments. Hence, we compare individual and team second-
movers on more equal grounds as we take their reaction at all first-mover quantities
into account. The estimation results are as follows.









From these estimation results we infer that the observed response function in treat-
ment SM-IND is qF = 10.354− 0.233qL whereas the one in treatment SM-TEAM is qF =
9. 399− 0.081 qL. Hence, we find that the slope is negative in both treatments. How-
ever, as in the truly sequential treatment we find that the intercept (slope) of the ob-
served response function in the individual treatment is significantly larger (smaller)
than the intercept (slope) of the observed response function in the team treatment (see
the significance levels of the estimated coefficients β1 and β3). This, again, implies that
individuals appear to be more “rational” than teams.
Note finally that once we consider only “ relevant” data in the strategy-method
treatments (i.e., only second-movers’ reactions at quantities actually chosen by first
movers), we again find that individuals’ reaction function is (slightly) downward
sloping (SM-IND: qF = 8.543 − 0.089 qL) while teams’ reaction function is upward
sloping (qF = 7. 615 + 0.106 qL). This can be inferred from the following estimation
results:
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As before, we find that the reaction functions of individual second-movers ap-
pear to be closer to the rational best-response than reaction functions of group second
movers.32
Estimating a model of reciprocity
In this section we provide the details of the estimation of the emotion-driven reci-
procity model of Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) briefly mentioned in Section
4.4.3. In doing so, we closely follow their exposition. Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad pos-
tulate that agents have preferences over own or “ my” (m) and other or “ your” (y)
payoffs that are represented by the following utility function:
u(m, y) =
{
(mα + θyα)/α for α ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]
(myα) for α = 0.
(4.2)
The “ convexity” parameter α determines the shape of the indifference curves. For
α = 1 preferences are straight lines, whereas they are strictly convex for α < 1. The pa-
rameter θ represents the emotional state of an agent and is a function of the reciprocity
and status variables r and s. Since player positions are randomly assigned to subjects
rather than earned, Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad suggest to assume s = 0 in our case. The
reciprocity variable r is a function r = r(x) = m(x)−m0 where m(x) is the maximum
payoff the second mover can guarantee himself after the first mover’s choice of x, and
m0 = m(x0) is the second mover’s payoff for a “ neutral” choice x0 by the first mover,
which will be estimated from the data. Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad suggest to normal-
ize r(x) such that it lies in the interval [−1, 1]. With let mg = maxx m(x) and mb =
minx m(x), the normalized reciprocity is given by r(x) = (m(x) − m0)/(mg − mb),
when mg > mb, and r = 0 otherwise. Given the first mover’s choice x ∈ {3, 4, ..., 15}
in our game, we obtain m(x) = (12− 0.5x)2, and mg − mb = m(3) − m(15) = 90.
Hence, r(x) =
(
(12− 0.5x)2 − (12− 0.5x0)2
)
/90 for a proper first-mover choice x0.
For estimation purposes, Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad impose two assumptions. Assump-
tion A.1: Agents make choices to maximize the utility function given in equation (4.2).
Assumption A.2: The emotional state function θ = θ(r) is the same for all agents ex-
cept for a mean zero idiosyncratic term ε. Hence, θi = θ(r) + ε i.
Instead of assuming a specific distribution, Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad suggest to have
the data select the error distribution. We use the following error power exponential
32Using Tobit regression techniques delivers very similar results.
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distribution with density








for z ∈ (−∞,+∞), µ ∈ (−∞,+∞), σ, ν > 0. The
parameters σ and ν will be estimated from the data. 33
Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad show that the emotional state of a subject can be written
as θi = ar(x) + ε i
= a
(
(12− 0.5x)2 − (12− 0.5x0)2
)
/90 + ε i, where a is a reciprocity parameter which,
again, will be estimated from the data. Note that the emotional state of a follower
reacts to the difference of the maximal payoff given a leader’s choice x and the maxi-
mal payoff for the neutral leader choice x0. With the above definitions in place, write
the utility function (4.2) in terms of players’ choices. That is, substitute the payoff
functions m(x, q) = (24− x− q)q and y(x, q) = (24− x− q)x to get
ui(x, q) =
{
(24− qL − qF)α(qαF + θiqαL)/α for α ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]
(24− qL − qF)1+θi(qFqθiL ) for α = 0.
(4.3)
The first-order condition of (4.3) w.r.t. q is (24− x − 2q)qα−1 − θixα = 0.34 Cox-
Friedman-Gjerstad show that this FOC is valid for all α ≤ 1 and that a unique max-
imizer q∗(x, α, θ) = q∗(x, α, a, x0) of function (4.3) exists for all (θ, α) ∈ (−∞, ∞) ×
(−∞, 1]. Summarizing, the goal of the estimation is to find α (the convexity param-
eter), a (the reciprocity parameter), x0 (the reference choice of the first mover) and
b and c (the parameters of the error distribution) by maximizing the log likelihood
function




ln Pr [qi = q|xi, α, a, x0, σ, µ]
for the NTreatm observations in the treatment under consideration. To control for
non-independence of observations, the model was estimated with robust standard
errors and with observations clustered by individual subject or group.
The estimation and test results are displayed in Table 4.10.35 The parameter α
(ranging from negative infinity to 1) measures the slope of the utility function. The
parameter a captures the sensitivity of a follower’s reciprocity: The larger the a, the
more strongly a follower reacts to the changes of a leader quantity. The parameter x0
represents the leader quantity that triggers best response from a follower. We make
the following observations.
33The probability density of the exponential power error function used in CFG is: f (z; b, c) =
exp(−0.5|z/b|2/c)
b2c/2+1Γ(c/2+1) . There is one to one correspondence between our parameters and theirs (b = dσ,
c = 2/ν).
34Note that the standard best response is obtained for α = 1, a = 0, and x0 = 12.
35The same notes as for the estimation of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model apply (see footnote 21).
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Table 4.10: Estimation results for the Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad model
Huck et al Truly Sequential Play Strategy Method
(2001) data All Data Relevant Data
SEQ-IND SEQ-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM SM-IND SM-TEAM
α 0.285** 0.308** -1.127*** 0.901** 0.929*** 0.4000 -0.207
(0.129) (0.151) (0.075) (0.050) (0.040) (0.247) (0.269)
a 0.789*** 0.977*** 2.805*** 0.131*** 0.742*** 0.406*** 2.218***
(0.101) (0.144) (0.070) (0.010) (0.026) (0.094) (0.514)
x0 5.669*** 8.108*** 8.022*** 7.013**** 6.396*** 8.677*** 7.970***
(0.564) (0.336) (0.046) (0.067) (0.124) (0.359) (0.109)
σ 0.494*** 0.297*** 0.170*** 0.536*** 0.560*** 0.444*** 0.297***
(0.044) (0.019) (0.028) (0.030) (0.020) (0.088) (0.430)
ν 0.549*** 1.400*** 0.563*** 0.395*** 0.639*** 0.413*** 0.618***
(0.116) (0.199) (0.145) (0.019) (0.026) (0.080) (0.116)
LL – -403.882 -161.284 -4273.041 -4144.851 -362.734 -232.151
N 220 234 156 2535 1690 227 156
Hypothesis αSEQ-IND = αSEQ-TEAM αSM-IND = αSM-TEAM αSM-IND = αSM-TEAM
Testing p < 0.001(t = 8.511) p = 0.662(t = −0.437) p = 0.097(t = 1.662)
aSEQ-IND = aSEQ-TEAM aSM-IND = aSM-TEAM aSM-IND = aSM-TEAM












p = 0.799(t = 0.254) p < 0.001(t = 4.378) p = 0.060(t = 1.884)
Notes: The estimations of Cox et al. (2007) using Huck et al. (2001) data are presented in the first column.
The log-likelihood information is absent in the paper.
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Our estimation results in the SEQ-IND treatment are similar to the ones using Huck
et al. (2001) data except for “neural leader quantity” x0. Individual followers in our
dataset consider Cournot quantity 8 to be fair, while followers in the Huck et al. (2001)
think the “fair” leader quantity is the collusion quantity 6.
Second, as the estimated reciprocity parameter a is significantly larger than 0, the
emotional state θ is a positive function of the reciprocity r parameter in all treatments.
More importantly for our main hypothesis, we find that the estimated reciprocity
parameter a is larger in the group treatments than in the corresponding individual-
player treatments. The test results shown at the bottom of Table 4.10 indicate that
these differences are highly statistically significant. Hence, team followers appear to
behave more reciprocal (or less “ self-regarding” ) than individual followers. This is
not in line with our main hypothesis.
Third, regarding the convexity parameter α , we find that its estimate in the group
player treatment SEQ-TEAM is significantly lower than its estimate in the correspond-
ing individual treatment SEQ-IND.36 This means that, c.p., indifference curves of
teams are shallower than those of individuals and, hence, teams are willing to give
up more money in order to increase the leader’s income by a unit than individuals
(see Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008). This is not in line with our main hypothesis.
We obtain a similar result when only the relevant data in the strategy-method treat-
ments are included in the estimation. Furthermore, when all data is of the strategy-
method treatments are taken into account, the estimates of the convexity parameter α
are pretty similar and much closer to 1 (when indifference curves are linear), and not
significantly different from each other.
Fourth, the neutral first-mover output x0 is close to the Cournot quantity of 8 in
both of the truly sequential treatments. The estimates of the neutral first-mover quan-
tity x0 are much lower in the strategy-method treatments when all data are taken into
account. We find x̂0 = 7.013 for treatment SM-IND and x̂0 = 6.396 for treatment
SM-TEAM. The test result indicate that these two parameter estimates are statistically
significantly different. Hence, team second-movers start punishing “ earlier” (that is,
for lower first-mover quantities) than individual second-movers. Note that the esti-
mates of x0 in the strategy-method treatments are clearly higher (and again closer to
the Cournot quantity of 8) when only the relevant data is taken into account. The test
result indicates that this difference is statistically significant. 37
36Again, we use the Wald test to compare parameters, following similar procedures in the previous
subsection. Since there is only one restriction on parameters, and we assume the parameter differences
to be normal, it is statistically identical to a t-test.
37For the sake of comparison, CFG use the random-matching Stackelberg data of Huck, Müller, and
Normann (2001) (which is closest to our treatment SEQ-IND) to estimate the same model. They find
α = 0.285, a = 0.789, and x0 = 5.669.
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Figure 4.4: Plot of the estimated emotional state variable θ
Figure 4.4 shows the plots of the emotional state function θ for our four treatments
given the estimated values of the reciprocity parameter a and the neutral first-mover
choice x0. We note that both for the sequential as well as for the strategy-method treat-
ments, the emotional state of groups is more pronounced (both positively and neg-
atively) for groups than that of individuals. Furthermore, perhaps not surprisingly,
the emotional state of both individuals and groups seems to react somewhat stronger
to the (hot) sequential treatment compared to the (cold) strategy-method treatments.
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Complete response functions in SM treatments
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Subject instructions
Please read these instructions carefully! Please do not talk to your neighbours and
remain quiet during the entire experiment. If you have a question, please raise your
hand. We will come up to you to answer it.
General information
In this experiment you can earn money by interacting with other participants. Your
earnings will be measured in “ Points”. The number of Points that you can earn
depends on the decisions that you and other participants make.
At the beginning of the experiment, every participant will receive 75 Points as an
initial endowment. Your total number of Points at the end of the experiment will
be equal to the sum of the Points you have earned in each round plus your initial
endowment. For every 50 Points you will be paid 1 Euro in cash.
Description of the experiment
The experiment consists of 15 periods. You will act in the role of a firm which
produces the same product as another firm in a market. There are two types of firms:
A-firms and B-firms. In each period each A-firm will be randomly matched with a
B-firm. Both firms have to decide which quantities they want to produce.
In the attached table, you can see the resulting profits of both firms for all possible
quantity combinations. The table is read as follows: the head of each row represents
an A-firm’s quantity and the head of each column represents a B-firm’s quantity. In-
side the little box where row and column intersect, the A-firm’s profit matching this
combination of quantities stands up to the left and the B-firm’s profit matching these
quantities stands down to the right.
How are decisions made in each period? The procedure is that first the A-firm and
then the B-firm decides. This means that the A-firm chooses its quantity first (selects
a row in the table). Then the B-firm is informed about the A-firm’s choice. Knowing
the quantity produced by the A-firm, the B-firm then decides on its quantity (selects
a column in the table).
[The following paragraph only in SM-TEAM and SM-IND treatments]
But the above procedure will be conducted in the following way: Instead of de-
ciding one after the other, both firms decide about their quantities at the same time.
But while the A-firm only has to choose one quantity, the B-firm has to make a num-
ber of conditional quantity choices. More precisely, for every possible quantity of the
A-firm (i.e., for every row in the table), the B-firm has to choose a quantity (i.e., a
column in the table). That is, the B-firm has to make “if-then decisions” of the form:
“If the A-firm chooses quantity x, I (the B-firm) will choose quantity y.” As there are
thirteen possible quantities, the B-firm has to make thirteen decisions. This proce-
dure corresponds to the one described above where the A-firm chooses its quantity
CHAPTER 4 111
first followed by the B-firm who chooses its quantity after being informed about the
A-firm’s quantity decision. This is so, since the B-firm has to decide how it would
react to each possible quantity the A-firm can select. It is then possible to match the
A-firm’s quantity with the relevant quantity of the B-firm to determine the outcome
in the market.
[The following four sections only in SM-TEAM and SEQ-TEAM treatments]
Acting in teams
You will be acting in teams. At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will
randomly match you with two other participants and the three of you will act as a
team throughout the experiment, either representing an A-firm or a B-firm.
What does it mean to act as a team? As a team you will make decisions jointly.
That is, the three of you must decide together what choices to make (either as an A-
firm or as a B-firm) and the payoffs of all three of you will depend on these choices.
To facilitate team coordination, there will be a place on your screen to send messages
back and forth to each other. Although we will record these messages, only you and
your team members will see them. Think of the message space as your own private
chat system to help you decide what to do. More on how this will work shortly. Note,
in sending messages back and forth between you and your team members we request
you follow three simple rules: (1) Discussion must be in English. No other language
is allowed. (2) Be civil to each other, don’t use bad language, and don’t make any
threats to each other. (3) Do not identify yourself, your seat number or anything that
might reveal your identity. The communication channel is intended for you to use to
discuss and coordinate your choices and should be used that way.
Description of the communication and decision-making screen
In the following we will describe the structure of the communication and decision-
making screen that each member of an A-firm and each member of a B-firm will face
during the experiment. Basically, for both a member of an A-firm and a member of a
B-firm the screen consists of three boxes: the dialogue box, the decision-making box,
and a box that shows which decisions have been made so far in a given period by all
members of a team (which we call the “Decisions made so far” box).
Screen for a member of an A-firm
We will first describe the communication and decision-making screen for a mem-
ber of an A-firm. This screen is shown on the next page. Imagine in what follows that
you are a member of an A-firm.
The line on top of the screen indicates that this is a screen of a member of an A-
firm. It also indicates the ID of this participant who is called “A1”. The IDs of the
other members of an A-firm are “A2” and “A3”. Each member of an A-firm will be
informed about his/her ID in this top line of the decision screen.
112 GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUALS IN MARKETS
Figure 4.9: Screen shot for SM-Team first mover
The dialogue box is on the left hand side of the screen. If you click on to the lower
(light grey) part of the box you can type a message to your team members (only you
and your team members can see your messages, no other participants can see them).
You can use this box to discuss what choice you want to make. To send a message
hit the enter key. Both your messages and your team members’ messages will be
reported at the top of the dialogue box with the ID in front. In the sample screen on
the next page, member A1 has already sent the message “Hello?” and has just typed
the new message “How are you?”
The decision-making box is in the middle of this screen. Since as an A-firm you
are acting as teams, you and your team members must coordinate on your quantity
choice. As described above, members of an A-firm will have to coordinate on a single
quantity they want to produce. To make a quantity decision, each member of an A-
firm will have to type in the quantity you agreed upon using the dialogue box. You
type in the quantity that you and your team members agreed on into the box in the
middle of the decision-making box, followed by a click on the “ Submit” button. The
quantity you and your team members submit will immediately appear in the box on
the right hand side of your screen which is called “Decisions made so far.” (Look at
the “Decisions made so far” box on the sample screen on the next page. The three
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“–” below the IDs of the A-firm members in this box indicate that none of the team
members of this particular A-firm has yet submitted a quantity.)
If the quantities you and your team members typed in are not the same, an error
message will appear at the top of the “Decisions made so far” box, informing you
that your and your team members’ quantities do not match and that there is still
disagreement. You can then use the chat box again to reach agreement. It might then
be necessary that you revise your choice, type in a revised quantity in the decision-
making box, and click the “ Submit” button again.
If the quantities you and your team members typed in are the same, the decision
screen will disappear and a message will indicate that your team has reached agree-
ment.
Screen for a member of a B-firm
We will now describe the communication and decision-making screen for a mem-
ber of a B-firm. This screen is shown on the next page. Imagine in what follows that
you are a member of a B-firm.
Figure 4.10: Screen shot for SM-Team second mover
The line on top of the screen indicates that this is a screen of a member of a B-firm.
It also indicates the ID of this participant who is called “ B1” . The IDs of the other
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members of a B-firm are “ B2” and “ B3” . Each member of a B-firm will be informed
about his/her ID in this top line of the decision screen.
The dialogue box is located on the left hand side of the screen and works as de-
scribed above for a member of an A-firm. The only difference is, of course, that mes-
sages sent are displayed with the ID of a B-firm in front.
The decision-making box is in the middle of this screen. Since as a B-firm you
are acting as teams, you and your team members must coordinate on your quan-
tity choices. (The following sentences in parenthesis only in SM-TEAM treatment)(As
described above, members of a B-firm will have to make contingent decisions speci-
fying how they react to each possible quantity of the A-firm. The column on the left
of the decision-making box, labelled “ A-firm’s quantity,” shows all possible quan-
tities of the A-firm. Next to each of these quantities, in the column labelled “ Your
quantity” you will have to type in the quantity with which you and your B-firm team
members want to react to each of the A-firm’s quantities.) (The following sentence in
parenthesis only in SEQ-TEAM treatment. Note that the screen shot in the SEQ-TEAM
treatment for B firms is identical to the screen of A-firms except the labels.)(On top
of the decision-making box the quantity chosen by the A-firm is indicated.) To make
quantity decisions, each member of a B-firm will have to type in the quantities you
agreed upon using the dialogue box. After typing the quantities, click the “ Submit”
button. The quantities you and your team members submit will immediately appear
in the box on the right hand side of your screen which is called “ Decisions made so
far.” (The meaning of the Look at the “ Decisions made so far” box on the sample
screen on the next page. The “ –” below the IDs of the B-firm members in this box
indicate that none of the team members of this particular B-firm has yet submitted a
quantity.)
If the quantities you and your team members typed in are not the same, an error
message will appear at the top of the “ Decisions made so far” box, informing you
that your and your team members’ quantities do not match and that there is still
disagreement. You can then use the chat box again to reach agreement. It might then
be necessary that you revise your choice(s), type in revised quantities in the decision-
making box, and click the “ Submit” button again.
If the quantities you and your team members typed in are the same, the decision
screen will disappear and a message will indicate that your team has reached agree-
ment.
[The following subsection only for SM-IND and SEQ-IND treatments]
Description of the decision-making screen
In the following we will describe the decision-making screen that an A-firm and a
B-firm will face during the experiment.
Screen for a member of an A-firm
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We will first describe the decision-making screen of an A-firm. This screen is
shown on the next page. Imagine in what follows that you are an A-firm.
Figure 4.11: Screen shot for SM-Ind first mover
The second line from above in the box on the right-hand side indicates that this is
a screen of an A-firm. You type the quantity you want to choose into the box on the
bottom of decision-making box, followed by a click on the “Submit” button.
Screen for a member of a B-firm
We will now describe the decision-making screen of a B-firm. This screen is shown
on the next page. Imagine in what follows that you are a B-firm.
The second line from above in the box on the right-hand side indicates that this
is a screen of a B-firm. (The following sentences in parentheses only in SEQ-IND
treatment. Note that the screen shot in the SEQ-TEAM treatment for B firms is identical
to the screen of A-firms except the labels.) (On the next line the quantity chosen by
the A-firm is indicated. You type the quantity that you want to choose, followed by a
click on the “Submit” button.)
[The following bullet list only in SM-IND treatment]
As described above, a B-firm will have to make contingent decisions specifying
how it reacts to each possible quantity of the A-firm. The column on the left of the
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Figure 4.12: Screen shot for SM-Ind second mover
decision-making box, labelled “A-firm’s quantity” shows all possible quantities of the
A-firm. Next to each of these quantities, in the column labelled “ Your quantity” you
will have to type in the quantity with which you want to react to each of the A-firm’s
quantities, followed by a click on the “Submit” button.
Payoffs, information during the experiment, and matching
Payoff in a period: Each member of an A-firm or a B-firm will earn the amount
indicated in the table for the selected quantity combination of both firms.
At the start of a new period, all members of both firms will be informed about
the quantity of the A-firm, the relevant quantity of the B-firm, and own profit in the
previous period. When the experiment starts, you will be told on your computer
screen whether you are a member of an A-firm or a B-firm. You will then keep this
role during the entire experiment.
The following bullet list only in SM-TEAM and SEQ-TEAM treatments
Of the 18 participants in the room, 3 teams acting as A-firms and 3 teams acting as
B-firms will be randomly formed at the beginning of the experiment. In each period,
A-firms will be randomly matched with any of the B-firms in the room. You will not
know the identity of the other firm (and its team members) you are matched with
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in any period. Remember, that the composition of all teams of 3 participants each
remains fixed throughout the entire experiment.
The following bullet list only in SM-IND and SEQ-IND treatments
Of the participants in the room, groups of 6 participants each will be randomly
formed at the beginning of the experiment. (The composition of these groups of 6
participants each will remain the same throughout the entire experiment.) In each
group, 3 participants will act as an A-firm and 3 participants will act as a B-firm. In
each period, A-firms of a group will be randomly matched with any of the B-firms
of the same group. You will not know the identity of the other firm you are matched
with in any period.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PUNISHMENT IN A HETEROGENOUS PUBLIC GOODS GAME 12
This chapter is published in De Economist (2008) 156: 269-293.
5.1 Introduction
The ever-increasing expansion of knowledge in day-to-day life has resulted in greater
demand for cooperation, and teamwork is increasingly being perceived as a crucial
part of being successful. When some members of a group driven by self-interest
withhold their effort contributions, the enforcement of sanctions is a common means
through which people retaliate against perceived injustices. Examples of sanctions
include fines and restrictions that may be implemented by a legal system, or costs of
money and time that may be imposed by private individuals on the offender (Masclet
et al. (2003)).
Sanction behavior has been investigated extensively via a laboratory experiment
called Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), or Public Good Game (PGG). In
this game, every member of the group receives an initial endowment of money, and
members have to choose simultaneously the proportion of money they keep for them-
selves and the proportion of money to be placed in a public account that would be
of benefit to everyone. Each member, after observing the individual contribution of
all the others, has an opportunity to reduce the earnings of any group member at
his or her own cost. Given the parameters set in VCM, the dominant strategy for
a participant is to have zero contribution and to never punish. Nevertheless, most
1This chapter is based on Tan (2008).
2I am grateful to Professor Charles Noussair, Jan Potters, Urs Fischbacher, the anonymous referee,
and participants at the NAKE research day 2007 in Utrecht, the Netherlands, for their valuable com-
ments and suggestions. I would also like to thank CentER Lab for financial support.
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public good games with punishment observe a prevalent use of sanctions. These
credible punishment threats sustain cooperation effectively (Yamagishi (1986); Fehr
and Gächter (2000) and Fehr and Gächter (2002); Bowles et al. (2001); Masclet et al.
(2003)).
So far, the punishment literature on VCM has focused mainly on symmetric play-
ers having the same impact on the group account in the contribution stage. In most
real-world scenarios, however, symmetric players are the exception rather than the
norm, while the asymmetry across different group members is a feature of many
situations of interest. A common example that comes to mind involves a group of
students working together on a project. For some students, less effort is needed to
achieve the same progress than is the case for others, due to their relatively higher
abilities or richer experience. Similarly, larger firms in a cartel of a certain industry
are more likely to have stronger bargaining power in negotiations with the govern-
ment because of their size and capacity in market share. In this paper, a situation
in which different group members have asymmetric impacts on a collective goal is
referred to as “productivity heterogeneity”. The aim of this study is therefore to in-
vestigate the efficiency of the sanction system under productivity heterogeneity: if
individual members of a group of agents with asymmetric productivities are allowed
to express disapproval against the actions of each other, then who determines the
punishment and who gets punished? Do behavioral differences occur when various
members react to punishment? To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on
this topic.
A starting point for the analysis will be the selection of an appropriate proxy for
productivity. A key parameter in the public good game, marginal per capita re-
turn (MPCR), is the benefit that each participant receives from each money unit con-
tributed to the group account by any group member. Since a higher MPCR reduces
the cost of contributing to the group account and consequently may induce an in-
crease in contributions, it may be considered as a proxy for the productivity of group
subjects (Isaac and Walker (1988)). Hence, the higher the productivity of a subject
(which is equivalent with the case of a higher MPCR), the less effort it takes that sub-
ject to contribute a given amount of output. Hereafter, the term MPCR will be used
interchangeably with productivity.
To implement this experiment, the study observes cooperation and punishment
behavior in a treatment with heterogeneous agents (where agents have different MPCRs
to the public account) and compares the results to the existing literature. Since little
analysis has been carried out to explore the effect of productivity heterogeneity, we
will attempt to fill the gap by also analyzing a treatment with heterogeneous agents
but with no sanction opportunities. 3 The effect of productivity heterogeneity can
therefore be measured by comparing this treatment with a symmetric one (in which
3Although Fisher et al. (1995) probe the effect of asymmetric MPCR, their study differs from ours in
terms of baseline comparison and information structure.
CHAPTER 5 127
all agents have the same MPCR), controlling for average productivity.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 presents public good
game experiments related to heterogeneity and punishment. Section 5.3 derives hy-
potheses according to the existing literature. Section 5.4 describes the experiment im-
plementation, and Section 5.5 illustrates the results. Section 5.6 provides concluding
remarks.
5.2 Literature review
Many studies have uniformly found that players in VCM games exhibit a substan-
tially higher rate of cooperation than can be expected under the assumption of the
standard economic model of the self-interested actor. Contribution rates of 40%-60%
are reported by many studies, but they decrease with repetition (Kim and Walker
(1984); Isaac et al. (1985); Andreoni (1988); Isaac and Walker (1988); Weimann (1994)).
5.2.1 Literature on heterogeneity
There are several ways to generate asymmetry in VCM. The first way is to allow vari-
ation of MPCR. Many public good studies have found that a higher MPCR reduces
the contribution cost, which implies a higher chance of contribution. Ledyard (1995),
surveying the literature on public good games, concludes that MPCR has a strong
positive effect on contribution rates.
To the best of my knowledge, most of the experiments addressing productivity
variation are not linear public good games (Marwell and Ames (1979), Marwell and
Ames (1980); Bagnoli and McKee (1991). Fisher et al. (1995) is the only study that ex-
amines exclusively the effect of asymmetric MPCR structure based on a linear public
good game. In their experiment, subjects are separated into groups of four - with two
high MPCR (0.75) and two low MPCR (0.3). A total of twenty periods are divided into
two stages, and the MPCRs of all subjects are shifted from one to the other after the
tenth period. They conclude that the subjects seem to focus only on their own MPCR,
for whoever is assigned MPCR 0.75 contributed more than the one who is assigned
MPCR 0.3. This reduces the group average contribution in an asymmetric group to an
intermediate level between baseline groups featuring a high- and a low MPCR. Their
experiment differs from ours in two respects. First, their comparisons are based on the
average contribution level of a mixed group and that level is the weighted average of
two homogeneous groups with extreme MPCRs. This study, in contrast, is based on
a mixed group and a homogeneous group with the same average MPCR. The second
difference is that the information structures are different in two settings. In Fisher
et al. (1995), participants are not told explicitly that different individuals necessarily
have different MPCRs, but simply that the MPCR are not necessarily the same. The
MPCR information is also private when the experimenters inform the subjects about
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the MPCR changes. This experiment, however, makes productivity distributions ex-
plicit among all players so as to allow richer reciprocal interactions. Ledyard (1995)
gives a tentative conjecture that productivity heterogeneity lowers the rate of contri-
bution, unless there is incomplete information and no repetition.4
Apart from the asymmetric payoff structure, another way to generate heterogene-
ity is by varying the endowments of the players. Unlike the studies on productivity,
the results of these studies on endowment heterogeneity are contradictory and non-
conclusive. A number of studies report that asymmetric endowments decrease the
cooperation level, especially when all players know the asymmetry (Anderson et al.
(2004); Cherry et al. (2005); Oxoby and Spraggon (2006)). Nonetheless, several other
studies find that endowment asymmetry does not so much hamper as promote con-
tribution (Chan et al. (1996); Buckley and Croson (2006)).
In addition to the studies focusing exclusively on productivities and endowments,
heterogeneity can also be generated by other means. Some studies interact both forms
of heterogeneity under different information structures (Chan et al. (1999)), some gen-
erate asymmetries in the dynamics of the game by introducing leaders (Potters et al.
(2007)), and a few other experiments do the same by varying private account valua-
tions across agents (Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997)). Due to different game settings, the
results differ significantly and cannot be compared directly with each other.
5.2.2 Literature on sanctions
Sanction is considered to be one of the most robust mechanisms for eliciting contri-
butions. The earliest studies on sanctioning systems under VCM are carried by social
psychologists (Yamagishi (1986)) and political scientists (Ostrom et al. (1992)). They
find that this mechanism can be self-maintained, and that it serves to increase contri-
bution levels.
An influential economic experiment conducted by Fehr and Gächter (2000) (here-
after FG), devises a situation in which the possibility of strategic punishment can be
removed. In the first stage of the experiment, four subjects play a standard public
good game. In the second stage, each subject, after reading the contributions and
earnings of the all group members, is given the chance to reduce the earnings of any
other player or players in his or her group by using his or her earnings in the contri-
bution stage. Game theory predicts that the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium to
this finite two-stage game is that agents never punish in the second stage because any
punishment will be costly for them. Since the threat of punishment is not credible,
no one will contribute to the group account in the first stage. However, FG observe
a significant positive amount of punishment mete out by subjects, and free riding is
remarkably curtailed accordingly. This result is obtained under both Partner Treat-
4Ledyard also points out that the effect of heterogeneity on cooperation is quite weak: “there does
not yet appear to be enough evidence for acceptance. Quite often there is conflicting evidence.”
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ment (the four subjects remain in the same group for all ten periods) and Stranger
Treatment (the subjects are randomly reassigned after each round). Many subsequent
studies replicate the experiment and obtain similar results (Bowles et al. (2001); Fehr
and Gächter (2002); Masclet et al. (2003); Noussair and Tucker (2005); Sefton et al.
(2007)).
There have been many extensions of FG on varying parameters of a VCM game.
For instance, Bowles et al. (2001) extends FG’s experiment to measure the sanctioning
effect under different group sizes and MPCRs to the public account. Their data sug-
gest that the amount of punishment received by free riders is increasing in both group
size and MPCR. As a result, the contribution levels of large groups with a high MPCR
are very high when punishment is allowed. As an extension of Bowles et al. (2001),
Carpenter (2007) systematically examines the interaction of group size, MPCR and
monitoring technology. He reports that punishments are sensitive to group struc-
tures. Sefton et al. (2007) extends FG’s experiment by adding a Reward Treatment
(where players can give a bonus to others based on contribution) and a Combined
Treatment (where players can both award and punish each other), and shows that the
Combined Treatment works most effectively in promoting contributions. Asymmet-
ric sanctioning power is investigated recently. Nikiforakis et al. (2010) discovers that
asymmetries in the distribution of punishing abilities seem to have no effect on either
the level or the evolution of cooperation over time. What increases cooperation levels
is the higher average ability to punish.
Sanction motivation is another interesting issue. Researchers have discovered that
punishments are not merely monetary based; the expression of disapproval itself is
also found to be effective. Masclet et al. (2003) and Noussair and Tucker (2005) pro-
vide evidence of cooperation being enhanced purely by “cheap talk”; that is, the op-
portunity for agents to express disapproval of other’s decisions without deducting
their monetary earnings. Likewise, Carpenter et al. (2004) conducts a field experi-
ment by imposing cost to punishers but keeping at zero the material harm to those
who were punished. This study discovers that the sanction mechanism enhances co-
operation in only one of the two samples.
While punishment tends to increase cooperation, it is not a panacea: if individuals
are given the possibility to counter-punish, then cooperation quickly breaks down
(Denant-Boemont et al. (2007); Nikiforakis (2008)). In addition, Bochet et al. (2006)
reports that punishment, while discouraging free riding, does not raise contribution
as efficiently as communication does. Note that all of the above-mentioned studies
on punishment assume that players have symmetric impacts on the group account in
the contribution stage.
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5.3 Preliminary conjectures
The literature mentioned in Section 5.2 cannot provide any comparable results on a
heterogeneous and homogeneous group with the same average MPCR for this exper-
iment. The only reliable clue available to us is a pattern in Fisher et al. (1995) that
shows that the average group contribution of asymmetric groups is always between
those of the high- and low-MPCR baseline groups. Since MPCR links positively with
contribution, the contributions of two groups with the same average productivity can
reasonably be expected to be similar.
Hypothesis 5.1 (Heterogeneous Productivity Hypothesis): Without sanctioning, the group
average contribution of a heterogeneous group is the same as that of a homogeneous group
with the same average MPCR.
Behavioral differences between the types are found in most of the above-mentioned
studies. High MPCR are usually associated with higher contribution levels, and vice
versa. For example, the discussion in Marwell and Ames (1979) reports that the “low
interest” subjects are expected to under-contribute to the public good. Isaac et al.
(1985) observes that individuals in high payoff conditions contribute more than indi-
viduals in low payoff conditions. Similarly, Fisher et al. (1995) find that high MPCR
types, on average, contribute more than low-MPCR types do, in every period. We
therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.2 (Productivity Determinant hypothesis): In the absence of sanction opportu-
nities, individual contribution increases when a player faces a higher MPCR.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has explored punishment under
productivity heterogeneity. Although several variants of sanction mechanisms could
be used, this paper, as a tentative exploration, replicates only the canonical form of the
punishment mechanism in FG’s experiment. Based on the robust findings in previous
experiments, punishment institution is anticipated as also being effective in terms of
fostering cooperation in a heterogeneous game.
Hypothesis 5.3 (Monetary Punishment Hypothesis): In the presence of heterogeneity, the
opportunity for agents to reduce the monetary payoff of others after observing their decisions
increases group average contribution levels.
If the punishment institution were effective, who would become the enforcers in
shaping players’ cooperation? Olson (1971) proposed a “dominant power” would
have a positive effect on cooperation. This means players have stronger incentives or
power to provide the social goods will punish more. According to Fehr and Gächter
(2002), 74.2 percent of these punishments are executed by above-average contributors
to below-average contributors. Combining what Hypothesis 5.2 (that contribution
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rises when a player has a higher MPCR), we can see that low-MPCR players are ex-
pected to be the free riders while high-MPCR players are expected to be the “domi-
nant power”, or cooperation enforcers in the group.
Hypothesis 5.4 (Punishment Enforcement Hypothesis): Given sanction opportunities, pun-
ishments are sent by high-MPCR subjects to low-MPCR subjects.
However, the situation at each given individual contribution level will be different.
Bowles et al. (2001) analyzes the way in which punishment affects individual contri-
butions, and finds that the punishment a player receives from other group members
increases saliently when the MPCR of the group account rises. Even though all play-
ers in this game are symmetric in productivity, similar results can be expected in this
study. The logic behind this is natural: it is cheaper to spur on members to make
additional contributions when their impact on the group account return increases,
since every single contribution will give rise to more positive externalities to all group
members. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.5 is given as follows:
Hypothesis 5.5 (Conditional Punishment Hypothesis): Conditional on an individual con-
tribution, high MPCR subjects receive more punishment.
The experiment is designed to test cooperation and sanction behavior under pro-
ductivity heterogeneity in a four-person linear public good game. The treatment vari-
ables are MPCR and the introduction of a sanction mechanism. The baseline Treat-
ment, Treatment 1 (T1) replicates the standard VCM with a homogeneous MPCR 0.6
of all group members. Treatment 2 (T2) is identical to T1, except for one difference.
Instead of endowed all subjects with the same MPCR, half of the group members have
a high MPCR of 0.9, and the other half have a low MPCR of 0.3. T2 is used as a control
group for Treatment 3 (T3). In T3, a sanction mechanism is added on top of T2. T3 is
the key treatment for studying the effect punishment brings to cooperation level in a
heterogeneous group, controlling for the average productivity.
5.4 The experiment
The experiment consisted of nine sessions conducted at CentER Lab, Tilburg Univer-
sity, located in Tilburg, the Netherlands. Each treatment, T1, T2 and T3, was in effect
in three of the sessions. Seventy-two subjects, among whom 50% were females, were
recruited via email contact from an experiment candidate list provided by CentER
Lab. Subjects who majored in graduate level Economics were excluded. Some of the
subjects had previously participated in economic experiments, but all were inexperi-
enced with voluntary contributions mechanism. Each subject participated in only one
session of the study. Since the student population in the contact list was very large
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(about 1400), the subjects were unlikely to know each other. The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)), developed at
the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich.
Each session included eight participants that were separated into two groups of
four. Before the start of each session, the computer program randomly designated
the subjects into different groups according to their choices of terminal upon entering
the room for the session. All three treatments adapted Partner Matching protocol,
under which group assignments remained constant throughout the experiment.5 A
session consisted of 15 rounds. All 15 rounds of play counted towards final earnings,
and there were no practice periods at the beginning of the sessions. At the begin-
ning of each period every player was randomly given a number between 1 and 4 to
distinguish their actions from those of the others during that period. To prevent the
formation of individual reputation, the numbers were randomly reallocated at the be-
ginning of every period.6 In addition, participants in T2 and T3 were also informed
of their productivity levels at the beginning of the experiment. These roles remained
fixed for the duration of the experiment.7 The above settings were common knowl-
edge to all participants.
The instructions used in the experiment were modified on the basis of those used
in Noussair and Tucker (2005). During each round, every subject was endowed with
10 tokens, with a conversion rate of 25 tokens = 1 Euro. Subjects simultaneously
chose the number of tokens to keep for themselves and to put in the public account.
T3 added a punishment stage after contribution decision in which subjects decided
whether or not to register disapproval of each group member’s decision by sending
points to them. The entire experiment was done by subjects anonymously interact-
ing with each other without informing the identity of the other group members, and
communication was strictly forbidden all the time.
5.4.1 Treatment 1 (T1)
In the baseline treatment T1, the MPCR of all group members was 0.6, which means
for each token put into the group account yields a payoff of 0.6 token to every mem-
bers in group. The rest of tokens kept by the subjects they were added up to their
private accounts. Therefore, the income in each round was calculated as:
5The purpose of choosing partner-matching protocol in this study is to simulate reality in which the
members of a project team or a union working towards a common goal do not vary within a certain time
period.
6Such a mechanism ensures that, even though the group members remain the same, the participants
cannot link the actions of the other subjects across the periods. Thus, retaliation as in Denant-Boemont
et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008) is not possible.
7We used neutral language in the experiment. Players with MPCR 0.9 were “type A” and players with
MPCR 0.3 were “type B”. Moreover, sensitive terminologies such as “contribution” and “punishment”
were avoided so as not to create biased decisions. For example, punishment was termed as “points that
reduce another player’s income”.
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Where Ci is the contribution of agent i, and ∑4k=1 Ck is the sum of contributions
to group account by all the members in the group, including agent i. After finishing
making decisions, subjects were shown the contribution and earnings of every group
member for every time period.
5.4.2 Treatment 2 (T2)
Heterogeneous productivity was generated in T2 by randomly assigning half of the
group members a high MPCR of 0.9 and the other half a low MPCR of 0.3. The
two MPCR levels were chosen such that the average MPCR of four group members
equaled to 0.6, which was comparable with T1. The income calculation from the pri-
vate account remained unchanged as T1, but the income from the group account was
calculated as 90 percent of the total input of group members with MPCR 0.9 to the
project plus 30 percent of the total input of group members with MPCR 0.3 to the
project. That is, the income in each round in T2 should be:









Where Ci is the contribution of agent i (no matter what MPCR he or she has),
and the third and fourth items are the sum of contributions of two high and low
MPCR subjects to the group account respectively (agent i included). Since the income
calculation was more complicated than T1, this calculation was posted together with
contributions and earnings of his peers for each round. Note that even though this
income calculation was different from homogeneous case, both games had the same
unique sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium of zero contribution for all players, if the
games were finite repeated.
5.4.3 Treatment 3 (T3)
T3 was divided into two stages. The first stage was a replication of T2. After contribu-
tion decisions were made, sanction mechanism was added in the second stage. At the
beginning of the second stage, the experimenter informed all subjects of the amount
each of the other three members of his group contributed. Subjects were asked to
send points ranging from 0 to 10 to every group member if they wished to. The ran-
dom ID assignment setting mentioned above made it difficult to track an individual
subject’s contribution decision from one period to the next, or to target him specifi-
cally for punishment beyond the current period. Every point one subject sent reduced
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his/her earnings by 1 token and reduced the earnings of the participant receiving it
by 2 tokens. Agent i’s earnings in T3 thus became:













Where ∑k 6=i Pik is the sum of points agent i sent all group members, and ∑k 6=i Pki is
the sum of points agent i received from all other subjects. Again, the sub-game perfect
equilibrium of this finite repeated game is nobody punishes.
At the end of the second stage, the computer displayed the subject’s own type,
the tokens he or she and all group members put into the project, the total number
of points he or she received and assigned to others, the income of this round and its
calculation. However, subjects were neither informed about the punishment infor-
mation of other members, nor did they know the individual punishment sent by a
specific player.
On average, a session lasted 50 minutes (including initial instruction and payment
of the subjects) and a subject earned an average of 215.55 tokens (approximately 8.62
euros). Table 5.1 summarizes the structure of the experiment as a whole.
Table 5.1: Summary of treatment designs
Treatment Section Subject Group MPCR Punishment
names number number number allowed
T1 3 24 6 All equal to 0.6 No
T2 3 24 6 Half equal to 0.9; Half equal to 0.3 No
T3 3 24 6 Half equal to 0.9; Half equal to 0.3 Yes
5.5 Results and interpretation
5.5.1 Treatment effects
The focus of this section is group behavior. The principal research questions involve
pairwise comparisons of contributions and earnings in three treatments in order to in-
vestigate how the sanction mechanism affects cooperation and punishment behavior
under productivity heterogeneity.
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Figure 5.1: Group contribution levels as a percentage of optimum (T1)
Figure 5.2: Group contribution levels as a percentage of optimum (T2)
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 display the total contribution levels for each of the six
groups as a percentage of the total endowment in T1 and T2, respectively, over the
15 periods. The bold lines indicate the average contributions over all groups within a
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treatment. A glance at these lines reveals that both T1 and T2 show patterns similar
to those reported in the current literature. The contribution rates are strictly positive
at the initial stages (around 55 percent of endowment for T1 and 35 percent of en-
dowment for T2), then fall consistently in later periods to the range between 10 to 20
percent of endowment in both treatments.
Figure 5.3: Average group contribution levels by treatment
Figure 5.3 puts the average contribution lines by three treatments to the same
graph. Note that the line in T2 lies consistently below that in T1 throughout the 15
time periods, indicating that the group average contribution rate in T2 is lower than
that in T1.
Result 5.1 The heterogeneous Productivity Hypothesis (Hypothesis 5.1) is not supported.
Without sanctions, the average contribution as a percent of optimum in a heterogeneous group
(T2) is less than that of a homogeneous group (T1) with the same average MPCR.
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5.1:
Group average contribution is 41.8% for T1 and 18.67% for T2. A two-sided Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test of difference yields z = -1.922 with p < 0.1. Therefore, hetero-
geneity in productivity seems to reduce the group average contribution level when
sanction is not possible.
The contribution rate in T2 is significantly lower than that in T1 because high-
productivity subjects (MPCR 0.9) do not significantly increase their contributions, but
low-productivity subjects (MPCR 0.3) free ride dramatically, compared to a median
productivity group with MPCR 0.6. Figure 5.4 illustrates the mean contributions by
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period in each of the three MPCR types. Although they vary greatly in the early
periods, they all converge to zero in the final periods. The patterns of high-MPCR
types and low-MPCR types in this study are consistent with the finding in Fisher
et al. (1995). In both studies, contributions of high-MPCR types dominate those of
low-MPCR types for all time periods. However, as described in Result 5.2 below, it is
not the case that subjects with higher MPCRs will contribute more.
Result 5.2 The Productivity Determinant Hypothesis (Hypothesis 5.2) is not supported in
this study. In particular, the contribution of high-MPCR types is not significantly higher
than that of the median-MPCR types in homogeneous groups. Moreover, contribution levels
converge to zero for both high- and low-MPCR types in the final periods.
Figure 5.4: Average contribution levels by MPCR types
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5.2:
The average contribution level of the low-MPCR types of this study and those
of Fisher et al. (1995) are similar in the sense that they both start around 25%, and
then decay towards zero over time. The mean contribution for the low-MPCR type
is 11.78% of the endowment, which is significantly lower than the other two MPCR
types (compared with median productive subjects, a Mann Whitney ranksum test
yields z= -2.082 with p < 0.05; while compared with highly productive subjects, z
= -1.922 with a p < 0.1). However, high-MPCR types do not contribute as much as
Hypothesis 5.2 leads us to expect if we compare the results of this experiment with
those of Fisher et al. (1995). In their study, the average contribution of subjects with an
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MPCR of 0.75 is around 40%.8 If Hypothesis 5.2 holds, then the average contribution
of subjects with an MPCR of 0.9 in this study should be higher. However, this figure
turns out to be only 25.4%. This number is also lower than that of a homogeneous
group with the same average MPCR (41.81%), but the difference is not significant
at the 10% level (z = -1.441). As it is shown in Figure 5.4, the contribution levels of
median-MPCR types in T1 and high-MPCR types in T2 are quite similar in the first
three rounds. In later periods however, contribution level in T2 falls more dramati-
cally than that of T1. Considering that information on productivity, contribution and
earnings of all group members is made explicit at the end of each period, it would be
natural to link the insufficient contributions observed in high-MPCR types with the
severe free riding behavior among the low-MPCR type.
Results 5.1 and 5.2 allow us to conclude that when sanction is not possible, pro-
ductivity heterogeneity decreases the group cooperation level. We now turn to the
situation in which the sanction mechanism is present.
Figure 5.5: Group contribution levels as a percentage of optimum (T3)
Figure 5.5 illustrates the group average contributions by period in T3. Two extreme
cases can be detected from this figure. On one hand, three out of six groups have
obvious rising trends in their mean contribution levels from approximately 60% in the
first period to nearly 90% in the final period, implying a large extent of cooperation.
On the other hand, the other three groups exhibit precisely the opposite behavior.
Contribution levels descend from the same starting point of 60% in the first period
to less than 10% in the final period, implying a cooperation failure. These two trends
8Due to the lack of specific data, this number is estimated based on Figure 5.3 of Fisher et al. (1995).
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offset each other, causing the average contribution line in T3 to hover around 50%
throughout the time of the study.9
Result 5.3 The monetary Punishment Hypothesis (Hypothesis 5.3) is supported. In the pres-
ence of productivity heterogeneity, average contribution levels are higher when sanctions are
available. In particular, heterogeneous groups with punishment (T3) have mean contribution
rates similar to those of the homogeneous groups without punishment (T1), controlling for the
average MPCR.
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5.3:
The mean contribution is 18.67% for T2 and 49.33% for T3. The Mann- Whitney
rank-sum test of difference between T2 and T3 yields z = -2.082, p < 0.05. This means
that the contribution level of T3 is higher than that of T2 at the 5% significance level.
The test statistic comparing T1 with T3 suggests that the difference is not significant
at any conventional level (z = -0.801).
As indicated in Figure 5.3, the average group contribution level of T3 lies signif-
icantly above T2, especially in periods 11-15 (z=-1.92 with p < 0.05). Comparing T3
to T1, the two lines are entangled in the first nine periods; from the tenth period
on, the average contribution level starts to decay steadily in T1, while it remains the
same in T3, although the difference is not significant at the 10% level. Consistent
with the current literature on punishment (such as Fehr and Gächter (2000)), this re-
sult reveals the power of sanction in preventing the decay of cooperation towards the
non-cooperative equilibrium level.
The mean contribution of the three groups with rising trends in Figure 5.5 is greater
than that of the other three groups with declining trends (A Mann- Whitney rank sum
test yields z = -1.964 with p < 0.05). What is behind such an extreme result - that
three groups successfully cooperate while the other three fail? In order to answer this
question, I find it helpful to probe sanction behavior by type. Result 5.4 summarizes
the findings.
Result 5.4 The punishment Enforcement Hypothesis (Hypothesis 5.4) is supported in this
study. Overall, more punishment points are assigned by high-MPCR types in successful
groups than by those in failed groups. Moreover, low-MPCR types in successful groups receive
more punishment than their counterparts in the failed groups. In sum, punishment is imposed
by high- MPCR subjects on low-MPCR ones in successful groups.
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5.4:
Using Figure 5.5, I designate three groups with rising average contribution trends
as SG (successful groups); the other three with declining trends are designated as FG
(failed groups). Then, I perform pairwise Mann-Whitney rank sum tests of difference
9Since there are only six groups in T3, this result may not be robust. Nevertheless, as a tentative
study, I treat this fact as given, and proceed to seek a plausible explanation.
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for the punishment points sent and received between two MPCR types in SG and FG
for the first five periods.10 My finding: the high-MPCR types receive the same average
points in SG and FG (z= -1.528), but the difference is significant for low-MPCR types
(z= -1.964 with p < 0.05). In contrast, there is no difference between the average points
sent by low-MPCR types in SG and FG (z = -0.655), while for high-MPCR types the
difference is significant (z = -1.964 with p < 0.05). This indicates that, for those groups
that successfully achieve cooperation, punishment is imposed mainly by high-MPCR
subjects to low-MPCR subjects.
However, higher contribution levels in T3 due to sanctions do not necessarily im-
ply higher group welfare. The sanctioning system itself is costly to maintain, in that
punishment reduces the earnings of both the punisher and the recipient. Even when
the sanction mechanism is absent, the lower average contribution rates in T2 do not
refer to lower welfare as well. The justification of the statement is that if most of the
contributions are from high-productivity subjects in a heterogeneous group, then the
high MPCR 0.9 from the group account will compensate for the decrease in the group
average contribution level caused by heterogeneity.11 Figure 5.6 shows the average
earnings by period in the three treatments.
10The reason for selecting the initial five periods instead of the entire 15 periods is that group average
contribution levels are close to each other at this time, and just about to diverge into two trends in these
periods. If something happens to cause this divergence, it must be the use of the sanction mechanism.
Contrast this to what happens in subsequent periods when players respond to sanctioning behavior,
punishment is much less frequently used.
11Imagine there is a group of T1 and a group of T2 consisting of four players each. Half of the players
in T1 and the two low-MPCR players in T2 do not make any contribution into the group account. Since
in T2 it is cheaper for high productivity subjects to produce the same amount of output, in order to yield
one token from the group account, the two highMPCR subjects in T2 only need to contribute a total of
approximately 1.11 tokens. In T1, however, the other two players with MPCR 0.6 have to contribute a
total of approximately 1.67 tokens.
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Figure 5.6: Average earnings by treatment
Result 5.5 The group average earnings of T1, T2 and T3 over 15 periods are similar. Specifi-
cally, after the introduction of punishment, the average earnings in T3 are significantly lower
than those in T1 in the first five periods. In the final five periods, however, mean earnings in
T3 is similar to those in T1 and significantly higher than those in T2.
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5.5:
The mean group earnings over 15 periods is 15.85 for T1, and 13.47 for T2, and
the former dominates the latter. This difference is insignificant, however, in either the
early periods (period 1-5) or the final periods (periods 11-15). This also implies that
contributions in T2 are indeed mainly made by high-MPCR subjects. The average
earnings of T3 in periods 1-5 is significantly lower than those of T1 (z = -2.17, p <
0.05), and are similar to those of T2. This implies a substantial decrease in earnings
due to sanction costs paid by both punishers and the punished. However, in periods
11-15, the mean earnings of T3 is significantly higher than those of T2 (z = 2.082, p <
0.05) and the same applies to those of T1. This result suggests that the sanction system
effectively counters the increasing free-rider behavior of a standard public good game
in the final periods. The contribution increment marks up the loss of punishment, and
results in similar average earnings of T3 as those of T1 and T2 over 15 periods (z= -0.32
and 1.281, respectively).
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5.5.2 Individual analysis
This section mainly concerns the relationship between sanctions and contributions at
the individual level in the presence of heterogeneous productivity. Result 5.6 aims at
finding the determinants of sanction behavior, and Conjecture 5.1 discusses the effect
of sanctions.
Conditional sanction assignment
Fehr and Gächter (2000) observes that agent i assigns more points to k the further
k’s contribution falls below the group average contribution. Falk et al. (2005) discov-
ers a positive relationship between the number of monetary punishment points that
agent i assigns to agent k and the negative deviation of k’s contribution from that
of i’s. Masclet et al. (2003) finds both of the above point-assignment patterns, and
also establishes that agents assign more punishments the more recipient’s contribu-
tion exceeds their own, but fewer points the more the recipient’s contribution exceeds
the average. This study replicates all of these earlier findings to see whether they also
carry over to a group with heterogeneous MPCRs. Besides the above factors, it would
be also interesting to see how the MPCR of a punisher and a recipient affect sanction
behavior. The regression outcomes of the number of points that agent i assigns to
agent k are presented in Result 5.6.
Result 5.6 The level of monetary sanction that one agent sends to another is increasing in
(i) the negative difference of the contribution of the recipient from the average level, and (ii)
the negative difference between the contribution of the recipient and the contribution of the
punisher, and (iii) when the recipient has a high MPCR of 0.9. The Conditional Punishment
Hypothesis (Hypothesis 5.5) is thus supported.
SUPPORT FOR RESULT 5.6:
Table 5.2 contains the estimated from the following regression model:
Ptik = β0 + β1(max{0, Cti − Ctk}) + β2(max{0, Ctk − Cti})
+β3 max{0, C̄t − Ctk}+ β4(max{0, Ctk − C̄t})
+β5typei + β6typek + ε
t
ik (5.4)
typei = 1if i has MPCR of 0.9
typek = 1if k has MPCR of 0.9
(5.5)
Because of the large number of zero values for the dependent variable, Tobit and
Random Effect Tobit estimations are used for the data. The results are presented in
Table 5.2.12
12The standard errors of the Tobit model are robust to within group correlation. The individual effect
in the Random Effect Tobit model is agent i (the punisher).
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Table 5.2: Determinants of sanctioning behavior
Tobit Model RE Tobit
(with robust (individual
std. errors) effect: i)
β0 Constant -5.326*** -6.595***
(1.975) (0.750)
β1 Negative Deviation from i’s Own Contribution 0.546*** 0.542***
(0.259) (0.121)
β2 Positive Deviation from i’s Own Contribution 0.078 0.17
(0.223) (0.141)
β3 Negative Deviation from Average 0.799** 0.848***
(0.352) (0.199)
β4 Positive Deviation from Average -0.162 -0.296
(0.242) (0.241)
β5 Type i (1 when i has high MPCR) -0.497 -0.088
(1.096) (0.738)




Notes: the number of observations is calculated as: 3(messages) x 4 (players) x 15 (periods)
x 6 (groups) = 1080. *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance
level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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The coefficients of these two models turn out to be rather similar. Both β1 and β3
are highly significant, suggesting player i assigns more points to player k the further
k’s contribution is below his own. On top of this, player i sends even more points if
the player k contributes below group average level. These two findings are consistent
with current literatures on punishment such as Fehr and Gächter (2000), Masclet et al.
(2003), Falk et al. (2005) and Noussair and Tucker (2005). Given all the contribution
information in a period, sanction behavior is also sensitive to subjects’ types. The pos-
itive significant estimated β6 suggests ceteris paribus, a subject with high productivity
level will receive more points than a subject with low productivity level. However,
the type of the punisher, β5 is not significant, meaning there is no distinct difference
in sanctioning behavior between high and low MPCR types.
Although the estimated β4 is not significant, the so-called “spiteful behavior” re-
ported by Falk et al. (2005) and Masclet et al. (2003) is unlikely to be the correct ex-
planation in this experiment. Instead, this result may be explained by the asymmetric
structure of this game: it is plausible for every member in a group to expect high-
MPCR subjects to make more contribution than the low-MPCR subjects would makes,
since it would be cheaper. The results in the previous section indicate that the con-
tributions of high MPCR types are significantly higher than those of the low-MPCR
types, which implies that it is much more difficult to trigger any possible spiteful pref-
erences in this case than it would be if agents in a group were symmetric. That may
be the reason why a higher positive deviation player k’s contribution from player i’s
does not lead to higher punishment from player i.
Sanction effect
One result in Fehr and Gächter (2000) is that agents receiving punishment in time
period t usually increase their contributions in the subsequent period. This study
replicates the analysis to see whether it still holds.
Conjecture 5.1 13 An individual increases his or her contribution level in the subsequent
period: (i) the more points he or she receives in period t, and (ii) the further his or her con-
tribution is away from the group average level and (iii) when he or she has an MPCR of 0.9
AND his or her contribution is below the group average level.
SUPPORT FOR CONJECTURE 5.1:
An estimation of regression contribution change within two time periods on the
factors discussed above may be expressed in the following formula. Similar to the
Conditional Sanction discussed in the previous section, a dummy variable is also
added to the regression representing the MPCR of the recipient.
13The reason of naming the relationship as a conjecture is the same as that of Masclet et al. (2003):
we cannot be certain that the points themselves instead of other possible variables correlated with the




i = β0 + β1(∑
k




typei = 1if i has MPCR of 0.9
(5.6)
The coefficient β1 calibrates the effect of the total number of points player i receives
on his change in contribution from one period to the next, is the effect of the differ-
ence between individual i’s contribution and his group average contribution level in
period t, and β3 is the MPCR type of the punished subject. The model is estimated
separately for players who contributed more the group average and less than group
average in time period t.14
A pooled OLS model and a Random Effect model are performed, and results are
highly similar. The coefficients of β2 in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 show a significantly
negative relation between the deviation from the average and the subsequent change
in the contribution level, which is again consistent with the current findings such as
Masclet et al. (2003): players have the tendency to make their contributions stay close
to the group average level. Furthermore, the coefficient of β1 in Table 5.3 suggests
there is a positive relationship between the points received in period t and the change
of contribution when one’s contribution is lower than group average level. What is
different from Masclet et al. (2003) is that this result carries over to those subjects
with contributions higher than group average level. A possible explanation may be
again the asymmetric structure of the game, in that high MPCR types are expected to
contribute more.
The sign and significance of β3 in Table 5.3 indicate high MPCR types are more
sensitive to punishment, but only when his contribution is below mean level. These
players dramatically raise their contribution for a given point they received when
their contributions are below group average, but while their contributions exceed
group average, the behavioral differences between the two types are not significant
any more. This may be due to the insufficient data for low MPCR types for subjects
have contributions higher than group average. This also naturally brings to another
explanation that it is relatively unusual for low MPCR types to contribute more than
group average. But when they do, it may reflect their altruistic characters that are
difficult to alter by punishment. As a result, punishments to altruistic low MPCR
subject may turn out to be a stimulant for them to contribute even more in the next
period.
14A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis that there are no behavioral structural differences between
players who contribute more than group average and those less than group average. (with p < 0.01).
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Table 5.3: Determinants of changes in contribu-
tion: Low contributors
OLS RE
β0 Constant -0.705** -0.567
(0.292) (0.391)
β1 Points received in period t 0.190*** 0.221***
(0.061) (0.068)
β2 Deviation from the average -0.527*** -0.511***
(0.138) (0.134)
β3 (1 when i has high MPCR) 0.895*** 0.809*
(0.317) (0.478)
R Squared 0.221 0.235
Observations 161 161
Notes: the individual effect in the Random Effect model is
player i. *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *
10% significance level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.4: Determinants of changes in contribu-
tion: High contributors
OLS RE
β0 Constant -0.272 -0.272
(0.354) (0.391)
β1 Points received in period t 0.266** 0.266**
(0.110) -0.110)




R Squared 0.178 0.194
Observations 151 151
Notes: the individual effect in the Random Effect model is
player i. *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *
10% significance level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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5.6 Conclusion
This study examines cooperation and sanction behavior through a four-person linear
public good game in which agents are asymmetric in productivity. The data analysis
reveals the following conclusions. Without a sanction mechanism, the mean con-
tribution level of a group with heterogeneous productivity is lower than that of a
homogeneous group with the same average MPCR. This is caused by severe free rid-
ing among low productivity subjects together with insufficient contribution in high
productivity subjects. The imposition of sanction significantly enhances cooperation,
but because of the cost of enforcing this system, the earnings under three treatments
are similar. In groups which cooperation is successfully achieved, high productivity
subjects punish low productivity subjects actively. Conditional on individual contri-
bution levels however, high MPCR types receive more punishment, and behave more
responsively by raising higher contributions in the next period.
When the productivity level of every participant is made public, the presumption
that high-productivity subjects should carry more responsibility regarding fostering
cooperation seems to become common knowledge, or a social norm, in this game.15As
explained in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a), this social norm stems from the fact that
the behavior of productive agents generates greater side effects than does the behav-
ior of their less productive counterparts. The results mirror the reality in which elites
in a society are under higher pressure, since their choices deeply impact a society.
The efficiency and robustness of this social norm needs to be further investigated,
however, since punishment neither increases welfare nor guarantees a successful co-
operation in this asymmetric game. Further research may give agents the power to
vote for institutions, in order to investigate whether the “participation constraint” of
the sanction mechanism is satisfied, and who would prefer to live in a society with
this norm, given the choice. If a public choice process of a social institution is driven
by evolutionary forces, this will eventually drive out institution with costly sanctions.
15This can be supported from the result that the behavior of high-MPCR subjects influences the co-
operation outcome to a large extent. Under sanction institution, it will be those who suffered higher
punishment given the same amount of contribution; in successful groups, it will be those who impose
severe punishment to defectors; whereas in failed groups, it will be those who do not use sanction sys-
tem.
148 PUNISHMENT IN A HETEROGENOUS PUBLIC GOODS GAME
5.A Appendix
Experiment Instructions
Presented below are the instructions for the Treatment 3. The instructions for the
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are identical except for the following differences.
Differences in Treatment 1 instructions and Treatment 3 appearing in this appendix:
1. The whole fourth paragraph of the general instruction (starting with “Before the
experiment starts. . . ”) is omitted.
2. In the fifth paragraph of the general instruction. The sentence “Note that each
group consists of . . . ”) is omitted.
3. The whole first paragraph in the Detailed Instructions (starting with “Each round
consists of. . . ”) is omitted.
4. In the income calculation formula under the Subsection of The First Stage, the
income from the project is changed into “60 percent of the total number of to-
kens all 4 group members put into the project”.
5. The two examples interpreting the income formula are changed according to
the income formula of a homogeneous group with MPCR equals to 0.6.
6. The whole subsection of The Second Stage is omitted.
7. In Screen 1 to Screen 3, all the information about “type” is omitted.
8. Screen 4 and Screen 5 are omitted.
9. In question 1 of the Quiz section, the first questions a) and b) about “types” are
omitted.
10. In question 2 to 4 of the Quiz section, the first sentence “ You are assigned
with. . . ” are omitted.
11. In question 3, the sentence after “You put in 10 tokens to the project” is changed
into “All other group members put in 10 tokens to the project”, and b) is changed
into “The income of the other group members for the period”.
12. In question 4, the sentence after “Suppose each group member has an endow-
ment of 10 tokens” is changed into “The other three group members put in a
total of 10 tokens to the project”.
13. Questions 5 - 8 in the Quiz section are omitted.
Changes in Treatment 2 instructions:
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1. The whole first paragraph in the Detailed Instructions (starting with “Each round
consists of. . . ) is omitted.
2. The whole subsection of The Second Stage is omitted.
3. Screen 4 and Screen 5 are omitted.
4. Questions 5 - 8 in the Quiz section are omitted.
Treatment 3 Instruction
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following instruc-
tions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of others, earn
a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these
instructions with care.
The instructions we have distributed to you are solely for your private information.
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment.
If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from
all payments. Should you have any questions please ask one of us.
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in TOKENS. At the
end of the experiment the total amount of tokens you have earned will be converted
to euros at the following rate: 25 TOKENS= 1 euro
Before the experiment starts the computer will assign you with a type. This type
can be either “A” or “B”. The meaning of type A and type B will be explained in
the “Detailed Instructions” below. Your type remains unchanged during the entire
experiment.
The experiment is divided into rounds. In each round the participants are divided
into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. Note
that each group consists of 2 participants with type “A” and 2 participants with type “B”. You
will stay in the same group for 15 rounds, but each participant will receive a different
identity name, ID 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the group. For example, a participant with ID 1 in this
round may not be the same as the participant with ID 1 in another round.
Detailed Instructions:
Each round consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how many
tokens you would like to put into to a project. In the second stage you are informed
on the inputs of the three other group members to the project. You can decide whether
or not to register disapproval of each group member’s decision by sending points to
them. The following sections describe the activity in detail.
The first stage
At the beginning of each round each participant receives 10 tokens. In the following
we call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment.
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You have to decide how many of the 10 tokens you want to put into a project and how
many of them to keep for yourself. Your choice must be an integer, i.e. numbers like
0, 1, 2, . . . and 10.
Your income consists of two parts:
1) The tokens that you have kept for yourself;
2) The income from the project. This equals 90 percent of the total input of group
members with type “A” to the project plus 30 percent of the total input of group
members with type “B” to the project (including your own input).
Your income in tokens, in first stage is therefore:
(10-your input to the project)+
0.9 × (total input to the project of members with type “A”)
+
0.3 × (total input to the project of members with type “B”)
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.
For example, suppose the total of the sum of all group members put into the project
is 30 tokens. Among these 30 tokens, 18 tokens are put by participants with type “A”;
and 12 tokens are put by participants with type “B”. In this case each member of
the group receives an income from the project of 0.9 × 18 + 0.3 × 12 = 19.8 tokens.
If the total sum put into the project is 9 tokens, among which 3 tokens are put by
participants with type “A”; and 6 tokens are put by participants with type “B”, then
each member of the group receives an income of 0.9 × 3 + 0. 3 × 6 = 4.5 tokens from
the project.
For each token that you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 token. For
every token you put into the project, the total input rises by one token. If you are type
“A”, your income from the project would rise by 0.9 × 1 = 0.9 token. However the
income of the other group members would also raise by 0.9 token each, so that the
total income of the group from the project would rise by 3.6 tokens. If you are type
“B”, your income from the project would rise by 0.3 × 1 = 0.3 token. However the
income of the other group members would also raise by 0.3 token each, so that the
total income of the group from the project would rise by 1.2 tokens. Your input to
the project therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On the other
hand you earn an income for each token put by the other members to the project. For
each token put in by a participant with type “A” you earn 0.9× 1 = 0.9 token; for each
token put in by a participant with type “B” you earn 0.3 × 1 = 0.3 token.
The second stage
At the beginning of the second stage, a screen will show you how much each of your
group members put into the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to register
your disapproval of each other group member’s decision by assigning points to the
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other three participants in your group.
You must decide how many points to send to each of the other three group mem-
bers. If you do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you
must enter 0. Every point you send will reduce your earnings by 1 token AND reduce
the earnings of the participant receiving it by 2 tokens.
Whether and by how much a person’s the income from the first stage is reduced
depends on the total of the points he/ she received from all of the other members of
his/her group. If somebody received a total of 3 points (from all other group members
in this period) his or her income would be reduced by 6 tokens. If somebody received
a total of 4 points his or her income would be reduced by 8 tokens. The other group
members can also assign points to you if they wish to.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
This is the screen that shows your type and your
ID for this round. Your type will be either “A” or
“B”. The ID will range from 1 to 4. After checking
your type and ID, click on OK to proceed.
SCREEN 2
Here you decide on how many tokens you will use
for the joint project in this round. Use the keyboard
to type in one of the numbers 0,1 . . . 10 and confirm
your choice by pressing OK.
Warning: Before pressing OK, make sure your
choice is correct. You cannot change your decision
after you have pressed OK.
After having pressed OK, you will be asked to
wait until all experiment participants have done
the same. The experiment continues only after all
experiment participants pressed OK. We therefore
kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much. After pressing OK, a waiting
screen will appear. After all experiment participants have pressed OK, Screen 3 will
appear.
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SCREEN 3
In the upper part of your screen you find a ta-
ble with information on your type and your ID,
the number of tokens chosen by all participants in
your group, the income you earned and its calcula-
tion. In the lower part, you find a table with infor-
mation on tokens put into the project and earnings
for all group subjects. Click on OK if you are done
with checking the information.
SCREEN 4
In the upper part of this screen you find a table with information on the type of each
participant, the number of tokens chosen for the project by each subject in stage 1 of
this round and the number of tokens earned in Stage 1.
In the lower part of this screen, you are asked to
make a decision on how many points you would
like to assign to reduce earnings of each of the three
other participants. Your choice must be integer,
i.e. numbers like 0,1,2. . . 10. The sum of points
you send to each individual must not exceed your
earning in stage 1 this round. Select OK, when you
are ready to continue. A waiting screen will ap-
pear. The experiment continues only after all par-
ticipants have pressed OK, and therefore we kindly
ask you not to delay your decision too much.
SCREEN 5 In this screen you will be provided with
information about this round. You will be shown
the tokens you and all participants put into the
project, the total number of points you received
and assigned to others, the income of this round
and its calculation.
Click on OK if you are done with checking the
information.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions
at this moment.
The experiment now starts with a quiz to make
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sure that everybody understands how you earn your points. After finishing the quiz,
please raise your hand for answer checking. After all participants answered all the
questions correctly, the experiment will begin.
Quiz To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following
questions:
1. About the experiment setting (Yes/ No):
(a) If you are assigned with type “A”, does your type change in different
rounds? Yes/No
(b) Are there 2 participants with type “A” and 2 participants with type “B” in
a group? Yes/No
(c) Are you in the same group in different rounds? Yes/No
(d) Is the person with ID1 in Round 2 the same with the person with ID1 in
Round 3? Yes/No
2. You are assigned with type “A”. Suppose each group member has an endow-
ment of 10 tokens. Nobody (including yourself) put in any token to the project.
How high is:
(a) Your income for the period?
(b) The income of the other group members for the period?
3. You are assigned with type “B”. Suppose each group member has an endow-
ment of 10 tokens. You put in 10 tokens to the project. Besides you, a partic-
ipant with type “A” puts in 3 tokens into the project; another participant with
type “A” puts in 6 tokens into the project; and the third participant with type
“B” puts in 2 tokens into the project. What is:
(a) Your income for the period?
(b) The income of the group member that is type A and put 3 tokens into the
project for the period?
4. You are assigned with type “A”. Suppose each group member has an endow-
ment of 10 tokens. Besides you, a participant with type “A” puts in 4 tokens into
the project; another participant with type “B” puts in 5 tokens into the project;
and the third participant with type “B” puts in 3 tokens into the project.
(a) What is your income if you put in 0 token to the project?
(b) What is your income if you put in 5 tokens to the project?
5. Suppose in the second stage of a period, you distribute the following amounts
of monetary points to the other three group members: 9, 5, and 0. What is the
total cost of the tokens you distribute?
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6. What are your costs if you send a total of 0 token?
7. By how many tokens will your income from the first stage be reduced, when
you receive a total of 0 monetary points from the other group members?
8. By how many tokens will your income from the first stage be reduced, when
you receive a total of 4 tokens from the other group members?
CHAPTER 6
VOTING ON PUNISHMENT SYSTEMS WITHIN A HETEROGENEOUS
GROUP 1 2
This chapter (joint work with Charles Noussair) is published in Journal of Public Eco-
nomic Theory (2011) 13(5): 661-693.
6.1 Introduction
When a group or a society faces a social dilemma, a potential role for an institution to
promote or enforce a cooperative norm arises. If such an institutional structure is not
imposed exogenously, it must arise endogenously from a social choice process involv-
ing the affected individuals. In a situation in which individuals are symmetric and
their incentives to cooperate are perfectly aligned, one might argue that agreeing on
a mechanism to enforce collective action might be relatively simple. The mechanism
can require the individuals concerned to sacrifice an equal amount, all individuals can
be punished similarly when deviating from appropriate behavior, and all individuals
behaving appropriately can benefit equally.
On the other hand, suppose that players are heterogeneous. Then it is possible
that the task of endogenously choosing an appropriate system to promote coopera-
tion may be more difficult, and suboptimal institutions might emerge from the pro-
1This chapter is based on Noussair and Tan (2011).
2We thank Luc Bissonnette for technical support and CentER at Tilburg University for financial sup-
port. We also thank participants at Jinan University, the PET workshop on public economics, the 2008
ESA European meeting, the 2008 NAKE research day, the CESifo Venice Summer Institute Workshop on
Behavioral Public Economics, the GSS interdisciplinary workshop at CentER, as well as Wieland Müller,
Nikos Nikiforakis, Owen Powell, Louis Putterman, Arno Riedl, Sigrid Suetens, Eric van Damme, Eline
van der Heijden, Marie-Claire Villeval, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments.
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cess. In this paper, we consider the effect that one particular type of heterogeneity
among agents has on the institutions that emerge from a voting process. We em-
ploy an experimental approach. Our research strategy is the following. We take a
setting, in which it is known from previous experimental results that effective insti-
tutions emerge from a simple voting process when individuals are symmetric. We
then construct an experimental environment that is identical, except for the fact that
there are two types of individual that differ only in the externality generated from
their contributions, and introduce an analogous voting process. We find that in the
heterogeneous environment, poor institutions often emerge.
The environment that we consider is a version of a popular experimental paradigm
to investigate social dilemmas, the voluntary contributions mechanism for public
good provision. This is a game, in which players simultaneously choose a fraction
of their endowments to contribute toward the provision of a public good. The level
of contribution can be readily interpreted as a measure of cooperation. While total
group payoff is increasing in the sum of members’ contributions, and the social op-
timum is reached only when all individuals contribute all of their endowments, the
dominant strategy for each player is to contribute zero. One focus of research to date
has been on the role of decentralized sanctions, the ability of individuals to punish
others based on their level of cooperation (e.g. Yamagishi (1986); Ostrom et al. (1992);
Fehr and Gächter (2000); Fehr and Gächter (2002); Masclet et al. (2003); Sefton et al.
(2007)). Such sanctions have been shown to be effective in increasing cooperation3,
but to have mixed effects on efficiency (Bochet et al. (2006); Cinyabuguma et al. (2006);
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008); Tan (2008)), although efficiency increases if the hori-
zon is sufficiently long (Gächter et al. (2008)).
In the studies listed above, the experimenter imposed the sanctioning institution
exogenously. There has been recent interest in endogenous punishment institutions
that the affected individuals select themselves. Guererk et al. (2005), Guererk et al.
(2006) permit individual players to choose, at the beginning of each period, between
membership in a group with, and one without, sanctioning opportunities. They find
that, while the majority of players opt for the sanction-free institution in the initial
periods, the entire population eventually migrates to the group in which sanctioning
is permitted. Botelho et al. (2005) construct a 21-period game in which players can
vote, by majority rule, whether to allow for punishment in the last period after expe-
riencing both systems with and without sanctioning possibilities for ten periods each.
They find a tendency for groups to vote for the system that yielded them a higher
3Some limitations apply to this result. If counterpunishment is allowed, much of the beneficial effect
is negated (Denant-Boemont et al. (2007); Nikiforakis (2008)). Punishment is also ineffective when the
cost of punishment is too high (Nikiforakis and Normann (2008)). There is also some tendency to punish
cooperative players. This tendency has been termed anti-social or perverse punishment (Cinyabuguma
et al. (2006)), and the incidence of this behavior varies greatly depending on the population studied
(Herrmann et al. (2008)).
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payoff previously. In their study, this was typically an institution that allowed no
punishment. Sutter et al. (2010) let players decide whether to impose a punishment
or reward regime at the beginning of a session, by unanimity, and find that individu-
als prefer rewards, even though payoffs are higher under punishment. Decker et al.
(2003) allow individuals to vote for enforcement of the maximum, median, or mini-
mum punishment assigned to an individual, and also report a tendency to vote for
the particular institution that yielded the highest payoff previously. They find that
the maximum rule is the most effective in generating high contributions. A number
of studies find that contribution rates under mechanisms enacted endogenously by
group members are higher than when the same institutions are imposed exogenously
(Tyran and Feld (2006); Kosfeld et al. (2009); Dal Bo et al. (2010)).4
Ertan et al. (2009) is the study most closely related to ours. They study a setting,
in which players vote at regular intervals, by majority, on whether to allow punish-
ment of group members who have made contributions that are (a) below-average, (b)
above-average, and (c) exactly equal to the average for the group. If a punishment
rule is passed, any group member may assign punishment to any individual meet-
ing the criterion of the rule. The rules are not mutually exclusive: any, none, or all
of punishment options (a) – (c) could be approved. They observe that most groups,
while initially choosing not to allow any punishment at all, eventually vote to allow
punishment of below-average contributors exclusively. A minority of groups ban any
form of punishment throughout their interaction, and no groups ever vote to allow
punishment of above-average contributors. Since both contributions and earnings are
highest when individuals can be punished if and only if they contribute less than the
group average, the authors conclude that groups successfully converge to the most ef-
ficient institutional structure. The focus of our study here is to consider whether this
ability of a voting process to converge to the optimal institutional structure is robust
to a particular change in the environment. This change is the existence of heterogene-
ity in the value to the group of individuals’ contributions.
In all of the studies mentioned above, agents were homogenous in terms of the
value that their contribution generated for the group, so that the tradeoff between
the social benefit of cooperation and the private benefit of free riding was identical
for each member of the group. In many situations, however, heterogeneity among
group members may exist, due to differing productivity of their contributions. Con-
sider, for example, a group of individuals that must complete a project for which all
group members will receive equal credit. However, the effort of some group mem-
4Two recent studies have the feature that the punishment institution voted into place only governs
players who vote in favor of it. In Kroll et al. (2007), agents first play a voluntary contributions game for
ten periods, and make and vote on non-binding proposals of minimum total contributions. They report
that voting is an empty commitment unless punishment is used to enforce the outcome. Kosfeld et al.
(2009) obtain a similar finding, that as long as there is no binding commitment, cooperation is difficult
to attain.
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bers, because of higher productivity in the required task, yields greater benefits for
all than the same effort from other members. For example, one hour of work on the
part of one individual may yield the same output as three hours of another individ-
ual’s work. Because all group members, including the contributor, reap the benefits
of an individual’s effort, this heterogeneity in productivity is equivalent to a hetero-
geneous cost of effort among individuals, with those with higher productivity also
having lower unit opportunity cost of contribution.5 Thus, the gains and costs of a
contribution depend on who made the contribution. The basic incentive structure of
this situation can be captured within the experimental paradigm described above if
the marginal per-capita return of a contribution (MPCR) differs depending on who is
making the contribution. 6
Margreiter et al. (2005) is the only study of which we are aware, in which a voting
process has been studied in an environment with a type of heterogeneity, similar to
that we have studied here. They considered the effect of voting on extraction policies
in the context of a common pool resource game, where players are heterogeneous in
terms of contribution costs. At the end of every period, players are asked to vote on
proposals about the proportion of endowment each group member is to contribute. If
a certain proposal is selected by majority vote, it is automatically implemented in the
5Heterogeneity in MPCR has been implemented in at least three different ways. One is for every
group member to benefit equally from a contribution, but to have the benefit depend on who made the
contribution (see for example Tan (2008)). This can be thought of as a situation in which the contributions
of some individuals yield a higher return than others, and is the way we implement heterogeneity here.
Another way is to have different individuals reap different returns from the same contribution (see for
example Reuben and Riedl (2009), Reuben and Riedl (2010)). Yet another is to have the return from the
portion of endowment kept and not contributed differ among agents (see Fisher et al. (1995)).
6There are a few prior experiments in which MPCR differs among group members. Fisher et al. (1995)
conduct a voluntary contributions game in which they assign half of the group members an MPCR of
0.75 and the other half an MPCR of 0.3. By comparing the average group contributions with those of
homogenous groups featuring MPCR of 0.75 and 0.3, they find that players with a similar MPCR behave
similarly in terms of contributions, regardless of the MPCR of the players with whom they are grouped.
Thus, the heterogeneity of MPCR, in itself, does not affect contributions.
Reuben and Riedl (2009) study a privileged group, a setting in which one player has an MPCR of
1.5, and thus a dominant strategy to contribute, and the other players have an MPCR of 0.5. They allow
individuals to punish others after observing the contribution profile. They find that punishment is not
as effective as in a control group where everyone is endowed with the same MPCR of 0.5. Fewer strong
free-riders are punished, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished.
Reuben and Riedl (2010) consider a version of the voluntary contributions game, in which play-
ers’ initial endowment of income, maximum permissible contribution, and benefit from provision of
the public good (the return a player receives from any individual’s contribution) differ, depending on
the treatment. They include treatments with and without punishment. As in previous studies, they
find that punishment increases contributions in all of their treatments. They argue that the norm that
is established differs depending on the treatment. In treatments with unequal contribution ceilings, the
norm that is enforced is to contribute in proportion to one’s maximum possible contribution. In treat-
ments with unequal marginal benefits from public good provision, the norm that seems to be generally
enforced is a “proportionality norm”, to contribute proportionally to the ratio of the marginal benefits.
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next period. The authors find that, compared to homogeneous groups, the number of
distinct proposals is markedly larger in heterogeneous groups, but fewer agreements
are reached by majority voting. When a proposal is enacted, however, they find that
it is generally an efficient one, regardless of whether individuals are homogeneous or
heterogeneous.
In this paper, we consider whether two key results of Ertan et al. (2009) apply
to a setting in which heterogeneity of group members’ productivity, as expressed in
the marginal-per-capita return of their contributions, exists. The two results are that
(1) permitting punishment but restricting who can receive it to below-average con-
tributors yields the highest payoff among punishment institutions that condition on
deviations from average contribution level, and (2) when engaged in repeated op-
portunities to vote, groups converge to this punishment institution over time. In our
experiment, as in Ertan et al., individuals vote at regular intervals on whether players
meeting certain criteria are permitted have punishment directed toward them. After
a punishment regime is selected, based on majority vote, it is in effect for that group
for a fixed and known number of periods. As in the Ertan et al. study, we vary, as a
treatment variable, the number of periods that the results of one vote are in effect.
Studying different voting terms is a potentially important aspect of institutional
design, and the effect of a punishment system could well depend on the length of
time a system is locked in and not subject to change. It is known that the effectiveness
of a punishment system may depend on the length of time it is in effect (e.g. Gächter
et al. (2008)). A longer horizon means that the stakes for each vote are greater. A
longer duration for an inefficient institution might lead to a larger detrimental effect
on cooperation, and a good institution can bring greater benefits if it is in effect for
a longer period of time. On the other hand, it is possible that more frequent voting
can allow a group to experiment more with alternative punishment rules and thereby
facilitate convergence to a good institution.
The basic parametric structure of our experimental environment follows Tan (2008).
She studies a four-person voluntary contributions game with two types of agent. Two
players have an MPCR of 0.9, so that each token they contribute yields 0.9 tokens to
all group members, and the other two players have an MPCR of 0.3. All agents are
permitted to punish any other agent in any period. Tan finds that punishment is not
very effective in increasing contributions among heterogeneous agents. In groups
that achieve cooperation, high MPCR players punish low MPCR players frequently
if they free ride. However, when controlling for the contribution level of the recipient
of punishment, high MPCR players receive more punishment than those with low
MPCR.
There is reason to believe that heterogeneity of MPCR may make a difference in
which institutions emerge from the voting process. If an institution is enacted to
facilitate the enforcement of a norm, the heterogeneous structure of our environment
may lead to conflict in the voting process and thus to inefficient outcomes. This may
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be because there are several plausible norms, specifying differing appropriate levels
of contribution for each type of agent (see Reuben and Riedl (2010) for a discussion).
This may make it more difficult to achieve consensus on which punishment system to
implement and may lead to a conflict between different types of agent. Such conflicts
may prove sustained and durable, with adverse long-term effects on contributions
and efficiency.
As described in section 6.4, the principal results we obtain are the following. We
find that, consistent with Ertan et al. (2009), the most effective institution, in terms of
contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of below-average contrib-
utors only, regardless of productivity type. However, unlike in the Ertan et al. envi-
ronment, groups often fail to enact this institution, especially when the votes are held
relatively frequently. Under these conditions, groups typically establish inefficient
regimes, and particularly common is a system in which no punishment is permitted.
No group ever votes to enable punishment of all individuals, regardless of their type
or contribution level. Players are more likely to vote to allow punishment of below-
average contributors and the type other than their own, and they attempt to escape
from future penalty exposure by disallowing punishment rules targeting their own
type. For many groups, this behavior appears to create an insurmountable roadblock
to the establishment of the appropriate institution.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we describe
the experiment and in Section 6.3, we advance several hypotheses about the perfor-
mance of different punishment regimes. In Section 6.4, we present an analysis of the
data. Finally, in Section 6.5, we make some concluding remarks.
6.2 The experiment
6.2.1 General setting
The experiment consisted of six sessions that were conducted at CentER Lab, at Tilburg
University in the Netherlands. There were two treatments, the Short-Term and the
Long-Term treatments. Each treatment was in effect in three of the sessions. Forty-
eight subjects, of whom 42% were females, and all of whom were students at Tilburg
University, participated in the study. Some of the subjects had previously participated
in economic experiments, but all were inexperienced with the voluntary contributions
mechanism. Each subject took part in only one session of the study. On average, a
session lasted about 80 minutes (including initial instruction and payment of the sub-
jects), and a subject earned an average of 454 tokens (approximately 18.16 euros). The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher
(2007)).
Each session included eight participants that were separated into two groups of
four. All individuals remained in the same group for their entire 30-period exper-
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imental session, with initial group assignments made randomly. All 30 periods of
play counted toward final earnings, and there were no practice periods at the begin-
ning of the sessions. At the beginning of each period, every player was randomly
given an identification number from 1 to 4 to distinguish her actions from those of the
others during that period. The level of anonymity is thus greater vis-á-vis players of
the opposite type. The other player of the same type can identify a player and track
his actions over the course of a session. However, players of the other type cannot
associate a player with her actions.
Productivity heterogeneity was generated by randomly assigning half of the group
members a high MPCR of 0.9 (players of this type will be referred to as type A players)
and the other half a low MPCR of 0.3 (type B players). Participants were informed
of their type at the beginning of the session, and their types remained fixed for the
duration of the session.7 The instructions used in the experiment were modified on
the basis of those used in Ertan et al. (2009) and Tan (2008).
6.2.2 Timing
The 30 periods that made up each session were divided into three segments, as illus-
trated in Figure 6.1. In the first segment, comprising periods 1 - 3, subjects played the
voluntary contributions game without the possibility of punishment. In the second
segment, consisting of periods 4 - 6, a second stage was added to the game in which
any player could punish any other player, after observing all players’ contributions.
In the third segment, which made up the remainder of the session (periods 7 -30), the
punishment system in place depended on the outcome of a voting process. Voting
took place every two periods in the Short-Term treatment, and every eight periods in
the Long-Term treatment. The subjects were not informed about the existence of the
next segment of the experiment until the after the previous segment had ended.
In each period of the first segment, the following occurred. Each subject was en-
dowed with ten tokens, with a conversion rate of 25 tokens = 1 Euro. Subjects simul-
taneously and independently divided their endowment between a private account
and a group account. The income of an individual equaled the number of tokens she
put in her private account, plus .9 times the total contributions of type A players in
her group, plus .3 times the total contribution of type B players in her group. That is,
a player’s income in each period equaled
Iij = 10− Cij + 0.9× ∑
j=A
CA + 0.3× ∑
j=B
CB (6.1)
7Neutral language was used in the experiment. Players with MPCR of 0.9 were referred to as “type
A” and players with MPCR of 0.3 were “type B”. Moreover, potentially biased terms such as “contri-
bution” and “punishment” were avoided. For example, punishment was termed as “points that reduce
another player’s income”.
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where Cij is the contribution of the ith player of type j. This calculation was dis-
played on subject i’s computer screen together with the contributions and earnings of
all group members at the end of each period.
In periods 4 - 6, each period was made up of two stages. There was a second, pun-
ishment, stage subsequent to the contribution stage described above. In the second
stage, subjects were given the opportunity to send a number of points, ranging from 0
to 10, to any other group member. Every point that a particular subject sent to another
reduced the sender’s earnings by one token and reduced the earnings of the recipient
by two tokens. Thus, subject i’s income in each period equaled:
Iij = 10− Cij + 0.9× ∑
j=A







where ∑k 6=i Pik was the sum of points subject i sent to all group members, and
∑k 6=i Pki was the sum of points she received from all others. At the end of each period,
the computer displayed the subject’s own type, the tokens she and all other group
members contributed, the total number of points she received and assigned to oth-
ers, her income for the current period, and how it was calculated. Subjects were not
informed about how much punishment other individuals sent or received.
In the third segment of each session, periods 7 - 30, the following took place. Ev-
ery two periods in the Short-Term treatment, as well as every eight periods in the
Long-Term treatment, a voting stage occurred at the beginning of a period. During the
voting stage, every subject was required to answer each of the following four ques-
tions by clicking a box that corresponded to either (a) yes, (b) no, or (c) no preference.8
The four questions were the following:
I vote to allow a person’s earnings to be reduced if the person is a:
1. Type A player assigning less than the average amount to group account.9
2. Type A player assigning more than the average amount to group account.
3. Type B player assigning less than the average amount to group account.
4. Type B player assigning more than the average amount to group account.
After all subjects gave their answers, the computer tabulated the votes. If the num-
ber of “Yes” votes on one of the questions exceeded the number of “No” votes, the
8Ertan et al. (2009) also included an option to vote to allow punishment of those players whose
contributions were exactly equal to the average. This option is not included in this experiment, however,
because if two more questions concerning average contributors of each type are included, the potential
number of punishment systems would increase to 64.
9In many studies of punishment behavior in the Voluntary Contributions Game, punishment is pre-
dominantly directed at those who contribute less than the average (e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000); Masclet
et al. (2003); Denant-Boemont et al. (2007), Tan (2008)) and it is the punishment of low contributors that
seems to promote contribution (Ertan et al. (2009)).
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reduction specified in the question was allowed; otherwise it was not. A “No pref-
erence” vote did not count towards the voting outcome. Since there were four ques-
tions, the number of possible outcomes, or punishment institutions, was 24 = 16.
Subjects were informed of the punishment system instituted, and the number of pe-
riods this institution would be in effect. In the Long-Term treatment, a vote occurred
every eight periods, and the same institution remained in effect for the eight-period
interval following the vote. In the Short-Term treatment, a vote took place every two
periods, and the resulting system was in effect for the two periods.
Figure 6.1: Timing of activity in each treatment
Long-Term Treatment:
4 7 15 23 30
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In every period, regardless of whether a vote occurred in the current period, the
contribution and punishment stages occurred in a similar manner as in the second
segment. During the punishment stage, subjects decided how many points to send to
members meeting the punishment requirement, but were required by the computer
program to abide by the restrictions resulting from the last vote, whether it occurred
in the current or in a prior period. The feedback presented to subjects at the end of a
period in the third segment was the same as in the second segment.
6.2.3 The experiment of Tan (2008)
Tan (2008), in a related study, examines the effect of an exogenously imposed punish-
ment institution on players with heterogeneous productivity. A number of features of
that study are similar to the one reported here. The parametric structure of the game
is the same in the two studies. Players played the voluntary contributions game un-
der a fixed matching protocol, with two high productivity players with an MPCR of
0.9, and two low productivity players with an MPCR of 0.3. In one treatment, no
punishment was possible, as in periods 1 - 3 in the study reported here. In another
treatment punishment of any other player was permitted, as in periods 4 - 6 here.
However, there are important differences between the two studies. In the Tan
(2008) study, the punishment system is imposed exogenously rather than enacted
endogenously by participants themselves. Furthermore, in the Tan experiment, the
length of a session is 15 periods, and the same punishment condition remained in ef-
fect for the entire session. While it is not the principal purpose of the study reported
here, the similar parametric structure between our experiment and Tan (2008) allows
us to make rough comparisons between the two studies, and we do so with regard to
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aspects of individual behavior in section 6.4.
6.3 Hypotheses
Our analysis is organized as a test of several hypotheses. The first two concern
whether particular results obtained in Ertan et al. (2009) generalize to our environ-
ment. The first hypothesis is that the most effective system for promoting high effi-
ciency is to permit punishment of only below-average contributors, regardless of their
productivity, a system we refer to hereafter as Pun-Low. The rationale for the hypoth-
esis is that such a system enables the group to punish low contributors to influence
their behavior, and prohibits punishment of high contributors in order to encourage
them to continue their behavior. Pun-low was the most effective of all of the available
systems in Ertan et al.’s (2009) environment.
Hypothesis 6.1 (Efficient Punishment Regime Hypothesis): The punishment regime that
yields the greatest efficiency is to allow punishment of below-average contributors only, re-
gardless of productivity (Pun-Low).
Ertan et al. observed that Pun-Low was reached consistently after several iterations
of the voting process. We consider whether this finding carries over to our setting
with heterogeneous agents. While there is a powerful collective incentive to converge
to the most efficient arrangement, there is also reason to believe that it may not do so
in an environment with heterogeneous agents. The work of Margreiter et al. (2005) in-
dicates that voting does not guarantee that an institution with high contributions and
efficiency emerges when contribution costs vary among group members. Nonethe-
less, as a null hypothesis we propose that the voting process will behave effectively
in discovering the most efficient arrangement.
Hypothesis 6.2 (Punishment Regime Convergence Hypothesis): Convergence to the most
efficient rule occurs over the course of the voting process.
Note that either Hypotheses 6.1 or 6.2 may be supported while the other one is
not supported. Pun-Low may lead to the greatest level of efficiency as in Ertan et al.
(2009), but may not be attained with the voting process. An institution other than
Pun-Low may generate the highest efficiency and also be the outcome of the voting
process.
The next hypothesis concerns the difference between treatments. A priori, the ef-
fect of lengthening the time that an institution is in effect on per-period efficiency is
ambiguous, and reflects a tradeoff between the stakes from each vote and experience
with the voting process and its results. On one hand, longer governance duration im-
plies that each vote counts more, and these larger stakes may create greater incentives
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to form more effective institutions. On the other hand, the shorter governance dura-
tion in the Short-Term treatment offers groups more opportunities to sample and to
learn which institutions are relatively effective from experience. Groups also acquire
more experience with the voting process itself in the Short-Term treatment. Since there
are two effects, stakes and experience, operating in opposite directions, we hypothe-
size that the contributions made and the efficiency attained are not different between
the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments.
Hypothesis 6.3 (Governance Duration Hypothesis): Contributions and efficiency are not
significantly different between the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments.
6.4 Results
The first hypothesis concerns the relative performance of different institutional struc-
tures in terms of contributions and efficiency. Table 6.1 displays the average group
contributions and earnings under each institution across treatments. The table shows
how many times each punishment system was enacted, for how many periods it was
in effect, the average contribution and efficiency level (measured as subject earnings)
it generated, and its rank among the systems in terms of contribution and efficiency
levels. Nine out of 16 possible combinations of punishment rules are enacted at least
once in our dataset. The four most common combinations are: (1) to disallow pun-
ishment of any agent (which we will refer to as No-Pun), (2) to allow punishment of
below-average contributors regardless of productivity (Pun-Low), (3) to allow pun-
ishment of Type B players making below-average contributions (Pun-B-Low) and (4)
to allow punishment of Type A players making below-average contributions (Pun-
A-Low). These four structures account for almost 90% of the total voting outcomes.
No group ever votes to permit punishment of all agents. Result 6.1 summarizes the
main findings concerning the relative performance of the institutions with regard to
contributions and efficiency.
Result 6.1 The efficient punishment regime hypothesis (Hypothesis 6.1) is supported. For the
pooled data from both treatments, the most effective regime, in terms of both contributions and
earnings, is Pun-Low, which allows punishment of players with below-average contributions
only, regardless of productivity type.
SUPPORT: According to Table 6.1, the four most successful institutions all allow
punishment of at least some below-average contributors. Pun-Low is the most effec-
tive institution in terms of contributions in both treatments, and in terms of efficiency
in the Short-Term treatment. In the Long-term treatment, Pun-Low is the second-ranked
system of efficiency after Pun-A-Low. Overall, in Pun-Low, the mean contribution level
is almost three quarters of the total endowment, which is 73% more than the next best
system, Pun-A-Low. A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, using average contributions in
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each group for the periods that the system is in effect as the unit of observation, in-
dicates that contributions in Pun-Low are significantly greater than in Pun-A-Low (z
= 2.364, p < 0.05) and than in Pun-B-Low (z = 2.030, p < 0.05) for the pooled data
from both treatments. A similar result holds for efficiency. Although efficiency is not
significantly greater in Pun-Low compared to Pun-A-Low (z = 0.447), it is significantly
greater than under Pun-B-Low (z = 2.030, p < 0.05).
If the data from the Short-Term treatment is considered separately, contributions
in Pun-Low are significantly greater than in Pun-A-Low at the 10% level (z = 1.641)
though not greater than under Pun-B-Low (z = 0.479). Pun-Low generates earnings
significantly greater than Pun-A-Low (z = 2.236, p = 0.036), as well as borderline
significantly greater than Pun-B-Low(z = 2.121, p = 0.057). If the data from the Long-
Term treatment are analyzed separately, pair-wise tests reveal no significant difference
between Pun-Low, Pun-A-Low and Pun-B-Low in terms of contributions or group earn-
ings. Contributions in Pun-Low are not different from Pun-A-Low (z = 1.389) or from
Pun-B-Low(z = 1.414). Pun-Low generates earnings that are not different from Pun-A-
Low (z = .463) or from Pun-B-Low (z = 1.414).
There are a number of other interesting patterns evident in the table. No-Pun is
considerably less effective in generating contributions and earnings than the systems
that allow punishment of below-average contributors. There are also some differences
in the incidence and relative performance of the institutions between treatments. In-
stitutions permitting punishment of only above-average, but not below-average, con-
tributors appear only in the Short-Term treatment. The inefficient No-Pun institution
is in effect in more than twice as many periods in the Short-Term treatment than in
the Long-Term treatment. The Pun-A-Low institution is more effective in the Long-Term
treatment than in the Short-Term treatment both in terms of contribution and earnings,
while the opposite holds for Pun-B-Low.
Table 6.2 reports the results of a regression estimating the effect of the different
institutions on contribution and efficiency levels. The data in the first three periods
of the sessions, in which no punishment regime is in effect, are the baseline of the
regressions. Unrestricted punishment, in effect in periods 4 - 6 of each session, and
in which players can reduce the earnings of any other player, does not lead to higher
contribution levels, but does lower earnings, in both treatments. This is indicated by
the estimates for β1.10 The significantly positive β2 across all equations confirms the
robust effect of allowing for punishment of below-average contributors: this increases
group average contribution levels and earnings relative to the baseline. The signifi-
cantly negative coefficient β5 in indicates that if players vote out to disallow any form
of punishment during the voting stage, group average contributions and earnings
10The reason that β1 is not significant may be the small number of periods during which unrestricted
punishment is in effect.
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Pun-Low 8 64 1 6.94 2 18.15
Pun-A-Low 4 32 2 4.13 1 20.22
Pun-B-Low 1 8 4 0.91 5 10.43
No-Pun 3 24 5 0.22 4 10.29
PunAL&PunBH 1 8 3 2.34 3 12.98
PunAH&PunBL 1 8 6 0.28 6 9.66
Pun-B-High – – – – – –
Pun-A-High – – – – – –


















Pun-Low 12 24 1 8.20 1 20.67
Pun-A-Low 9 18 3 3.97 4 13.27
Pun-B-Low 18 36 2 4.57 2 15.21
No-Pun 25 50 7 0.41 7 10.50
PunAL&PunBH 2 4 5 2.88 3 14.40
PunAH&PunBL 1 2 4 3.63 6 11.03
Pun-B-High 1 2 9 0.00 9 10.0
Pun-A-High 3 6 6 2.00 5 12.3


















Pun-Low 20 88 1 7.28 1 18.84
Pun-A-Low 13 50 2 4.07 2 17.72
Pun-B-Low 19 44 3 3.90 3 14.34
No-Pun 28 74 7 0.35 6 10.43
PunAL&PunBH 3 12 4 2.52 4 13.45
PunAH&PunBL 2 10 6 0.95 9 9.93
Pun-B-High 1 2 9 0.00 8 10.0
Pun-A-High 3 6 5 2.00 5 12.3
Pun-B 1 2 8 0.13 7 10.03
Total 90 288
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Table 6.2: Average group contributions and earnings as a function of pun-
ishment system in effect.
Average Contributions Average Earnings
Long-Term Short-Term Long-Term Short-Term
Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment
β1 Unrestricted Punishment -0.306 0.657 -4.979*** -9.434***
(0.578) (0.492) (1.127) (2.486)
β2 Pun-Low 2.733*** 2.989*** 1.978** 5.351**
(0.497) (0.502) (0.969) (2.317)
β3 Pun-A-Low -1.780*** -0.535 -1.669 -1.448
(0.626) (0.507) (1.220) (2.486)
β4 Pun-B-Low -0.875 1.030** -2.295 0.496
(0.826) (0.451) (1.615) (2.134)
β5 No Pun -1.934** -1.971*** -2.921* -4.217**
(0.843) (0.417) (1.642) (2.025)
β0 Constant 4.062*** 3.459*** 16.704*** 14.718***
(0.411) (0.339) (0.801) (1.171)
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.399 0.273 0.459
Observations 164 166 164 166
Notes: Dependent variable: Group average contributions, Ci and group average earnings,
Ii in period t. *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Contribution data
corresponding to infrequently enacted institutions such as PunAL&PunBH, PunAH&PunBL,
PunAH, PunBH and PunB are excluded because of an insufficient number of observations.
The model specification is a fixed effect model with the variable “group” as the individual
effect. A Chow test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients in the Long-Term and Short-Term
treatments are equal for both contributions and earnings. Therefore, we conduct a separate
estimation for each treatment.
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decrease relative to a situation in which the same system is imposed exogenously.11
The second hypothesis concerned whether the most effective institutional struc-
ture emerges from the voting process. Our findings are summarized in Result 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Incidence of Pun-Low, Pun-B-Low, Pun-A-Low and No-Pun in both
treatments
Result 6.2 The Punishment Regime Convergence Hypothesis (Hypothesis 6.2) is not sup-
ported. Institutional rules fail to converge to the efficient Pun-Low system in either treat-
ment.
SUPPORT: Figure 6.2 shows the incidence of each institution in each of the se-
quence of votes in the two treatments. The horizontal axis of the figures represents
the timing of the vote, with voting time “1” indicating the first vote in a session, which
occurs at the beginning of period 7. The second vote occurs in period 9 in the Short-
Term and in period 15 in the Long-Term treatment. The vertical axis represents the
number of groups, out of a total of six groups, that choose each system. None of the
six groups votes for Pun-Low during its last vote in the Short-Term treatment, while
only three of the six groups do so in the Long-Term treatment.
As we can see from the data in the figures, the relatively efficient Pun-Low insti-
tution is chosen with greater frequency in the Long-Term treatment. Efficiency refers
11If a time trend is added to all of the regressions in Table 6.2, the results remain substantially the same.
In the Long-Term treatment, the effect of time on contributions is positive and significant, indicating an
upward trend in contributions. In the Long-Term treatment, the variables that were previously significant
at at least p < .05 remain so. The effect of Pun-B-Low becomes negatively significant. In the Short-Term
treatment, the time trend is negative and significant, and the inferences on all other variables remain the
same. The effect of time on earnings is positively significant in the Long-term treatment. The coefficient
of Pun-Low, while remaining positive, is no longer significant, when time is included as an independent
variable. The coefficients for all of the other treatments become significantly negative. In the Short-Term
treatment, the effect of time is insignificant and the inclusion of the time trend makes the coefficient on
No Punishment insignificant at p = .05.
170 VOTING ON PUNISHMENT SYSTEMS WITHIN A HETEROGENEOUS GROUP
to the level of group earnings the institution generates. However, the positive effect
on efficiency of the relatively frequent choice of Pun-Low in the Long-Term treatment
is not sufficient to offset the even greater increase in contributions and efficiency that
occurs in those instances when subjects in the Short-Term treatment select Pun-Low.
Result 3 summarizes our findings.
Result 6.3 The Governance Duration Hypothesis (Hypothesis 6.3) cannot be rejected. That
is, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments
generate equal contributions and equal efficiency.
SUPPORT: Mann-Whitney rank sum tests of differences in contributions and effi-
ciency between the Short-Term and Long-Term treatment in periods 7 to 30, taking each
group’s activity over those 24 periods as a unit of observation, suggest that neither
distributional difference is significant between the two treatments (p = .749 for con-
tribution, and p = .423 for earnings).
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Figure 6.3: Earnings and punishment levels in the Long-Term treatment












































































Notes to Figures 6.3-6.6: Each panel corresponds to one group in the treatment. The horizontal axis des-
ignates the number of periods, with the segments indicating the periods in which a specific institution
is in effect. The names of the institutions voted into effect are noted in the upper part of each segment.
The lines with crosses represent the group average earnings, and the lines with dots represent average
number of punishment points.PL signifies “allowing punishment of players with below average con-
tributions”. PAL denotes “allowing punishment of type A players with below average contributions”.
PBL indicates “allowing punishment of type B players with below average contributions”. NP means
“not allowing any form of punishment”. PB is “allowing punishment of type B players. PunAHBL is
“allowing punishment of type A with above average contributions or type B players with below average
contributions”. PAH is “allowing punishment of type A players with above average contributions. The
sign ‘..’ represents a situation in which the same institution is in effect after the latest vote as after the
immediately preceding vote.
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Figure 6.4: Earnings and punishment levels in the Short-Term treatment
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Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the time series of earnings and punishment points as-
signed for each group, in the Long-Term and Short-Term treatments, respectively. The
vertical axis indicates the per-capita earnings in tokens (the maximum possible is 24,
and the level corresponding to zero contribution and zero punishment is 10), and the
number of punishment points allocated per capita. The horizontal axis is the period
number. The figures show considerable consistency and thus little variation over time
within a group (which complicates statistical inference). When the same institution is
in existence, there are also some clear consistencies across groups. 12
12It is reasonable to conjecture that in the experiment, players might prohibit punishment, in order to
save time and end the session more quickly. In the experiment, each group could continue at its own
pace. However, subjects were aware that they could not receive their payment and leave the laboratory
until all players have finished the 30-period session. Therefore, there was little point of hurrying up to
finish the experiment early. In the Short-term treatment, each voting round took on average between 9
seconds for the quickest group and 14 for the slowest. The quickest group mainly voted for Pun-Low
and Pun-A-Low. The slowest two groups voted primarily for No-Pun and tended to enact relatively
uncommon punishment rules such as punAL&punBH. The length of a round of contribution averaged
between 3 to 5 seconds for each of the six groups. In groups who vote for punishment, it took an
average of about 6 extra seconds for the punishment stage (the reason for such short punishment time
is that towards the end of the game, when players tend to make high and similar contributions, little
punishment occurs). Thus, over a session, a group that prohibited punishment every round would only
save 3 minutes (24 periods times 6 seconds for the extra punishment stage) compared to a group that
allowed punishment every round. This seems a fairly negligible amount of time saved, which would
not affect the play of the game.The differences in overall length between the Long-Term and Short-term
treatments are very small. The average length of play, after the instructions have been read, is 40 minutes
in the Short-Term compared to 42 minutes in the Long-Term treatment. Play in the Short-Term treatment
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Both figures show that, while Pun-Low performs better than the other systems on
average in terms of earnings, it only reaches efficiency levels close to the potential
maximum in some instances. It is also clear that punishment is effective in raising
contributions, at least in the short run; in almost every period after which any pun-
ishment points are assigned, there is an increase in group earnings. The No-Pun in-
stitution consistently leads to zero or near-zero contributions, as reflected in average
earnings near ten tokens. In the Long-Term treatment, three groups achieve close to
the maximum possible level of earnings, and they do so by enacting Pun-Low or Pun-
A-Low. In the Short-Term treatment, institutional changes are quite frequent with at
least four changes, between one vote and the next, occurring in each group. Only two
groups achieve close to maximal earnings by the end of their session. One does so by
enacting Pun-Low, and the other with Pun-B-Low. The figures all show that there is
considerable stability within groups, so that most variation is between group rather
than within group.
Figure 6.5: Contributions and punishment levels in the Long-Term treatment


















































































ranged from 32 to 47 minutes, and play in the Long Term treatment varied from 36 to 45 minutes.
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Figure 6.6: Contributions and punishment levels in the Short-Term treatment
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Figures 6.5 and 6.6 are similar to 6.3 and 6.4, except that they display the patterns
and relationships between contributions and punishment. Clear patterns are in ev-
idence. In the Long-Term treatment, when Pun-Low is in effect, punishment occurs
when average contributions are relatively low, and result in an increase in contribu-
tions, often to the maximum possible level. When Pun-A-Low and Pun-B-Low are in
force, little punishment is applied and contributions tend to be low relative to under
Pun-Low. In the Short-Term treatment, the connection between punishment and con-
tribution is less evident than in the Long-Term treatment, even under Pun-Low. The
quantity of punishment applied decreases over the first ten periods or so of the ses-
sions, and remains low thereafter, even if contributions remain low.
We now turn our focus to how individuals vote, punish, and respond to pun-
ishment in our study. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the voting behavior of individuals
based on their type and contribution level in the period immediately preceding the
vote. Each panel in the figures corresponds to the voting behavior of one of the four
types/contribution profiles in one of the treatments. Each bar indicates the percent-
age voting in favor, voting against, and abstaining from each of the four punishment
rules. The figures are constructed by classifying each player into one of the four cate-
gories: type A below-average contributor (abbreviated to AL), type A above-average
contributor (AH), type B below-average contributor (BL) and type B above-average
contributor (BH) based on her actual contribution one period before the voting stage.
Then the number of “yes”, “no” and “no preference” votes are summed.
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Figure 6.7: Voting patterns in the Long-Term treatment, percentage of players
voting to punish each type and contribution level
Notes to Figures 6.7 and 6.8: “AL player” denotes a Type A player who contributes below the group
average, “AH player” is a Type A player who contributes above the average, “BL player” is a Type B
player who contributes below the average, and“BH player” is a Type B player who contributes above
the average. “VoteAL” means voting in favor of punishing Type A players who contribute less than the
average. “VoteAH”, “VoteBL”, and “VoteBH” are defined analogously.
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Figure 6.8: Voting patterns in the Short-Term treatment, percentage of players
voting to punish each type and contribution level
The figures illustrate the sharp conflicts between above-and below-average con-
tributors, as well as between type A and type B players. When above-average con-
tributors vote in favor of punishment of below-average contributors, they are much
more likely to vote in favor of punishment of the other type. Likewise, when they vote
against allowing punishment of above-average contributors, they are more likely to
vote in favor of banning this punishment for their own type. Below-(above-) average
contributors are more willing to vote to allow punishment of above-(below-) average
contributors than of players who contribute similarly to themselves.13These patterns
suggest that players try to shut down punishment channels that may point to them
in the future.
Consider the regression reported in Table 6.3. The dependent variable equals 1 if
subject i votes to permit a specific punishment rule k in period t, and 0 otherwise.14
The first six independent variables are dummy variables that equal 1 if the voter or
13There is one exception. In the Long-Term treatment, AH players, rather than AL players, are more
willing to allow for punishment of BH players: 43.5% of AH players vote to allow for punishment of BH
players while only 30.8% of AL players vote to allow for punishment of BH players.
14There were 20 total abstentions out of 288 submitted votes in the Long-Term treatment, and 53
abstentions out of 1152 submitted votes in the Short-Term treatment. Since these consist of less than 10%
CHAPTER 6 177
Table 6.3: Voting patterns
Long-Term Short-Term
Treatment Treatment
β1 Rule targets voter herself -0.552* 0.148
(0.327) (0.096)
β2 Rule targets opposite type 0.734*** 1.148***
(0.216) (0.106)
β3 Rule targets below average contributors 1.171*** 0.923***
(0.253) (0.294)
β4 Player i is high MPCR type 0.802*** 0.607**
(0.302) (0.289)
β5 Rule targets high MPCR type players 0.198** -0.119
(0.097) (0.103)
β6 Rule targets opposite contribution behavior 0.170 0.509**
(0.145) (0.234)
β7 Amount of punishment voter received in period t-1 -0.014 -0.054**
(0.053) (0.024)
β8 Amount of punishment voter assigned to others in period t-1 0.048 0.025***
(0.044) (0.005)
β9 Voting round 0.091 0.004
(0.107) (0.005)




Notes: Dependent variable: Voting by player i in favor of permitting the punishment of player k, V̄ki .
*10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Only “yes” votes and “no” votes arte included
in the estimation; abstentions are excluded. A probit model with observations clustered within group
correlation is reported. The results of a logit model are highly similar.
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rule satisfies the relevant condition. The seventh and eighth variables are continuous
variables representing the total number of punishment points received from other
players and sent to other players, respectively, in the period immediately preceding
each vote. The variable “Voting round” takes the value 1, 2, or 3 in the Long-Term
treatment, and 1 to 12 in the Short-Term treatment. This variable captures whether a
player is less likely to vote to allow punishment as the experiment progresses. Result
4 summarizes the findings.
Result 6.4 (Voting Behavior) In both treatments, the willingness of players to vote on pun-
ishment of a certain player profile is greater (i) if the punishment rule targets the opposite
MPCR type, (ii) if the rule targets below-average contributors, and (iii) if the voter has a high
MPCR. There is no systematic effect of time on voting behavior. In the Short-Term treatment,
voting behavior responds to the punishment that the voter assigned and received just prior to
the vote.
SUPPORT: The estimates in Table 6.3 show highly significant positive coefficients
of β2, β3 and β4. This indicates that players are more willing to vote in favor of a
punishment rule if it targets the opposite productivity type (β2), below-average con-
tributors (β3), and if the player voting has a high productivity level (β4). The variable
representing “voting rounds” (β9) is not significant. In the Short-Term treatment, indi-
viduals are more likely to vote to punish others, the more punishment they assigned,
and the less they received, in the preceding period.
Previous research indicates that the number of punishment points one individual
assigns to another is influenced by the difference in contribution between the punish-
ing and the punished agent, as well as the difference between the negative deviations
of the recipient’s contribution from the group average level (Fehr and Gächter (2000);
Masclet et al. (2003); and Falk et al. (2005)). Consider the following regression equa-
tion, whose estimates are given in Table 6.4.
Ptik = β0 + β1(max{0, Cti − Ctk}) + β2(max{0, Ctk − Cti})
+β3 max{0, C̄t − Ctk}+ β4(max{0, Ctk − C̄t})
+β5typei + β6typek + ε
t
ik (6.3)
where typei if the punisher i has an MPCR of 0.9; typek if the punished player k has
an MPCR of 0.9, and C̄t is the average contribution within the group in period t. Be-
cause of the large number of zero values for the dependent variable, we estimate this
of the total data, we do not include them in our main analysis. Nevertheless, we run Probit regressions
with the dependent variable that equals 1 if a subject chooses to abstain and 0 otherwise. All of the
independent variables are exactly the same as in Table 3. In the Long-Term treatment, individuals are
significantly more likely to abstain if the proposal affects players with the opposite MPCR. In the Short-
Term treatment, abstentions are also significantly more likely for a rule targeting type A players.
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specification with a Tobit model. The standard errors take within-group correlation
into account.
Evidence from prior experimental studies also shows that low contributors on av-
erage respond to punishment by raising their contributions in the subsequent period
(Fehr and Gächter (2000); Masclet et al. (2003)). The change in the contribution of
player i between period t and t+1 can be modeled as:
Ct+1i − C
t
i = β0 + β1(∑
k
Pki) + β2(C̄t − Cti )
+β3typei + β4(typei ×∑
k
Pki) + εti (6.4)
where typei = 1 if player i is a type A player. β1 measures the effect of the total
number of points subject i receives on her change in contribution from one period to
the next if she is of type B, and β2 is the effect of the difference between individual
i’s contribution and her group’s average contribution level in period t. β2 would
capture a reversion to the mean contribution level, and a change in contribution not
due to being punished, such as a fear of subsequent punishment, or an attempt to
influence the subsequent institutional choice. β3 measures any difference in overall
contribution change between the two types, and β4 registers a differential response
to punishment on the part of type A or type B players. The estimates of (6.4) for the
Pun-Low system are given in Table 6.4. The estimates of models (6.3) and (6.4), for the
data from the exogenously-imposed unrestricted punishment system studied in Tan
(2008), are also included in tables 6.4 and 6.5 under the column labeled Unrestricted
Punishment. 15 Result 6.5 summarizes the main findings from the estimation of (6.3)
and (6.4).
15Of course, the coefficients from Tan (2008) have different interpretations, due to the constraints on
the punishment that can be applied, the absence of the voting process, and the different histories of
contributions and punishment. Apart from an overall reversion to the mean that typically appears in
social dilemmas, and a fear of subsequent punishment, agents in the current study may change their
contribution level to influence the subsequent institutional choice.
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Table 6.4: Determinants of sanctioning behavior under Pun-Low
Pun-Low
Unrestricted punishment Equal contribution norm Proportional norm
(source Tan(2008)) Long-Term Short-Term Long-Term Short-Term
-5.326*** 3.226*** 2.968*** -3.696*** -3.742**
β0 Constant
(1.975) (0.630) (0.803) (0.625) (1.486)
β1 Recipient k’s Negative 0.546** 0.752*** 1.769*** 0.563*** 0.717***
Deviation from i’s Contribution
(max{0, ci − ck}) (0.259) (0.130) (0.671) (0.121) (0.151)
β2 Recipient k’s Positive 0.078 1.144*** – 1.253*** –
Deviation from i’s Contribution
(max{0, ck − ci}) (0.223) (0.423) – (0.435) –
β3 Recipient k’s Negative 0.799** -0.201 -1.346 -0.176 -0.224
Deviation from Average
(max{0, c̄− ck}) (0.352) (0.199) (0.862) (0.125) (0.274)
β4 Recipient k’s Positive -0.162 – – – –
Deviation from Average
(max{0, ck − c̄}) (0.242) – – – –
β5typei -0.497 -0.325 0.431 0.627 2.105
(= 1 if i is Type A) (1.096) (0.529) (0.673) (0.768) (2.352)
β6typek 0.787* -0.268 0.084 -0.304 0.115
(= 1 if k is Type A) (0.475) (0.533) (0.669) (0.532) (0.657)
Log-Likelihood -744.01 -277.957 -75.205 -277.479 -76.232
Observation 1080 278 99 278 99
Notes: Dependent Variable: Punishment points player i sends to player k at time t: Ptik. *10% significance; **5% significance,
***1% significance. A Tobit model is used with standard errors robust to within group correlation. Since the earnings of
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Result 6.5 (Punishment Behavior and Responses) Under Pun-Low the severity of punish-
ment is increasing in the negative difference between the contributions of the recipient and the
punisher. Type B players increase their contributions more in the subsequent period, the far-
ther their contribution is below the group average. Type A players increase their contributions
in response to punishment.
SUPPORT: The estimates in Table 6.4 show that in both Pun-Low and under the
unrestricted punishment regime, there is a positive relation between the punishment
points player i sends to player k and the extent to which player k’s contribution was
below that of player i’s. Unlike under unrestricted punishment, there is no relation-
ship between the type of the sanctioned party, and punishment behavior. Table 6.5
indicates that in the Pun-Low regime, the contribution level increases significantly, the
more a player’s contribution is below group average (β2).The insignificance of the β1
coefficient suggests that it is not the actual sanction, but rather the possibility of pun-
ishment, which triggers increases in contribution for type B players when punishment
of below-average contributors in enabled. The significant β4 coefficient in the Unre-
stricted Punishment data indicates that type A players are more likely to increase their
contribution in response to punishment than type B players. Under Pun-Low, type A
players respond to punishment by increasing their contribution while type B players
do not. On the other hand, Type Bs tend to increase their contribution in the direction
of the average when not punished, while the type As do not exhibit this tendency.16
Reuben and Riedl (2010) document the enforcement of a norm that prescribes con-
tributions that are proportional to the ratio of private marginal benefits, which is plau-
sible in our setting. Self-serving biases or strategic motives can lead individuals to
punish those who deviate from norms that favor the sanctioner, more than those who
deviate from other potential norms. The lack of consensus about a norm translates
into conflict about which punishment institution to vote for. We rerun regression (6.3)
and (6.4) by replacing group average contributions with contributions proportional
to the MPCR types of the players.17 More specifically, we assume a norm that high
MPCR players contribute three times as much as the low MPCR players. The regres-
sion results in the last two columns of Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 indicate that the findings
presented in Result 6.5 remain robust. Moreover, the proportional norm is not nec-
essary a better specification than the equal contribution norm, as the fitness of the
models do not increase significantly.
16Inclusion of a time trend in the regressions reported in Table 6.4 yields a significantly negative effect
of time. However, the significance of other variables remains exactly the same. For Table 6.5, when a
time trend is included, the regression results remain the same and the coefficient of the time variable is
not significant.
17There are other reasonable norms, such as every player setting contribution levels to attempt to
equalize earnings. However, replacing contributions with earnings field the exact same result in this
setting. As every player benefits exactly the same from the public goods, any differences in earnings
between two players boil down to differences in their contributions.
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6.5 Discussion and conclusion
We have studied the voting behavior of groups that face a social dilemma. At regular
intervals, the groups vote to select a punishment institution, a set of conditions under
which individuals may punish others. The game we study is one in which interacting
agents make voting, contribution and punishment decisions over a series of periods.
The voting decision, when combined with the votes of others, can influence subse-
quent contribution decisions and constrain punishments. In turn, the prior history
of group play, as well as beliefs about future play, can influence contribution, pun-
ishment, and voting decisions. The issue we investigate is whether the most efficient
institution, in terms of yielding maximal gains to the group, emerges from the voting
process. We pose this question for an environment, in which players are heteroge-
neous in terms of the benefit that their contributions yield to the group.
It is clear which institutions promote high levels of contributions and efficiency.
These are institutions that allow punishment of low contributors only. In particular,
we observe that Pun-Low, which allows punishment of low contributors regardless
of how much surplus their contribution would have created, while immunizing high
contributors, performs well in generating high average contributions and efficiency
levels. Pun-Low exploits the willingness of individuals to punish low contributors,
and the tendency for the punished low contributors to cooperate more in response. It
does so while eliminating the adverse consequences of the punishment of high con-
tributors, which are a reduced level of cooperation on the part of punished individu-
als, and a resulting decrease in earnings. We thus extend a previous result obtained
by Ertan et al. (2009) in a similar setting with symmetric players, to an environment
with asymmetric players. When the Pun-Low system is in place, little punishment
is actually applied. The threat of punishment is typically sufficient to generate high
levels of cooperation at a low cost of enforcement.
However, we find that groups often fail to adopt this institution even after having
repeated opportunities to vote for its enactment. The heterogeneity of players, and
the ability to vote to selectively punish individuals by type as well as by behavior,
appears to lead to negative consequences. There are several possible explanations
for the difference in the effectiveness of the voting process between our setting, and
one in which players are symmetric. The explanations are not mutually exclusive.
One possibility is that the purpose of punishment becomes ambiguous because the
motivation to free-ride becomes opaque. Fuster and Meier (2010) document such
an effect in another setting. They find that in a treatment where there are private
incentives to contribute, free riders are punished less harshly, and hence cooperation
is not as common as in a treatment without such incentives. A possible explanation
is that the private reward received by high contributors reduces their anger at free-
riders, and thus reduces their tendency to punish them. Here, the voting outcome
might be interpreted as granting license to individuals to free-ride or an obligation to
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cooperate. Moreover, free riding might be viewed as reciprocation for others’ voting
behavior.
Another plausible explanation for the poor choice of institution is that the designa-
tion of two different player types creates a common identity, which leads to solidarity
between players of the same type. Unfortunately, our design cannot offer us direct ev-
idence for or against this common identity argument. In order to identify and isolate
a possible identity effect of this nature, one could include another treatment in which
the MPCRs are the same for all group members, but some individuals are designated
as “Type A”, and others as “Type B” players.
However, we believe that the feature that generates the difference in outcomes be-
tween our setting and the homogeneous one is the pervasiveness of defensive voting.
Conflicts are generated as players attempt to prevent punishment that can be directed
at themselves, while also seeking to enable punishment of players who differ in both
contribution behavior and productivity type. The result is that, because majority sup-
port is required to enact a punishment rule, groups often find themselves with no
ability to punish some or all free riders, and thus without a mechanism for enforcing
high contributions. Prohibiting punishment of one type seems to be often interpreted
by that type as a license to free ride. 18
There are obvious limitations to our study. Within our design, it is not possible to
evaluate how effective a punishment regime is in a heterogeneous group compared
with a homogeneous group. This is because our design does not include a baseline
where players are homogeneous. We can only rely on a comparison between the qual-
itative patterns we have observed and those of Ertan et al. (2009). We thus must oper-
ate under the auxiliary hypothesis that any differences between our and their subjects
and procedures do not overwhelm or interact with differences in the environment in
such a way as to negate the main conclusions. Moreover, we have only allowed a
limited selection of the possible punishment rules. In particular, the rules that we
have considered treat both types in the same manner. It is plausible that a rule that
allows the punishment of those who contribute below the average of their respective
type would be better received by all group members and would allow heterogeneous
groups to function as well as homogenous groups. Another open question is whether
homogeneous groups would still converge to efficient outcomes if people could vote
to allow the punishment of all low contributors excluding themselves. This would
allow us to directly address the question of whether it is really player asymmetry that
drives the inability to enact efficient institutions or rather, whether it is the specific
menu of policies that we have studied.
18For instance, when Pun-A-Low is in effect in the Long-Term treatment, both type B players in a group
contribute less than the group average in 90.63% of periods, and one of the two type B players con-
tributes less than the average in all of the remaining periods. In contrast, under Pun-B-Low, both type B




Presented below are the instructions for the 3-Vote Treatment. The instruction for the 12-Vote
Treatment is identical except only one sentence in Part III. In the sentence “After the voting,
the decision is in effect for eight rounds. Then you will be asked to vote again for every eight
roundsé”Ÿï¿ 12 the number of rounds is changed from an “eight” to a “two”.
The Long-Term treatment instruction
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (PART I)
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following instruc-
tions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of others, earn
a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these
instructions with care.
The instructions we have distributed to you are solely for your private information.
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment.
Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have
to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. During the experiment
your entire earnings will be calculated in TOKENS. At the end of the experiment the
total number of tokens you have earned will be converted to euros at the following
rate: 25 TOKENS= 1 euro.
Before the experiment starts the computer will assign you with a type. This type
can be either “A” or “B”. The meaning of type A and type B will be explained in
the “etailed Instructions” below. Your type remains unchanged during the entire ex-
periment. The experiment is divided into rounds. In each round the participants are
divided into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants.
Note that each group consists of 2 participants with type “A” and 2 participants with
type “B”. You will stay in the same group for 30 rounds, but each participant will
receive a different identity name, ID 1, 2, 3 or 4 within the group in each round. For
example, a participant with ID 1 in this round may not be the same as a participant
with ID 1 in another round.
Detailed Instructions:
At the beginning of each round each participant receives 10 tokens. In the following
we call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment.
You have to decide how many of the 10 tokens you want to put into a project and how
many of them to keep for yourself. Your choice should be an integer, i.e.numbers such
as 0, 1, 2,. . . ,10.
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Your income consists of two parts: 1) the tokens which you have kept for yourself;
2) the income from the project. This equals 90 percent of the total input of group
members with type “A” to the project plus 30 percent of the total input of group
members with type “B” to the project (including your own input).
Your income in tokens in each round is therefore:
(10-your input to the project)
+ 0.9× (total input to the project of members with type “A”)
+ 0.3× (total input to the project of members with type “B”)
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.
For example, suppose the total sum of all group members put into the project is 30
tokens. Among these 30 tokens, 18 tokens are put by participants with type “A”; and
12 tokens are put by participants with type “B”. In this case each member of the group
receives an income from the project of 0.9× 18 + 0.3× 12 = 19.8 tokens. If the total
sum put into the project is 9 tokens, among which 3 tokens are put by participants
with type “A”; and 6 tokens are put by participants with type “B”, then each member
of the group receives an income of 0.9× 3 + 0.3× 6 = 4.5 tokens from the project.
For each token that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 token. For every
token you put into the project instead, the total input rises by one token. If you are
type “A”, your income from the project would rise by 0.9× 1 = 0.9 tokens. However
the income of the other group members would also increase by 0.9 tokens each, so
that the total income of the group from the project would rise by 3.6 tokens. If you are
type “B”, your income from the project would rise by 0.3× 1 = 0.3 tokens. However
the income of the other group members would also increase by 0.3 tokens each, so
that the total income of the group from the project would rise by 1.2 tokens. Your
input to the project therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On
the other hand you earn an income for each token put by the other members to the
project. For each token put in by a participant with type “A” you earn 0.9× 1 = 0.9
tokens; for each token put in by a participant with “B” type you earn 0.3× 1 = 0.3
tokens.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
This is the screen which shows your type
and your ID for this round. The ID will
range from 1 to 4. After checking this
information, click on OK to proceed.
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SCREEN 2
Here you decide on how many tokens you will use for the project in this round. Use
the keyboard to type in one of the numbers 0,1,. . . ,10 and confirm your choice by
pressing OK.
Warning: Before pressing OK, make
sure your choice is correct. You can-
not change your decision after you have
pressed OK. After having pressed OK,
you will be asked to wait until all exper-
iment participants have done the same.
The experiment continues only after all
experiment participants have pressed
OK. We therefore kindly ask you not to
delay your decision too much. After
pressing OK, a waiting screen will ap-
pear. After all experiment participants have pressed OK, Screen 3 will appear.
SCREEN 3
In the upper part of your screen you
find a table with information on your
type and your ID, the number of tokens
chosen by all participants in your group,
the income you earned and its calcula-
tion. In the lower part, you find a table
with information on tokens put into the
project and earnings for all group sub-
jects.
Click on OK if you are done with
checking the information.
The experiment will begin with three rounds of play. Each round you begin with
a new 10 tokens to allocate, and each round’s earnings are independent of the others.
After these three rounds, there will be further instructions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment.
The experiment now starts with a quiz to make sure that everybody understands
how you earn your points. After finishing the quiz, please raise your hand for answer
checking. After all participants answered all the questions correctly, the experiment
will begin.
Quiz
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following ques-
tions:
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About the experiment setting (Yes/ No):
1. If you are assigned with type “A”, does your type change in different rounds?
Yes/No
2. Are there 2 participants with type “A” and 2 participants with type “B” in a
group? Yes/No
3. Are you in the same group in different rounds? Yes/No
4. Is a person with ID1 in Round 2 definitely the same with a person with ID1 in
Round 3? Yes/No
2. You are assigned with type “A”. Suppose each group member has an endowment
of 10 tokens. Nobody (including yourself) put in any tokens to the project. How high
is:
1. Your income for the period?
2. The income of the other group members for the period?
3. You are assigned with type “B”. Suppose each group member has an endowment
of 10 tokens. You put in 10 tokens to the project. Besides you, a participant with
type “A” puts in 3 tokens into the project; another participant with type “A” puts in
6 tokens into the project; and the third participant with type “B” puts in 2 tokens into
the project . What is:
1. Your income for the period?
2. The income of the group member which is type A and put 3 tokens into the
project for the period?
4. You are assigned with type “A”. Suppose each group member has an endowment of
10 tokens. Besides you, a participant with type “A” puts in 4 tokens into the project;
another participant with type “B” puts in 5 tokens into the project; and the third
participant with type “B” puts in 3 tokens into the project .
1. What is your income if you put in 0 tokens to the project?
2. What is your income if you put in 5 tokens to the project?
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (PART II)
After this break for instructions, you and the same three members of your group will
be interacting for another three rounds. As with the three rounds just completed, each
of these rounds begins with a decision on assigning ten tokens to a group account or
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to a personal account. This time, however, each round also includes a second stage of
decision-making.
At the beginning of the second stage, a screen will show you how much each of
your group members puts into the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to
register your disapproval of each other group member’s decision by assigning points
to the other three participants in your group. You must decide how many points to
send to each of the other three group members. If you do not wish to change the
income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. Every point you send will
reduce your earnings by 1 token AND reduce the earnings of the participant receiving
it by 2 tokens.
Whether and by how much a person’s income from the first stage is reduced de-
pends on the total of the points he/ she received from all of the other members of
his/her group. If somebody received a total of 3 points (from all other group mem-
bers in this round), his or her income would be reduced by 6 tokens. If somebody
received a total of 4 points, his or her income would be reduced by 8 tokens. The
other group members can also assign points to you if they wish to.
Your total income from this round (two stages together) is therefore calculated as
follows:
= ( income from the 1st stage
+ points assigned to other participants)
- 2× total points received by three other participants.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like. Note that Screen 1 to Screen
3 are exactly the same as the first three rounds.
SCREEN 4
In the upper part of this screen you find
a table with information on the type of
each participant, the number of tokens
chosen for the project by each subject
in stage 1 of this round and the num-
ber of tokens earned in Stage 1. In the
lower part of this screen, you are asked
to make a decision on how many points
you would like to assign to reduce earn-
ings of each of the three other partici-
pants. Your choice must be integer, i.e. numbers like 0,1,2,. . . ,10. Select OK, when
you are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear. The experiment continues
only after all participants have pressed OK, and therefore we kindly ask you not to
delay your decision too much.
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SCREEN 5
In this screen you will be provided with
information about this round. You will
be shown the tokens you and all partici-
pants put into the project, the total num-
ber of points you received and assigned
to others, the income of this round and
its calculation. Click on OK if you are
done with checking the information.
The experiment will continue with
another three rounds of play. After these
three rounds, there will be further in-
structions.
Please raise your hand if you have any question at the moment.
The experiment now starts with a quiz to make sure that everybody understands
how you earn your points. After finishing the quiz, please raise your hand for answer
checking. After all participants answered all the questions correctly, the experiment
will continue.
1. Suppose in the second stage of a period, you distribute the following amounts
of monetary points to the other three group members: 9, 5, and 0.
(a) What is the total cost of the tokens you distribute?
(b) What are your costs if you send a total of 0 tokens?
2. By how many tokens will your income from the first stage be reduced, when
you receive a total of 0 monetary points from the other group members?
3. By how many tokens will your income from the first stage be reduced, when
you receive a total of 5 tokens from the other group members?
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (PART III)
In the remaining parts of the experiment, you will play for twelve sets of two rounds
each in the same group of four subjects. Before this part begins, each group will de-
cide, by voting, whether to permit subjects to reduce one another’s earnings after
learning of their assignments to the group account. It will be possible to allow reduc-
tions of a type A or type B subject who assigns more than the average to the group
account, and/or of type A or type B subjects who assigns less than the average to the
group account. Once the decision has been made by your group, it will be in force for
the next two rounds of the experiment.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
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SCREEN 6
In this screen you are asked to answer
“Yes”, “No”, or “No preference” to four
questions by clicking the box to the right
of each of the three choices. For each
question, if the number of “Yes” vote in
your group exceeds the number of “No”
vote, the reductions in question will be
allowed; otherwise they will not. A “No
preference” vote does not count towards
the voting outcome. Click on OK if you are done with answering the questions.
Warning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change
your decision after you have pressed OK. After having pressed OK, you will be asked
to wait until all experiment participants have done the same. The experiment contin-
ues only after all experiment participants pressed OK. We therefore kindly ask you
not to delay your decision too much. After pressing OK, a waiting screen will appear.
After all experiment participants have pressed OK, Screen 7 will appear.
SCREEN 7
In this screen you will be informed of
the outcome under which your group
will operate for the next two rounds.
The possible messages are listed in the
appendix below. Note that only one
of these messages will show up on the
screen.
Click on OK if you are done with
checking the information.
After the voting, the decision is in ef-
fect for eight rounds. Then you will be asked to vote again for every eight rounds.
During the reduction stage of each round, if the earnings of certain group members
are voted “allow to be reduced” because of the rules decided by your group, you
can decide whether to send points to the group members meeting the description.
On the other hand, the reduction boxes for any individuals whom your group has de-
cided cannot have their earnings reduced will automatically appear with zeros inside,
which cannot be changed.
It is important that you fully understand the voting process before we continue.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment. If not, the experi-
ment will continue.
Possible messages:
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1. Your group has voted not to allow group members to reduce one another’s earn-
ings.
2. Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of any other
group member.
3. Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type B players
assigning less than the average to the group account.
4. Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type B players
assigning more than the average to the group account.
5. Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type A play-
ers assigning less than the average to the group account.
6. Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type A play-
ers assigning more than the average to the group account.
7. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of players
assigning less than average to the group account regardless of their types.
8. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of players
assigning more than average to the group account regardless of their types.
9. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B
players.
10. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B
players assigning less than average AND Type A players assigning more than
average to the group account.
11. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B
players assigning more than average AND Type A players assigning less than
average to the group account.
12. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type
A players.
13. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B
players AND Type A players assigning less than average to the group account.
14. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B
players AND Type A players assigning more than average to the group account.
15. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type A
players AND Type B players assigning more than average to the group account.
16. Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type A
players AND Type B players assigning less than average to the group account.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates and compares several economic institutions (Chapter 2
and 3) as well as the impact of heterogeneity on institution performances (Chapter 4
and 5) and selection (Chapter 6).
A general conclusion of Chapter 2 and 3 is that institutions do shape behavior.
Institutions matter since their changes affect information states and individual incen-
tives. In Chapter 2, for instance, the data from the experiment indicate that focusing
on auditing effort (i.e. how many audits will be conducted) instead of auditing prob-
ability increases the cost-effectiveness of an auditing mechanism. The emphasis on
effort introduces strategic uncertainty which does not exist in the traditional rule. The
bounded rule associates the audit probability of a player with the actions of others.
As many subjects are strategic uncertainty averse, they shy away from this situation
since they are not sure how others are going to react. Hence, future mechanism design
can make better use of the typical patterns established in boundedly-rational human
beings to increase efficiency.
Chapter 3 implies that emotion can be a very powerful driving force for the usage
of punishment mechanisms in social dilemmas. Hence, even though a third-party
approval mechanism is useful in turning down punishment targeting cooperators, it
dampens the power of punishment towards defectors. One implication is that when
anti-social punishment is not pervasive, the intervention of a third party reduces the
effectiveness of the peer punishment mechanism in promoting cooperation. The re-
sults also shed light on the importance of designing effective punishment institutions
to enforce cooperation when the proposal rights are separated from the enforcement
right of punishment.
The second part of my dissertation shows that heterogeneity among players in-
fluences the well-established properties of economic institutions. In particular, I ex-
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amine two types of heterogeneity: making decisions alone or in a group (Chapter
4) and the cost of contributions in public goods (Chapter 5). Chapter 4 shows that
the established notion “groups are more rational and behave closer to the sub-game
perfect equilibrium” does not carry over to repeated sequential games. The reason
is that groups learn to collude more than individuals over the course of the game.
So far, most of the theory is silent on the behavioral difference between groups and
individuals, or in some cases, states explicitly that they are not supposed to make any
difference. The results of Chapter 4 call upon the need to incorporate some of these
findings into future theoretical studies.
In the public goods provision study explored in Chapter 5, asymmetric cost and
benefits from the public goods result in different cooperation incentives among play-
ers. Consequently, low-incentive players heavily free ride on the high-incentive ones.
As many people are conditional cooperators, the free-riding behavior is perceived
highly negatively, melting down cooperation toward the end of the game. The impli-
cation is that it is important to incentivize players with lower incentives to contribute,
for their free-riding decisions have a negative spill-over effect on the others. A poten-
tial mechanism to tackle this problem is to collect players’ contributions sequentially.
Considering 1) most people are conditional cooperators and 2) the marginal contribu-
tion benefit/cost varies among individuals, the contribution should be elicited firstly
from the group of individuals who have the highest benefit/lowest cost to contribute,
and then from the remaining low-incentive contributors. This solution echoes the act
of publicly announcing big donors who help to provide public facilities (e.g. schools,
theatres, or green areas in the city), or matching small donors with big donors with
seed money (see, for example, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002)).
Results from Chapter 6 show that suboptimal institutions arise when individuals
have the opportunity to endogenously select institutions to govern themselves. The
most likely reason lies in the self-serving bias among subjects. They turn down pun-
ishment channels that might target themselves in the short-run future, even though
punishing low contributors results in long-run benefits. Since many groups got stuck
in inefficient institutions, a possible solution is to let groups learn from each other. For
instance, an extra information feedback stage could be imposed before the institution
selection stage. This information can help groups learn and emulate the successful
examples (i.e. choosing institutions only targeting low contributors).
Considering homogeneity across individuals is more an exception than the norm
in a society, future research should further explore the impact of heterogeneity on the
performance and selection of economic institutions. As people differ in many aspects
(gender, ability, endowment, etc), an interesting question to explore is how these so-
cial characteristics link with each other, and whether they affect decisions in different
environments in a systematic manner. For instance, people who are more pro-social/
reciprocal might tend to be more affected by information from others’ choices in mar-
ket situations. Moreover, more research is needed to understand the behavioral norm
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across heterogeneous individuals, as lacking consensus on an appropriate behavioral
norm often leads to conflicting interests. Only based upon these findings can future
institutional designs better serve different agents and improve efficiency.
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